Huangpu River Blockade: Who Counts as "One of Us"? The Political Dilemma of Chinese Entrepreneurs

Image: On October 26, 2007, Beijing, China, the panoramic view of the Forbidden City was covered in smog. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) warned that due to severe air pollution in Beijing, some outdoor activities might face delays.(Photo by Guang Niu/Getty Images)

[People News] In recent years, the long-forgotten term "one of us" has frequently surfaced in internal speeches within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Like an enduring enigma, it reveals a hidden aspect of Chinese politics while exposing a deep contradiction and crisis within the system.

Especially now, from the recent "217 Meeting" to various local government conferences held before and after spring to engage with private enterprises, there has been a noticeable absence of substantive pro-business policies. Instead, CCP officials seem to rely solely on the phrase "one of us" as a way to express sincerity and loyalty, effectively using it as a stalling tactic.

However, this almost "coded language" within the Party does little to build trust among entrepreneurs. On the contrary, it intensifies the identity crisis felt by China’s private business owners. The struggle over political recognition, marked by the notion of "one of us," highlights the growing conflict surrounding the status of private entrepreneurs. At the same time, it exposes the CCP’s declining ability to govern and communicate effectively, signaling that China’s political decay has entered a new phase.

The Schrödinger’s State of Chinese Entrepreneurs

In contrast to common perceptions, the term 'insiders' is used far beyond the traditional scope of the United Front strategy. Historically, within the context of the United Front, which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) claims as one of its three key strategies, 'insiders' were not a frequently employed term. Typically, it was only in rare internal party situations, where there was a need to differentiate between allies and adversaries or factions, that key figures would assert and vouch for someone as an insider—either to protect comrades who might be unjustly persecuted or to win over internal party factions and cliques.

This phenomenon illustrates the personalization and subjectivization of organizational relationships within the CCP, involving multiple identities such as recognition, interests, and organizational ties. It encompasses both personal and factional recognition, similar to the relief experienced by members of secret societies after performing a specific gesture. This concept is further extended to mutual recognition within the entire ruling group or even the ruling class, symbolizing a strong emphasis on 'political correctness.'

Regarding private entrepreneurs, their status and recognition have fluctuated significantly in the eyes of the CCP throughout the revolutionary and state-building periods. They have transitioned from being targets of the United Front and potential allies among national capitalists to subjects of the 'Three Anti' and 'Five Anti' campaigns. They have shifted from being part of a mutually dependent interest community with party and government officials to becoming victims of the 'state advances while the private sector retreats' policy. Additionally, they have moved from being the 'financial backers' of internal party factions to being perceived as the behind-the-scenes orchestrators of 'color revolutions.' This trajectory can be described as a rollercoaster ride, serving as a key indicator of the ongoing ideological transformations within the CCP. This history also explains the lingering anxiety that this group continues to experience today.

The most recent and closest instance of being regarded as 'one of their own' occurred during the era of Jiang Zemin (江泽民). In the final years of his leadership, he introduced the 'Three Represents' theory, which for the first time ideologically included private entrepreneurs as part of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This theory acknowledged their role as representatives of advanced productive forces, recognized their status as social elites, and expressed a willingness to integrate them into the Party.

However, since 2012, the succession of CCP leaders has marked the end of the honeymoon period between private entrepreneurs and the Party. With the trend of state-owned enterprises advancing while private enterprises retreating, the political situation for private entrepreneurs has worsened. They have even become targets for local bureaucrats' 'catching and hunting' practices and have faced renewed hostility reminiscent of the Boxer Rebellion. It was only two years after the COVID-19 pandemic, amid economic decline and looming crises, that high-tech private enterprises like Hangzhou Deep Seek achieved significant breakthroughs in the semiconductor conflict and AI competition between the U.S. and China. This represented what is referred to as new productive forces, which unexpectedly revitalized the entire private sector. This development also led Chinese leaders to once again address private entrepreneurs at the '2.17' meeting, referring to them as 'one of their own.'

Nevertheless, due to the inherent arbitrariness and ambiguity of the term, and in the absence of sufficient legal interpretation, ideological theoretical support, and accompanying policies, it remains highly uncertain whether the designation of 'one of their own' indicates a return to the policies of the Jiang Zemin era or genuinely acknowledges private entrepreneurs as members of the ruling elite. From the term 'one of their own' alone, Chinese private entrepreneurs perceive no clear guarantees or commitments, let alone any means to participate in power distribution and policy-making as 'one of their own' within the CCP.

In summary, the current situation of these individuals resembles Schrödinger's cat; whether viewed individually or collectively, it remains unspoken and unseen, with their fate hinging on a single thought. This uncertainty may be the underlying cause of the volatility in China's capital markets.

The Political Decline of the Supply Side

Furthermore, even though many private entrepreneurs are now members of the Communist Party, they remain skeptical of the so-called welcoming rhetoric directed at 'insiders.' This skepticism is underscored by the fact that even the prominent entrepreneur Ren Zhiqiang has faced imprisonment for his outspoken criticism of 'insiders.' Between 2013 and 2023, the Communist Party has purged four million officials under the pretext of anti-corruption, and with an additional 800,000 purged in 2024, nearly five million officials have been removed, making the risks associated with being an 'insider' quite substantial. In contrast, being a traditional target of United Front work appears to be somewhat safer.

This complex predicament underscores the political decline associated with the term 'insider' in China. A decade ago, Francis Fukuyama published 'Political Order and Political Decay,' and since then, the concept of political decay has almost become a self-fulfilling prophecy. As Fukuyama noted, when the political engagement of emerging social groups is not accommodated within the existing system, the political system is likely to decline due to its failure to adapt to changing circumstances. This trend of political decay has been particularly evident in the United States since the early 21st century, especially following the 'Occupy Wall Street' movement, characterized by significant political polarization and the emergence of far-right populist movements.

In China, this political decline occurred almost simultaneously. Following the outbreak of the Jasmine Revolution, Chinese politics shifted towards a more closed and centralized approach. The ruling group of the Communist Party of China adopted a hostile stance of rejection and repression towards emerging forces, both external and internal, embarking on a political decline reminiscent of new Maoism. Despite Francis Fukuyama's warm reception by Wang Qishan during his visit to Beijing, it failed to convince Chinese leaders that the political decline on both sides of the Pacific had begun almost simultaneously; instead, they concluded with a sense of super confidence that 'the East rises while the West declines.'

One particular episode stands out as more significant today: during the COVID-19 pandemic, a middle-class elite in Wuhan was quarantined in a concentration camp while holding Fukuyama's book, which he read daily. This was witnessed by the entire nation and caused a considerable shock. For a time, the book gained immense popularity, leading Chinese social elites to gain an unprecedented understanding of the extent of political decline that could result in such poor governance as the dynamic zero-COVID policy. This may have set the stage for the middle-class resistance that emerged before the White Paper Revolution at the end of 2022.

Since the abrupt end of the dynamic zero-COVID policy, the ongoing lack of policy supply has continually highlighted the aftermath of China's political decline. On one hand, in a climate of widespread social panic, the Beijing authorities are left with only ambiguous propaganda aimed at 'insiders,' reflecting severely impoverished discourse capabilities and ideological production. On the other hand, this discourse poverty and insufficient policy supply are revealing the ultimate failure of Beijing's supply-side policies since 2012. This has nearly become a consensus within Beijing's political and academic circles, even resulting in a significant purge at a leading official economic think tank.

In other words, when discussing the decline of Chinese politics, we are not only highlighting the need for Fukuyama's theory and the Marxist dogma embraced by the Communist Party of China (CPC) to align with the economic base. This includes the CPC's suppression of the private economy, which, through its crude and makeshift methods, inherently conflicts with the CPC's ideological foundation. Furthermore, this decline is particularly evident in the supply-side policies implemented over the past decade. This represents a fundamental issue that the ruling elite in Beijing has been reluctant to acknowledge, making it challenging to escape the constraints of misguided policies and to identify appropriate policy paths for private enterprises, consumption-side reforms, and the enhancement of public welfare.

Theoretically, the so-called supply-side reform led by Liu He is intended as a preventive anti-crisis measure. However, it bears a striking resemblance to the 

Furthermore, while supply-side reform appears to be an economic strategy, it effectively acts as a form of economic clearing, or the normalization of dynamic zeroing. In reality, this approach has intensified the overall decline of Chinese politics, heightening the contradictions and conflicts between China's closed, centralized political system and emerging social forces. A recent example is the series of corruption scandals involving management in China's aviation, aerospace, and military sectors, which have placed the current private economy in a highly uncomfortable political position. Without a fundamental reassessment and transformation of supply-side reform, the 'Schrödinger's cat' state of China's private sector and its entrepreneurs is unlikely to see any significant change.

This shift will undoubtedly challenge the authority of the highest leader behind Liu He. However, if the discourse remains limited to 'our own people,' no matter how artfully it is articulated, it will likely be difficult to break free from political illusions and regain public trust.

(Adapted from Voice of America)