Three Strange Things About the CCP Public Security Minister’s Trip to the Northwest

Cai Qi (righ) and Wang Xiaohong (left) serve as Xi Jinping&9;s gatekeepers. (Composite image)

[People News] According to Xinhua News Agency on November 21, Wang Xiaohong—Secretary of the CCP Central Secretariat and State Councilor—recently conducted an inspection tour in Shaanxi and Ningxia. Several strange aspects of the report deserve attention:

First, Wang Xiaohong was not given the title “Minister of Public Security,” and in the CCTV News footage, no high-ranking officers in police uniforms were seen accompanying him.

Second, while Wang Xiaohong stressed “thoroughly studying and implementing the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, and implementing the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee and the State Council,” he mentioned the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards,” but did not mention Xi Jinping or the “Party Central Committee with Xi at its core.”

Third, the places he inspected—Xi’an and Yan’an in Shaanxi, and Yinchuan and Zhongwei in Ningxia—were described as sites where he “went deep into relevant enterprises, projects, and villages to learn in detail about industrial scientific and technological innovation, transformation of scientific and technological achievements, infrastructure construction, industrial transformation and upgrading, and comprehensive rural revitalization,” etc. For someone who is nominally still the Minister of Public Security, such an inspection seems rather off-duty.

This is not the first time Wang Xiaohong has been doing things unrelated to his official duties. From July 3 to 4 this year, he visited Anhui Province, going to relevant enterprises, research institutes, and grassroots public security units in Hefei and Suzhou “to conduct on-site inspections of industrial development, the transformation of scientific and technological innovation achievements, and risk prevention and control in key sectors.” State media again mentioned only his two titles—“Secretary of the CCP Central Secretariat, State Councilor,” and omitted the most important title of “Minister of Public Security.”

State Councilors are members of the State Council who assist the premier, responsible for certain areas of work or major special tasks. Currently, economic work within the State Council is mainly handled by the vice premiers and the ministers and commission directors of various ministries. Among the State Councilors, none is specifically responsible for economic affairs, and Wang Xiaohong’s inspections are clearly not related to any task assigned by Premier Li Qiang.

Wang Xiaohong’s first such off-duty inspection occurred from October 15 to 16, 2024, when he went to Tianjin to inspect work supporting high-quality economic development, visiting relevant enterprises to learn about production operations. Again, the report omitted his most important, most powerful title: Minister of Public Security.

If the omission of “Minister of Public Security” the first time could not fully indicate anything, the omission three times is extremely strange. It is clear that both Wang Xiaohong’s off-duty inspections and the state media reports are not oversights but deliberate arrangements. The intention is likely to let the outside world sense a shift in Wang Xiaohong’s power.

Indeed, in the past year, personnel changes in the Ministry of Public Security have been enormous. On April 16, Xu Ganlu was removed from the posts of Vice Minister of Public Security and Director of the National Immigration Administration (National Exit-Entry Administration), replaced by Wang Zhizhong. On July 9, Yang Weilin was appointed Vice Minister of Public Security, while Vice Ministers Chen Siyuan and Sun Maoli were removed. On July 21, Ling Zhifeng—Member of the Party Committee of the Ministry of Public Security and Director of the Political Department—was promoted to Vice Minister and Director of the Special Service Bureau. Ling had become head of the Political Department in March 2023, replacing Feng Yan. In September, Jia Lijun became Member of the Party Committee and Director of the Political Department.

Xu Ganlu, Chen Siyuan, and Sun Maoli—all removed—basically belonged to Xi’s faction or had close ties to Xi’s trusted subordinate Wang Xiaohong. But the backgrounds of newly added top officials at the ministry show they are not part of Xi’s “home army,” or at least not in the true sense.

In addition to these newly replaced top officials, another Vice Minister, Xu Datong, was appointed in March 2023, having previously served as Vice Governor of Shaanxi and Director of the Provincial Public Security Department, also without a Xi-faction background. As for the Executive Vice Minister, Qi Yanjun, he is Wang Xiaohong’s trusted subordinate.

The newly added vice ministers are not Wang Xiaohong’s confidants, while those removed were his confidants or belonged to Xi’s camp. The intention behind these changes is clear: to weaken Wang Xiaohong’s power and ensure that the Ministry of Public Security no longer “belongs to Xi.”

Once the personnel reshuffle at the Ministry of Public Security is complete, will Wang Xiaohong still be the minister?

According to the ministry’s official website, from November 6 to 8, Wang Xiaohong went to Shandong and Jiangsu to “publicize the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee and conduct inspections,” mentioning Xi and the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards.” Following past practice, Wang Xiaohong should have delivered a briefing within the ministry itself, but he did not—instead going to the grassroots. This in itself is strange.

So who delivered the briefing at the Ministry of Public Security? Officials did not say. But the ministry’s website states that on October 24, the Ministry’s Party Committee held an expanded meeting to convey the spirit of the Fourth Plenum. The report emphasized in its first paragraph: “We must take studying and implementing the spirit of the plenary session as a major political task for the present and the future,” and “earnestly unify our thinking and actions with the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee.” The second paragraph, after “upholding the Party’s absolute leadership,” mentioned the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards.” The entire report did not mention Xi Jinping once.

As I have previously analyzed, a Public Security Minister repeatedly mentions Xi while visiting local regions, yet Xi’s name is absent from the Ministry’s own Party Committee meeting report—does this contrast not seem peculiar? Does it indicate that Wang Xiaohong may have already been stripped of his authority to publicly address the entire system within the ministry? Thus he can only go to local regions—or is dispatched—to show up and talk about studying the Fourth Plenum, expressing loyalty to Xi.

Perhaps he “over-did” the loyalty display. During Wang Xiaohong’s recent inspections in Shaanxi and Ningxia, the report did not mention Xi, only emphasizing “implementing the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee and the State Council.” Could this be because he has been reprimanded?

Another anomaly: on November 6, when Xi Jinping traveled south to Hainan to receive briefings and attend the entry-into-service ceremony of the aircraft carrier Fujian, Wang Xiaohong was not present. He did not appear until November 9 at the opening ceremony of the National Games in Guangzhou. Why was Wang Xiaohong—usually extremely diligent in ensuring Xi’s security—not by Xi’s side?

Judging from the sweeping personnel changes at the Ministry of Public Security, the repeated omission of Wang Xiaohong’s most important title, his off-duty inspections, and his absence from Xi’s side, Wang Xiaohong’s actual power has very likely been marginalized or stripped—just like Xi’s.

So who is really in charge of the Ministry of Public Security now? △