File photo: On March 5, 2021, the day before the opening of China's National People's Congress (NPC), police patrol Tiananmen Square with dogs on a day of heavy air pollution in Beijing. (Photo by Kevin Frayer/Getty Images.)
[People News] Previously, I analyzed how during this year’s Two Sessions, it was evident that high-ranking CCP officials were using a coordinated script to praise Xi Jinping. This suggests that some internal consensus had been reached before the meetings, with related directives issued. Given the mounting internal and external crises, it is possible that the officials’ praise for Xi’s work over the past year was actually a farewell gesture. If Xi steps down, it is likely to be in a relatively dignified manner—preserving his image is also a way to maintain the CCP’s image and, ultimately, its rule.
Recent news reports following the conclusion of the Two Sessions seem to support this analysis, as shifts in the political winds of Zhongnanhai are becoming increasingly apparent. These changes are reflected in the following key developments:
1. State and Military Media Headline the Qiushi Article on "Two Unwavering Principles," Signaling a Reversal of the Past Five Years’ Crackdown on Private Enterprises.
On March 15, both Xinhua News Agency and the People’s Liberation Army Daily (PLA Daily) featured an article from Qiushi, the CCP’s theoretical journal, titled Adhering to and Implementing the "Two Unwavering Principles". The author of the article was listed as Xi Jinping, but in reality, it was merely an excerpt from his past statements on the topic, compiled from November 2013 to February 2025.
The so-called Two Unwavering Principles were first introduced at the 16th Party Congress, during which Hu Jintao became the CCP’s top leader. They emphasize: (1) "Unwaveringly consolidating and developing the public sector of the economy" and (2) "Unwaveringly encouraging, supporting, and guiding the development of the non-public sector of the economy." During the 18th Party Congress, when Xi Jinping took over, this principle was further reinforced, stating that all types of ownership should have equal access to production factors, fair participation in market competition, and equal protection under the law.
However, after Xi consolidated power following the 19th Party Congress, despite the official retention of the Two Unwavering Principles, government actions and policies clearly signaled a suppression of private enterprises.
For instance, in January 2018, Renmin University Professor Zhou Xincheng published an article in Qiushi titled The Communist Party Can Summarize Its Theory in One Sentence: The Elimination of Private Ownership. In September of that year, Vice Minister of Human Resources and Social Security Qiu Xiaoping called for "strengthening the Party’s leadership over private enterprises and promoting democratic management." Around the same time, blogger Wu Xiaoping made waves with his claim that "the private economy has completed its historic mission and should exit the stage." The backlash was so intense that on November 1, Xi convened a special meeting, declaring that "private enterprises and entrepreneurs are one of us." However, in practice, the suppression of the private sector continued.
In a September 2020 document, the CCP explicitly emphasized strengthening ideological and political work within private enterprises and ensuring that entrepreneurs "demonstrate political clarity."
In 2019, Alibaba founder Jack Ma stepped down. In 2021, Alibaba was fined 18 billion yuan for antitrust violations. In 2023, Ant Group and its subsidiaries were fined 7.123 billion yuan.Tencent and other tech giants were hit with regulatory crackdowns. Private innovation in sectors such as education and emerging industries faced heavy restrictions. The impact of these policies, combined with the economic devastation of the three-year COVID-19 pandemic, led to the collapse of many private businesses, with an increasing number of entrepreneurs choosing to withdraw from economic activities entirely.
Although Xi has mentioned the Two Unwavering Principles in economic meetings once a year over the past five years, state media has never made it a focal point of coverage—nor has it reassured private entrepreneurs.
Now, with speculation that Xi’s grip on power is slipping, support for private enterprise has resurged. From the Third Plenum communique to Xi’s recent participation in a private entrepreneurs' meeting (which included Jack Ma, whom he had previously suppressed), and now to the prominent publication of the Qiushi article in both state and military media—this all signals a repudiation of Xi’s past crackdown on private enterprises and his leftward shift in economic policy. Crucially, this shift coincides with reports of Xi’s serious illness in July 2024. The elevation of private-sector support to such an important level suggests that Zhongnanhai is implementing crisis management strategies. But who holds the power to make such a change? It is unlikely to be Xi himself, who was the primary architect of the crackdown. Rather, the real decision-makers are likely operating under his name.
That said, today’s CCP is in a vastly different situation than during the Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao eras. Externally, it faces economic and technological decoupling from a United States that now considers it an adversary. Internally, it struggles with severe economic downturns and widespread public discontent. Even if the policy shift is real, how many private entrepreneurs still have confidence to invest and grow their businesses?
2. Li Qiang Convenes Meeting, Emphasizes "The Party Central Committee".
On March 14, Premier Li Qiang of the Communist Party of China chaired the eighth plenary meeting of the State Council, aimed at 'learning and implementing Xi Jinping's important speeches during the National Two Sessions and the spirit of the National Two Sessions, and deploying the key work of the State Council for 2025'.
Throughout the report, Li Qiang referred to 'Party Central' three times, asserting that at the start of this State Council's term, it was clearly stated that they should 'be effective executors, action-oriented, and practical workers in implementing the decisions and deployments of Party Central'; he also mentioned that 'according to the major policies set by Party Central', the 'Government Work Report' outlined specific plans for this year's economic and social development. In contrast, Xi's directives or speeches were only referenced twice.
This stands in stark contrast to a similar meeting held during the same period in 2024. In that report, Li Qiang mentioned Xi four times in his opening remarks, only referring to 'Party Central' once at the end, indicating that the 'final outcomes should align with the decision-making intentions of Party Central', among other points. It is now quite evident who the decision-maker is in Zhongnanhai; it is clearly not Xi, and Li Qiang has already pledged his loyalty to the new 'Party Central'.
This situation inevitably recalls March 7 during the Two Sessions, when Xi attended the plenary meeting of the military delegation. In the official report from that occasion, Xi did not mention 'Party Central' or 'Central Military Commission' even once, which is a stark departure from his rhetoric in similar contexts over the past seven years. The reason likely lies in the fact that the previous 'Party Central' was synonymous with 'Xi Central', while the current 'Party Central' has effectively sidelined Xi.
3. Cai Qi is Asked to Convene a Party Building Meeting, Supporting Xi and Lowering the Tone.
On March 12, the leading group for Party building work of the Communist Party of China (CPC) convened a meeting, attended by two members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, Cai Qi and Li Xi, who also serve as the head and deputy head of this group, respectively. Notably, Cai Qi and Li Xi had also participated in a similar meeting on April 3 of last year. It is quite rare to hold Party building meetings in consecutive years. (Participation: 'Cai Qi is asked to convene a Party building meeting to praise Xi's toned-down rhetoric') Furthermore, Cai Qi's praise for Xi has noticeably diminished compared to last year.
The author deduces from the differing phrases used in this year's official media's 'decision of the Party Central Committee' and last year's 'meeting approved by the Party Central Committee' that this year's Party building meeting was called at the request of Cai Qi by the 'Party Central Committee', which refers to the new 'Party Central Committee' that Li Qiang is loyal to and which Xi Jinping seems reluctant to acknowledge.
4. In Addition, A Series of Articles Released by the Xinhua News Agency of the CPC Clearly Downplays Xi.
On March 14, the Xinhua News Agency and the Military Daily launched a series of reports titled 'Civilizational Insights from China's Development Practices', reflecting on China's past developments across various sectors. The article published on the 14th was titled 'People First, the Starting Point of Chinese-style Modernization', while the article on the 15th was titled 'Green Innovation, Igniting a New Engine for World Modernization'.
Upon reading the entire series, it is evident that Xi is downplayed, with a strong emphasis on the leadership role of the CPC. In the article from the 14th, Xi is mentioned only twice: once as 'the Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core' and once in reference to his proposal of the 'new development concept'. In the article from the 15th, Xi is mentioned just once, again as 'the Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core.'
It is widely recognized that the concepts of 'people first' and 'green innovation' have been consistently emphasized by Xi Jinping in his previous speeches. However, a recent article from Xinhua News Agency fails to mention any of Xi's speech-related content. Additionally, when comparing this with similar articles from the past few years, it becomes evident that those articles frequently cited Xi's speeches to underscore his 'leading' position. What does this shift signify? Is it suggesting to the outside world that Xi's power is diminishing?
5. The Military Daily Has Once Again Published Reports That 'Distort' the Essence of Xi's Speeches.
On March 15 and 16, the Military Daily of the Chinese Communist Party released reports titled 'A certain Air Force base deeply studies and implements the spirit of the Central Military Commission's Political Work Conference' and 'The Zhejiang Provincial Armed Police Corps deeply studies and implements the spirit of the Central Military Commission's Political Work Conference.' These reports not only mentioned 'Chairman Xi' just once, but also distorted the true purpose of Xi's visit to Yan'an for the Military Commission's Political Work Conference, which was to convey that 'all levels, especially senior cadres, should lead by example.' The focus was on how leaders at all levels and agency officials should take the initiative to enhance their skills, among other things. Such reports have become quite common over the past eight months.
On June 17 of last year, Xi Jinping, along with military commission members Zhang Youxia and He Weidong, traveled to Yan'an to convene the Military Commission's Political Work Conference. Officially, this was described as 'personally decided by Xi Jinping.' In his address, Xi repeatedly stressed the importance of political building within the military, particularly emphasizing that 'senior cadres must engage personally, have the courage to set aside their pride, expose shortcomings, and adopt a deeply reflective attitude to address fundamental issues of thought, thereby promoting the political building of the military to be more profound and practical.'
Xi Jinping's speech clearly indicates that, despite being the Chairman of the Central Military Commission for over a decade, he still lacks full control over the Chinese Communist Party's military and has not secured complete loyalty. Among those showing disloyalty are several senior generals, including the commander and deputy commander of the Rocket Force who have been arrested and investigated, as well as two former defense ministers and heads of military enterprises. Xi perceives that even senior generals who have not faced arrest or investigation may not be loyal to him, which is why he has called on them to 'address the fundamental issues of thought.' The concurrent training course for the secretaries of the disciplinary committees and the directors of the supervisory commissions suggests that a new wave of military purges is imminent.
However, following last year's Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, which reported Xi's serious illness and a decline in military authority, various military branches and units failed to grasp the true purpose of Xi's political work meeting. Instead, they focused on minor details from the meeting and avoided discussing the issue of 'loyalty.' Additionally, some military branches expressed positions that starkly contrasted with their previous declarations of loyalty to Xi prior to the Third Plenary Session.
In my opinion, what does it signify when no one adheres to the words of a Chairman of the Military Commission, and even misinterprets them?
6. The Military's Silence Regarding Reports of Vice Chairman He Weidong Being Taken Away is Quite Puzzling.
On the evening of March 13, U.S. time, Zhao Lanjian, a former mainland media figure now living in the U.S., disclosed that He Weidong, a member of the 20th Central Political Bureau and Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, was taken away after the conclusion of the Two Sessions on the 11th while returning to the Bayi Building. His residences in Beijing and Shanghai were also searched. This revelation quickly garnered widespread attention both domestically and internationally, with some analysts suggesting that the likelihood of this event is quite high.
On November 27 last year, foreign media reported that Dong Jun, the Minister of National Defense of the Communist Party of China, was under investigation. The following day, Wu Qian, the spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense, dismissed these claims as 'purely fabricated.' By early December, Dong Jun reappeared in public. The Chinese military quickly responded to the 'disappearance' of the Minister of National Defense, a position significantly lower than that of the Vice Chairman of the Military Commission. However, concerning the 'rumors' surrounding Xi's confidant He Weidong, the military has remained silent, allowing these rumors to spread. If Xi truly holds military power, could such a situation arise? Is it possible that the military is deliberately signaling something?
If these reports are accurate, it would indicate that Xi's key allies in the military, He Weidong and Miao Hua, are both under investigation, which would indeed threaten Xi's position.
In just four days, the changes noted in the official and military media of the Communist Party reflect a shift in the political winds at Zhongnanhai. Speculations over the past few months regarding Xi Jinping's loss of power and the old guards of the Communist Party pulling strings behind the scenes are being confirmed, suggesting that an announcement regarding the transition of the highest levels of power from Zhongnanhai is imminent.
(First published by the People News)
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