The CCP Faces the Most Difficult Two Sessions in History: Five Major Pain Points Haunt Zhongnanhai

On March 5, 2023, CCP leaders attended the opening session of the National People's Congress.

People News - As the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Two Sessions approach, on February 28, the CCP leadership held the 19th collective study session of the Politburo. During the session, Xi Jinping emphasized the need to build a higher-level “Safe China,” stressing that safeguarding national political security must be the top priority. He underscored the importance of firmly maintaining the security of the regime, the system, and ideological security, declaring that “security is also a hard principle.”

Xi Jinping’s remarks appear to be setting the tone for this year’s Two Sessions. Every year, the CCP uses the Two Sessions to focus on economic development issues and announce the GDP target for the year. Currently, the outside world is watching to see what major measures the CCP will introduce to stimulate China’s sluggish economy. However, Xi Jinping’s emphasis on national security raises the question: is this a strong remedy for the Chinese economy, or a heavy-handed crackdown?

Amid internal and external crises—ranging from China’s economic downturn to pressures from Trump’s tariffs and shifting Sino-Russian relations—the CCP is likely to face the most difficult Two Sessions in its history.

Pain Point 1: Trump Imposes an Additional 10% Tariff as a "Gift" for the CCP’s 2025 Two Sessions

On February 27, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. plans to impose an additional 10% tariff on Chinese imports starting March 4. Speaking in the Oval Office, Trump emphasized that this 10% increase is in addition to the previously announced 10%, citing his dissatisfaction with China's role in the fentanyl trade as the reason.

Last month, Trump announced a 25% tariff on Canada and Mexico and included a 10% tariff on China. At the time, some observers speculated whether Trump was being too lenient on the CCP. However, Trump's "Art of the Deal" approach often uses tariffs as a tool to address issues such as the fentanyl crisis.

The CCP, however, remains cunning, never publicly admitting its involvement in trafficking fentanyl to the U.S. Instead, it blames America for its own problems. On February 2, a spokesperson from China’s Ministry of Public Security expressed strong opposition to the additional 10% tariff, arguing that the root cause of the fentanyl crisis in the U.S. is its domestic drug demand. In other words, the CCP essentially suggested that if Americans choose to use drugs, they should not blame China for supplying them. In response to the tariffs, the CCP has taken countermeasures, including filing complaints with the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Now, with Trump imposing yet another 10% tariff, Beijing remains defiant. Chinese Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao stated on February 28 that China would take countermeasures against the U.S.

So far, Xi Jinping has not initiated a phone call with Trump, possibly because Beijing believes it still has bargaining chips. According to The Wall Street Journal, China currently believes it can withstand the additional 10% tariff. Data from economic consultancy Gavekal Dragonomics suggests that these tariffs will increase the average tariff rate on Chinese exports to the U.S. from about 14.5% in 2023 to 24.5%. Chinese companies may try to circumvent the tariffs by rerouting goods through third countries.

However, with the new 10% increase, the average tariff rate on Chinese goods exported to the U.S. will rise to 34.5%, leaving exporters with almost no profit margin. Furthermore, Trump’s global reciprocal tariff strategy could close loopholes that allow Chinese products to bypass tariffs by going through third countries. Trump’s approach is tightening the noose around the CCP, and a final escalation to a 60% tariff is entirely possible.

Pain Point 2: The Toughest Job Market in History – "Flexible Employment" to Reach 400 Million

In November last year, China’s Ministry of Education and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced that the number of university graduates in China’s 2025 cohort is expected to reach 12.22 million, an increase of 430,000 from the previous year, marking yet another record high. This puts tremendous pressure on the CCP regarding employment.

According to a recent report by job recruitment platform Zhaopin, by 2023, China’s "flexible employment" population had already reached 200 million, accounting for 14.3% of the country’s workforce. This figure does not include the additional 200–300 million migrant workers. A South China Morning Post article on February 26 predicted that by 2036, the number of people in flexible employment in China could reach 400 million.

So, what exactly is "flexible employment"? It essentially means working sporadically—people are considered employed even if they only work one hour per week. Ahead of this year’s Two Sessions, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of Economic Strategy released the 2024 Digital Intelligence Platform Report on Promoting High-Quality and Adequate Employment, which praises digital platforms like Alipay for facilitating employment. As of the end of last year, Alipay’s employment services had assisted over 98 million job seekers. Notably, in 2023 alone, 15 million young people born in the 2000s and 2005s turned to Alipay for job opportunities. Alipay even launched a "daily wage section" for flexible workers, providing digital services such as "find a job nearby," "daily/instant wage payment," and "labor protection." This service is available in 45 cities, including Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Wuhan, and Xi’an.

But is this an attempt to save face for the CCP, or a blatant admission of a crisis? The fact that 15 million young people aged 24 or younger relied on flexible employment through Alipay last year suggests that many are effectively unemployed. After all, do government employees, civil servants, or workers in state-owned enterprises get paid daily? This raises serious doubts about the true scale of youth unemployment in China. The actual youth unemployment rate for those aged 16–24 remains a mystery. In December last year, senior economist Gao Shanwen of Guotou Securities questioned the reliability of China's reported economic growth figures, noting a stark contradiction between the officially reported GDP growth and the vast number of unemployed individuals. He estimated that China’s GDP has been overstated by a cumulative 10 percentage points over the past three years, while the number of new jobs created has fallen short by 47 million compared to normal levels. For his remarks, Gao was personally criticized and silenced by Xi Jinping.

Pain Point 3: Trump Disrupts China-Russia Relations, Leaving the CCP Restless

The China-Russia relationship, which the CCP describes as limitless, is now facing a significant challenge from Trump 2.0. During discussions involving the U.S., Russia, and Saudi Arabia, the Chinese Foreign Minister surprisingly expressed agreement with the U.S. and Russia regarding a ceasefire in Ukraine. A recent 90-minute phone call between Trump and Putin has also caused sleepless nights for the CCP and Xi Jinping. Even commentators like Hu Xijin and Jin Canrong have remarked that Trump intends to reshape the global order, creating a rift in China-Russia relations and fostering a united front against China.

On February 24, Xi Jinping held a phone conversation with Putin, during which the Chinese press release noted that Xi stated, "History and reality indicate that China and Russia are good neighbors that cannot be separated," highlighting Xi Jinping's deep-seated worries about Russia being drawn closer to the United States.

In response to a question from the far-right media outlet Breitbart News, Rubio remarked: "For both Russia and the U.S., a better outcome would be for Russia to no longer be a 'little brother' that is entirely dependent on China." He added, "If Russia permanently becomes China's 'little brother' and must comply with China due to its dependence, I believe that would not be a favorable outcome for Russia."

The U.S., China, and Russia are three nuclear powers, ranked in terms of overall strength as the United States, China, and Russia. The U.S. certainly does not want the second and third powers to unite against the first. The U.S. goal is not necessarily for the first and third to collaborate against the second; it is sufficient to separate the second and third. This objective is relatively easier to achieve. Recently, the fallout between Zelensky and the Trump team at the White House has inadvertently brought Russia closer to the U.S.

Pain Point 4: Pandemic Rampant, Capital City Becomes a High-Risk Zone

As we enter 2025, the country is experiencing frequent outbreaks of the pandemic, with various viruses invading cities, including H1N1, norovirus, and avian influenza. Hospitals across the nation are overwhelmed, and crematoriums are working overtime to keep up with demand. The public is actively sharing reports of infections and deaths on social media, which are alarming. However, the authorities are selectively downplaying the severity of the situation, not only failing to disclose the number of severe cases and deaths but also completely banning any mention of COVID-19.

On February 14, a netizen from Beijing commented: "Beijing has been hit hard in January and February. Those who didn’t get sick in January have all fallen ill after the New Year. It’s been 11 days and I’m still coughing. Many people in our unit have already been infected." Many patients are showing signs of severe lung damage, and the mortality rate is alarmingly high. Netizens report that individuals from all age groups are affected, with children and young adults being the most prevalent. Those born in the 1980s are becoming a disappearing generation, with a mortality rate of 5.2%. A netizen from Zhejiang remarked: "This wave is indeed severe. 80% of the workers at a construction site have been infected. Be careful of severe lung damage, everyone." On February 16, another netizen from Beijing shared in the comments of a social video: "A friend working at a high-end nursing home in Beijing reported that from mid-January to early February, dozens of elderly residents died, all due to norovirus."

With the pandemic resurging, many netizens speculate that it may be linked to vaccine side effects, but the Chinese Communist Party continues to cover it up, misleading the public. While various industries are facing a downturn, the funeral industry is experiencing a boom, with crematoriums struggling to keep up with the demand. Funeral homes in different districts of Beijing are offering high salaries, with ordinary security guards earning as much as 16,000 yuan a month. Despite this, the demand still far exceeds the supply, highlighting the significant number of deaths.

Since January of this year, there have been several reports in mainland media and the entertainment industry about the unexpected deaths of young adults. On January 16, crosstalk performer Xu Zhao Cheng passed away suddenly due to illness at just 36 years old. On January 30, newcomer actor Liang You Cheng died unexpectedly from an acute illness at the age of 27. On January 31, Yi ethnic singer, actor, and internet celebrity 'Yi Pin Xiao Mi' (real name Mi Wan Hong) also succumbed to a sudden illness at the age of 37. On February 11, actor Gao Liang died in Chengdu from a sudden illness at the age of 50. On February 15, Wu Yu Yan, the deputy director of the editorial office of China New Weekly, passed away unexpectedly at 41. On the same day, 20-year-old Uzbek singer Shi Lin, who had just participated in the 2025 'Spring Festival Gala', tragically passed away. Additionally, there have been reports of the death of Taiwanese artist Da S, among others...

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, Master Li Hongzhi, the founder of Falun Dafa, remarked in an article titled 'Rationality' that 'the current plague known as the 'Chinese Communist Party virus' (Wuhan pneumonia) has a specific purpose and target. It aims to eliminate those affiliated with the evil party and those who align with the Communist Party.'

Whenever the National Two Sessions are held, the weather in Beijing tends to be either rainy or overcast. This year, the Two Sessions are expected to be overshadowed by the pandemic and gloom, signaling that Beijing is becoming a high-risk area.

Pain Point 5: Rumors at the Two Sessions: Xi Jinping is on the Verge of Being Dismissed

Since the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in July last year, rumors have been swirling about Xi Jinping losing military power and experiencing a reduction in his authority. Reports of Xi suffering a stroke and being stripped of military control by Zhang Youxia have been persistent, particularly following the investigation of Miao Hua, which is viewed as a significant indicator of Xi's waning influence within the military. Additionally, there appears to be a subtle shift in the CPC's propaganda system regarding key titles that signify Xi Jinping's political power. Phrases such as 'Chairman of the Military Commission Responsibility System' and '2442', which emphasize Xi's supreme authority, have seen a marked decline in usage in party media.

Recently, prominent commentator Cai Shenkun disclosed that, according to an insider within the system, Xi Jinping's power has indeed been curtailed, and he is effectively in a nominal position within the party, merely awaiting the Fourth Plenary Session to officially announce his removal. At present, the actual holders of the highest power in the CPC are three individuals born in 1942: Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Hu Deping.

In light of recent overseas rumors regarding the precarious situations of Jia Qinglin and Ding Xuexiang, along with the fact that Li Ganjie, the Minister of the Organization Department, has stopped accompanying Xi on his inspections outside Beijing as is customary, it seems that Xi Jinping's faction continues to face purges and marginalization. On February 25, just prior to the Two Sessions, Lou Yangsheng, the former Secretary of the Henan Provincial Committee from the Zhejiang New Army, was demoted to a less significant role, which appears to signal Xi Jinping's further loss of power.

From the perspective of the political struggles within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it seems somewhat implausible to assert that Xi Jinping's close allies were all eliminated by his own actions. However, if we consider the possibility that Xi Jinping is on the verge of stepping down, it remains unclear who his successor might be. This ambiguity contributes to the difficulty in fully accepting the narrative that Xi Jinping is losing power. The reshuffling of power, where the old is discarded and the new emerges, is bound to be a tumultuous process, and the incoming leaders will likely exhibit distinct factional characteristics. This is due to the CCP's system, which does not allow for a straightforward meritocratic approach; it is unlikely that someone without clear factional ties will replace Xi Jinping's faction in seizing full control of power. Additionally, the arrangements following Xi Jinping's departure will be a significant element in the CCP's political struggle. Will it be a smooth transition of power, or will there be a comprehensive counteroffensive to eliminate rivals? If it is a peaceful transfer of power, who possesses the strength to compel Xi Jinping to relinquish authority easily? Zhang Youxia holds military power but does not engage in power distribution, while three elderly figures without real authority seem to control the redistribution of power, which appears inconsistent with the established logic of the CCP's system.

The current state of the CCP's political landscape is indeed confusing, making it difficult for outsiders to discern what is truly happening within its political black box. However, one thing is certain: the internal conflicts within the CCP have never ceased. The CCP regime is increasingly losing public support. Xi Jinping's Maoist policies are also unpopular, and if discussions about Xi Jinping's imminent departure become a topic of hushed conversation during the Two Sessions, it would not be surprising. 

(First published by People News)