Following the Fourth Plenary Session, Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin spearheaded a significant purge within the military

Zhang Youxia counterstrikes against Xi Jinping (People News illustration)

[People News] During the Fourth Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the attendance rate of central committee members was recorded at 82%, marking the lowest level since the establishment of the 20th Central Committee. Media outlets calculated that, based on the 42 military committee members featured in the CCTV program 'News Broadcast', 27 were absent, resulting in an alarming absentee rate of 63% among military central committee members.

Such circumstances typically emerge following fierce power struggles or extensive purges. The removal of Miao Hua and He Weidong has led to a breakdown in the command structure, compelling the military to swiftly promote new personnel to reorganise the command chain.

1. Nine lieutenant generals made a collective appearance, signalling an urgent overhaul at the upper echelons of the military.

At the venue of the all-army Fourth Plenary Session on November 3, nine lieutenant generals from the Central Military Commission were seated in the second row. This included Chen Zhi, deputy director of the Logistics Support Department; Liu Zheng, deputy director of the Training Management Department; Zhang Like, deputy director of the Defence Mobilisation Department; and Zhu Chuan Sheng, deputy chief of the Joint Staff Department. The three deputy directors of the Political Work Department were Wang Chengnan, Zhang Yutang, and Xiong Zhaoyuan, while the two deputy directors of the Joint Operations Command Centre were Dong Lisheng and Zheng Shoudong. With the exception of Wang Chengnan and Dong Li, the other seven were promoted to lieutenant general only within the last two months. Analysing their backgrounds may shed light on the factions they represent:

1. Joint Operations Centre

Dong Lisheng, born in 1964, is a lieutenant general in the Air Force. He has held several key positions, including commander of the Cangzhou Flight Test Training Base, deputy commander of the Air Force Test Training Base, and commander of the Air Force Test Training Base. In 2017, he was appointed chief of staff of the Eastern Theatre Command Air Force, and in 2018, he became the deputy chief of staff of the Air Force. In March 2021, he was named deputy commander of the Northern Theatre Command, and in 2022, he took on the role of deputy commander of the Air Force. In February 2023, he was transferred to the Central Military Commission Joint Operations Command Centre. He was promoted to major general in the Air Force in July 2015 and to lieutenant general in March 2021.

Zheng Shoudong, born in April 1961, was promoted to major general in July 2016. In 2025, he is set to be transferred to the Central Military Commission Joint Operations Command Centre. His previous roles include director of the Military Training Department at the Shenyang Military Region Headquarters, deputy commander of the 40th Group Army, chief of staff of the 80th Group Army, commander of the 72nd Group Army, and commander of the 80th Group Army. Zheng Shoudong served as the director of the Operations Department at the Shenyang Military Region Headquarters during Zhang Youxia's tenure as commander, and he is considered a close confidant of Zhang Youxia.

Zhu Chuan Sheng, born in 1970, hails from Boluo Township in Chengwu County, Shandong Province, and is a resident of Shedian Town in Sheqi County, Nanyang City, Henan Province. He is a naval officer currently serving as the deputy commander of the 91811 unit. Zhu has a long history of service in the army, and his exceptional performance during the flood relief efforts in 1998 led to his promotion to rear admiral in the navy in 2018, followed by a promotion to vice admiral in July 2023. The fact that he transitioned from the army to the navy indicates that he was selected as a cadre for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. In March 2025, he was appointed as the deputy commander of the Eastern Theatre Command and concurrently as the army commander. By October 2025, he was also referred to as the 'Deputy Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff.'

2. Training and Mobilisation Position System

Liu Zheng, a lieutenant general in the air force, serves as the director of the Training Management Department of the Central Military Commission. In May of this year, he organised an observation event for military training grounds, which was attended by Zhang Youxia. General Wang Chun, the previous director of the Training Management Department, has not been seen recently, suggesting that Liu Zheng has taken over the responsibilities of this department. Zhang Shengmin, who previously held the position of political commissar of the Military Training Management Department, had worked closely with Liu Zheng during that time.

Zhang Like, born in February 1967, is from Nanha County in Hebei Province (now part of Nanha District in Xingtai City). He has a long-standing career in the navy, having held various leadership roles, including chief of staff and division commander in the East Sea Fleet's aviation unit during his early years. He later served in the Southern Theatre Navy (South Sea Fleet) as the deputy commander of naval aviation. In 2022, he was appointed as the commander of the Shandong Provincial Military District within the national defence mobilisation system. He currently holds the position of director of the National Defence Mobilisation Department of the Central Military Commission. The former director, General Liu Faqing, was absent from the Fourth Plenary Session, leading to Zhang Like's appointment.

3. Logistics and Political Work System

Chen Chi, a former colonel in the Air Force, previously served as the president of the Air Force Shijiazhuang Flight Academy. In June 2019, he was promoted to major general. He currently holds the position of deputy director of the Logistics Support Department of the Central Military Commission. Following the dismissal of General Zhang Lin from his role as a representative of the National People's Congress, it is expected that Chen Chi has taken over Zhang Lin's responsibilities.

Wang Chengnan, born in October 1964 in Shulan, Jilin, is a lieutenant general in the Air Force. He has held various positions, including political commissar of the Air Force's First Aviation Division and deputy political commissar of the 15th Airborne Corps. He was promoted to major general on May 10, 2016. In March 2017, he became the political commissar of the Airborne Corps. In December 2019, he was appointed secretary of the Air Force Discipline Inspection Commission and promoted to lieutenant general. In April 2020, he assumed the role of political commissar of the Central Theatre Command Air Force, and in December 2021, he transitioned to serve as the deputy director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission.

Zhang Yutang has held several significant positions, including director of the Network Public Opinion Bureau of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, vice chairman of the All-China Journalists Association, director of the Propaganda Bureau of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, and director of the Military News Communication Centre, as well as president of the PLA Daily.

Xiong Zhaoyuan, born in August 1966, graduated from a military academy and has held various roles, including staff officer, instructor, secretary, head of the organisation department, director, secretary-general, and deputy political commissar. On January 22, 2017, Xi Jinping signed his promotion to major general, and in 2020, he became the political commissar of the Naval Command Academy. Currently, Xiong Zhaoyuan serves as the deputy director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission and has a background in the Rocket Force. When Zhang Shengmin was the director of the political department of the former Second Artillery Corps, Xiong Zhaoyuan was the secretary-general of the political department's office, making him a close ally of Zhang. Like Zhu Chuansheng, he also transitioned from the army to the navy.

Among these major generals, Zheng Shoudong was born in April 1961, Dong Li in 1964, and Wang Chengnan in October 1964; all are seasoned veterans, particularly Zheng Shoudong, who is actually beyond the typical age for his rank.

2. Due to severe corruption, Xi Jinping's loyalists are gradually disappearing from the military.

Xi Jinping quickly promoted a group of generals, but they were swiftly purged due to corruption, which has become an international joke. According to media personality Yuan Hongbing, Xi Jinping harbours strong suspicions about the loyalty of military personnel, which has developed into a psychological issue.

Among the nine major generals, none hail from the 31st Army or the Nanjing Military Region, indicating that Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin have thoroughly cleansed Xi Jinping's former loyalists.

Professor Dennis Wilder, a visiting professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and former senior director for Asian affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, published a commentary after the Fourth Plenary Session. He told BBC Chinese that the issue of corruption in the Chinese military has "become endemic (a local disease)."

He believes that corruption is an issue that affects every officer in the People's Liberation Army (PLA), stating, "because promotions require 'paying to play.' This is a serious problem that undermines morale and damages the operational effectiveness of the PLA." 

3. Du Zheng: Zhang Youxia Dominates the Military 

Independent commentator Du Zheng published an article titled "Crushing the Fujian Gang, Zhang Youxia Rules the Military" in Taiwan's Liberty Times last month. The article disclosed that a source from a certain military region of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) indicated three current trends within the military: first, there is an internal initiative for 'everyone to pass' as they discreetly eliminate the 'toxic influence' of Miao Hua and He Weidong, investigating who has purchased positions from Miao Hua or He Weidong and their associates; second, anyone expressing dissatisfaction with anti-corruption measures will be treated as a political issue; third, there is a strict crackdown on military personnel using VPN software. However, according to a 2014 Wall Street Journal article titled "Revealing China's Intelligence Agency's General Staff Department 3," the CCP has over 100,000 military spies responsible for overseas surveillance, making it impossible to effectively address the issue of military personnel bypassing internet restrictions. 

Du Zheng summarised the current personnel practices in the military as having a unique model: 

First, an 'acting' model is being adopted. This maintains unit operations, with the agents under surveillance. For instance, Cao Junzhang was promoted to acting commander of the armed police force. 

Second, some key positions are intentionally 'under-equipped.' This reflects the top leadership's lack of confidence in personnel decisions. For example, Zhang Shengmin was promoted to vice chairman of the Military Commission but does not participate in the decision-making body, and Dong Jun was appointed Minister of National Defence but does not join the Military Commission. 

Third, Zhang Youxia holds significant power. Both Zhangs must outwardly show loyalty to Xi Jinping, but this power structure has effectively undermined Xi's military authority. If the two truly have ambitions, it could lead to a scenario where 'the gun commands the party' and 'the gun does not protect Xi.'

Recently, self-media commentator Wang Jizhou analysed the 46th image of the Tui Bei Tu, which depicts "A golden sword lies in the eastern gate," in the context of the current tensions in China-Japan relations. The phrase "The warrior enters the underground palace through the back door" suggests a military coup that could lead to the establishment of a military government.

According to Du Zheng's analysis, the power structure within the military is fragile, and the issues of "loyalty and unity" have not been effectively addressed. Continuing to conduct purges in search of loyalty will only intensify existing conflicts; should these conflicts become more pronounced, the predictions of the Tui Bei Tu may indeed come to fruition.

(First published in People News)
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