Beginning to Betray Xi? What’s Going on with Li Qiang’s Weak Support for Xi at the Two Sessions?

Beginning to Betray Xi? Li Qiang’s Weakest Support for Xi at the Two Sessions (AI-Generated Image)

People News - Li Qiang was once the most loyal of Xi Jinping’s confidants. His promotion from Shanghai Party Secretary to Premier of the State Council was entirely orchestrated by Xi. When Xi was Party Secretary of Zhejiang, Li Qiang served as his secretary—a role that deeply ingrained obedience to leadership into his mind, heart, and soul. As soon as he assumed the premiership, Li Qiang famously declared that the “State Council belongs to the Party.” At every meeting—whether large or small, public or private—he constantly referenced the “Xi core.” Even when traveling abroad, he actively requested to use a chartered plane, emphasizing the leader’s exclusive status.

However, Li Qiang seems to have changed—specifically after the Third Plenum in July 2024. Since then, references to “Xi steering the ship,” “Xi commanding,” and “Xi Thought” have noticeably decreased.

On March 5, 2025, during the opening of the National People’s Congress, Party media reported on how members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) attended various delegation discussions. All five other PSC members followed a unified script, enthusiastically pledging loyalty by promoting the “Xi core,” praising Xi’s leadership, and reaffirming the slogans of “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards.” However, observers noticed that Li Qiang’s support for Xi was significantly weaker, leading to speculation that he was beginning to distance himself from Xi.

Li Qiang Shows Weakest Support for Xi at the Two Sessions

On the afternoon of March 5, Li Qiang attended the Yunnan delegation’s deliberations. Unlike other PSC members, he did not mention “Xi Jinping steering the ship,” the “Two Establishes,” or the “Two Safeguards” at all. Instead, he only emphasized “the Party Central Committee’s decision-making and deployment.” This shift suggests that Li Qiang, in this critical public setting, deliberately downplayed Xi’s core status in favor of collective leadership.

The term “collective leadership” was reintroduced after the Third Plenum in July 2024, when rumors surfaced that Xi had undergone brain surgery. In a speech around October 1, 2024, Xi officially acknowledged this concept. However, external analysts saw this as a major sign that Xi had been weakened and his power curtailed.

On the morning of March 6, Li Qiang attended a joint session of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) for economic and agricultural sectors. In his speech, he only mentioned Xi once, referring to “Xi Jinping’s important directives and the major policies set by the Party Central Committee,” without using any other phrases to promote Xi.

That afternoon, Li Qiang attended the Hebei delegation’s deliberations. Again, he only mentioned “Xi Jinping’s important directives and the Party Central Committee’s decision-making and deployment” once, without any further expressions of loyalty to Xi.

This starkly contrasts with his behavior at the 2024 Two Sessions. On March 5, 2024, when Li Qiang attended the Yunnan delegation’s deliberations, his speech was filled with flattery toward Xi. He repeatedly mentioned the “Xi core,” “Xi Thought,” the “Two Establishes,” the “Four Consciousnesses,” the “Four Confidences,” and the “Two Safeguards.” He even pledged: “We must be even more conscious in using Xi Thought to arm our minds, guide our practice, and advance our work, always maintaining a high level of unity with the Party Central Committee, with Xi Jinping at its core.”

Li Qiang’s past speeches were filled with extreme displays of loyalty to Xi Jinping, almost as if he wished he could offer up his heart and soul to him. Such expressions of devotion were evident everywhere in his previous statements. Even as the State Council was stripped of power, its institutions downsized, and Cai Qi’s authority expanded, Li Qiang remained silent. Even when some administrative control of the State Council Secretariat was transferred to Cai Qi—allowing secretaries of ministries and commissions to monitor and report directly to him—Li Qiang made no objections. He seemed entirely willing to accept his diminished role, even if it meant becoming nothing more than the Party’s chief administrative officer.

Li Qiang Appears to be Subtly Mocking Xi

During the opening of this year's National People's Congress, Li Qiang delivered a government work report in which he surprisingly stated: "The minimum standard for basic pensions for urban and rural residents will be increased by another 20 yuan." This announcement triggered a wave of ridicule online, with comments such as, "20 yuan is a lot," "20 yuan can buy a steamed bun for a day," and "What a shame, whose embarrassment is this?" Some analysts even suggest that by mentioning such an embarrassing issue in front of a large audience, including reporters, Li Qiang is intentionally putting Xi Jinping in a difficult position, effectively delivering a slap in the face.

Consequently, some observers have noted that Li Qiang, who frequently emphasized early on that "the supreme leader personally deploys and commands," has actually overseen numerous decision-making and policy failures, or projects that have stalled, such as the construction of Xiong'an New Area, the transition from poverty alleviation to a moderately prosperous society, the success in pandemic response, and the diplomatic efforts to counter the U.S. alongside Russia, among others. Therefore, analysts believe that this may be Li Qiang's way of shifting blame, employing the recently criticized terms "low-level red" and "high-level black" against Xi Jinping as highlighted by the Communist Party of China.

Analysts: The Contradictions Between Li and Xi Have a Long-standing History

Commentator Wen Rui noted that the relationship and tensions between Li Qiang and Xi Jinping have been ongoing for quite some time. Last year, Li Qiang remarked in a report, 'The economic achievements in 2023 are attributed to General Secretary Xi Jinping's leadership and guidance, and are the result of the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core.' Given the dismal state of the economy in 2023, Li Qiang's comments suggest a level of dissatisfaction with Xi Jinping, almost as if he is shifting blame, which comes across as a subtle form of criticism. This is particularly evident as Li Qiang supports Li Keqiang's focus on the street economy and the development of the private sector, while Xi emphasizes new productive forces and the Party's control over the economy.

On December 23 of last year, Li Qiang chaired a State Council executive meeting where the 'Opinions on Strictly Regulating Administrative Inspections Involving Enterprises' were reviewed and approved. During the meeting, he publicly criticized local governments and departments for improper law enforcement practices that negatively impact the normal operations of businesses and the improvement of the business environment. The meeting announced the launch of an initiative to 'standardize law enforcement involving enterprises.'

Wen Rui, former Inner Mongolia official Du Wen, and U.S.-based political commentator Chen Pokong all highlighted that Li Qiang's criticism of local governments for abusing administrative discretion to engage in 'deep-sea fishing' and his strict demand that law enforcement agencies refrain from using judicial means to persecute private entrepreneurs indicates that he has 'crossed the line.' The 'knife handle' of public security and law enforcement is firmly in Xi Jinping's control, and Li Qiang is essentially making a public statement that Xi Jinping has not effectively managed this 'knife handle.' The higher reference points to Xi Jinping's arbitrary actions and improper law enforcement, while the lower reference refers to Wang Xiaohong and the Ministry of Public Security, who are causing disorder under the leadership of Xi Jinping and Wang Xiaohong.

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in the latter half of last year, during a foreign visit by Xi Jinping, Li Qiang unexpectedly announced a sensitive topic that Xi has been particularly wary of in recent years: the New Year's Eve holiday. This holiday has not been observed for several years due to its sensitive nature.

Chen Pokong suggests that Li Qiang's bold public statement marks a stark departure from his previously submissive behavior, indicating that he may no longer care or fear the repercussions.

What has emboldened Li Qiang to shift from being a weak secretary to a 'strong independent premier'? Analysts speculate that Li Qiang might be aware that Xi's power has waned. There are widespread rumors that within the military, Xi Jinping has essentially lost his authority; within the party and government structure, his influence has significantly diminished. These assertions appear to be accurate.

Wen Rui posits that the fundamental issue lies in Xi Jinping's tendency to assign Li Qiang tasks that are impossible to accomplish. Firstly, Li Qiang lacks a strong network within the State Council; secondly, his experience is limited; and thirdly, his capabilities are constrained, leaving him with little room to maneuver. He argues that Li Qiang is unable to express his dissatisfaction openly and directly, resorting instead to various methods that we observe, where 'on the surface, it seems he is praising Xi Jinping, but in reality, it is a challenge to Xi Jinping.'

Following the Third Plenary Session last year, all six members of the Standing Committee publicly endorsed Xi's ideology and the spirit of the session, yet only Li Qiang refrained from mentioning the 'Two Establishes' or 'Two Safeguards.' This omission drew significant attention at the time.

Li Qiang's unusual decision to withhold support for Xi after a year resembles a semi-public act of betrayal or defiance, sending an extraordinary political signal.

Recently, rumors have emerged suggesting that Xi Jinping is merely awaiting an official announcement regarding his abdication. Li Qiang, who ranks second in the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, is next in line after Xi; should Xi be compelled to resign, Li Qiang would nominally be the primary candidate to succeed him. Furthermore, during the Two Sessions, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made a sudden and high-profile critique of the internal issue known as 'low-level red and high-level black,' which warrants attention from the international community. Unusual occurrences have been frequently observed during the CCP's Two Sessions, leading to renewed speculation that significant changes may have already transpired within Zhongnanhai. The power crisis facing Xi Jinping may surpass external perceptions, and the political landscape of the CCP could undergo sudden transformations at any moment.