Sun Zhigang Should Atone with Death for the "Corn Revolution" He Pushed in Guizhou

On August 14, 2024, the Tianjin Second Intermediate People's Court held a public first-instance trial for the bribery case of former Guizhou Provincial Party Secretary Sun Zhigang. (CCTV screenshot)

[People News] In the last article of our "Night Talk in Zhongnanhai" column, we discussed that Sun Zhigang, the former CCP Guizhou Provincial Party Secretary who was sentenced to a suspended death sentence with life imprisonment at the end of last month, will have 17 other high-level cadres sharing the same fate accompanying him in Qincheng Prison. This assertion is based on the fact that, compared to these 18 individuals, previously imprisoned big tigers and even elder tigers like Zhou Yongkang—convicted and sentenced to either suspended death or life imprisonment—have a promising future of walking out of prison alive, as long as they live long enough.

To elaborate, while life imprisonment may seem harsher than a fixed-term sentence of up to 25 years, under current CCP laws, a life sentence can be commuted, meaning that the actual time served may be no less than 13 years if the prisoner shows "remorse and exemplary behavior." The countdown starts from the day the life sentence is confirmed, not from the date of detention.

Theoretically, Zhou Yongkang, sentenced to life imprisonment in June 2015, could be released as early as June 2028, barring medical parole or other conditions. Zhou’s courtroom performance—expressing guilt, accepting the verdict without appeal, and praising the court’s handling as reflective of the CCP’s commitment to strict party governance and rule of law—solidifies his classification as someone showing "outstanding reform behavior."

For those given a suspended death sentence, after the suspension period, the sentence can often be commuted to life imprisonment or a fixed term, followed by potential reductions. According to authoritative lawyers in China, "there is no set rule, but typically release may occur in about 20 years, sometimes even less depending on behavior."

Thus, while sentenced to death with a reprieve but not with lifelong imprisonment, Wang Fuyu—a fellow high-level official from Guizhou who entered Qincheng over two years before Sun Zhigang—might share prison time with him for about 18 years. Given Qincheng’s living and medical conditions, Wang, born in 1952, and Sun, born in 1954, both have a fair chance of surviving for 18 years or more.

Since the previous "Night Talk in Zhongnanhai" article listed the crimes and financial figures tied to 18 cadres sentenced to suspended death with life imprisonment, we’ll elaborate on Wang Fuyu, who, despite similar sentencing, escaped lifelong imprisonment.

Wang openly admitted in court to accepting bribes equivalent to over 434 million yuan during his tenure and an additional 17.35 million yuan after retirement. Despite this massive amount, why was he not sentenced to life imprisonment?

Comparing his case with the 18 others, half of whom accepted lesser amounts, Wang Fuyu was recognized for "voluntarily surrendering and truthfully confessing to part of the bribery acts known to the investigators, as well as most undiscovered facts of bribery and influence-peddling crimes, qualifying as a voluntary surrender, with some crimes being attempted."

Another critical factor compared to Sun Zhigang is that Wang Fuyu’s "illegal gains and proceeds were fully recovered," including interests earned and profits from investments using the bribe money. For instance, if Wang or his family invested a bribe sum of 100 million yuan in 50 properties and later sold them for 150 million yuan, the entire profit, in addition to the initial amount, was surrendered.

In essence, the total value Wang surrendered exceeded the recognized bribe amount.

Regardless, Wang’s acceptance of over 450 million yuan without life imprisonment reflects leniency from "the organization," which explains why he eagerly declared, "I accept the court's decision and will not appeal," even before the ruling was fully read.

Last September, I joked in an article titled Successive Corrupt Guizhou Party Secretaries that Liu Fangren, sentenced to life imprisonment, awaited the arrival of his successor Sun Zhigang in Qincheng Prison.

However, doing the math reveals that Liu Fangren, who was detained in January 2002 and sentenced to life imprisonment in early 2004, is unlikely to serve 20 more years in prison. Reports from the time mentioned that Liu embraced "legal education" after entering Qincheng and expressed "sincere remorse" to the authorities, fully accepting his appeal’s denial as "right and fair."

However, like the future Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai, this Guizhou Party Secretary Liu Fangren also had a period before entering Qincheng Prison during which he refused to admit guilt, citing "ignorance of the law."

Among the group of corrupt CCP officials, few, like Liu Fangren, dared to defend themselves openly in court during their first trial, express dissatisfaction with the verdict, and insist on appealing. Bo Xilai is another notable example. Liu Fangren's charges, as detailed in his sentencing document, included using his position between March 1995 and February 2002, while serving as the CCP Guizhou Provincial Party Secretary and Chairman of the Provincial People's Congress, to benefit others by accepting bribes. He received a total of 6.61 million yuan and 19,900 USD, amounting to over 6.77 million yuan, either alone or in collusion with his daughter-in-law, Yi Yang, in 22 separate incidents.

Compared to Bo Xilai, Liu Fangren’s financial crimes seemed even higher on the surface. However, Bo Xilai’s crimes largely involved embezzlement, for which the CCP regime has consistently imposed stricter punishments. Additionally, Bo Xilai was convicted of embezzlement, bribery, and abuse of power, which led to "significant losses to the interests of the state and the people," resulting in a combined sentence.

Of course, Bo Xilai also had his claims of being "wronged," but Liu Fangren was even more "aggrieved" because 5 million of the 6.77 million yuan in question had been collected by his daughter-in-law, Yi Yang, independently. According to Liu Fangren’s defense, he first heard about this "5 million story" only under repeated pressure from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection investigators, who threatened him with "leniency for confessions, strictness for resistance, and a dead-end for refusal to disclose."

Liu Fangren's appeal based on this reasoning was inevitably rejected, as then-General Secretary Jiang Zemin had already ordered strict punishment before Liu Fangren’s sentencing. Moreover, Yi Yang was not given lenient treatment and was ultimately sentenced to 15 years in prison.

After Liu Fangren was imprisoned, some articles in the domestic media described him as starting his corrupt activities shortly after assuming office in Guizhou, yet he managed to smoothly complete two terms and even garnered a relatively positive reputation among the public. Descriptions such as "pragmatic," "unlike typical leaders who enjoy empty talk," and "approachable" were common feedback from reporters interviewing people in Guizhou.

Although I do not fully agree with such praise from domestic journalists, when comparing officials' flaws, Sun Zhigang undoubtedly stands out as the most disliked among Guizhou's Party Secretaries, including Liu Fangren. In the eyes of Guizhou's residents and local officials, Sun was far worse than Liu.

A quick online search reveals that since the first trial of Sun Zhigang’s case, domestic media criticism has focused on the "Corn Revolution" he aggressively promoted throughout the province in the name of poverty alleviation.

Six months after Sun Zhigang’s promotion from Guizhou Governor to Provincial Party Secretary, the provincial government office issued a notice on January 24, 2018, titled "On Winning the Battle for Strategic Adjustment of Planting Structure." The core message was to "aim for all dryland basic farmland to be planted with economic crops, thoroughly changing the traditional practice of growing corn."

To push forward this "deep industrial revolution to revitalize the rural economy," Sun decided to expand the "Five-Step Work Method" he had previously implemented in the provincial government, which included policy design, task deployment, cadre training, supervision and inspection, and accountability. He mandated these be applied to the "industrial revolution to eradicate corn fields."

To curry favor with Secretary Sun and avoid being held accountable, leaders in Guizhou's poorest agricultural areas declared slogans such as "If you dare plant, I will remove it; no corn stalks shall remain. Prosperity means not planting corn." This marked the beginning of a vigorous campaign to eradicate corn planting across the province.

Reports indicate that one of the most zealous implementers of Secretary Sun's directives was Kaili City, where a regulation in the Notice on Adjusting Corn Planting Structure prohibited corn planting in various village locations. Violators caught planting corn faced not only penalties but also the loss of three years' worth of cooperative medical subsidies.

It wasn't until after Sun Zhigang left Guizhou that a local corn cultivation expert dared to disclose that during the corn ban, some areas in the province imposed strict controls on the sale of corn seeds, as "higher authorities required that no corn seeds be present in Guizhou's markets," putting significant pressure on agricultural departments.

In an article titled Who Betrayed Sun Zhigang to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection?, published in September in our Night Talk in Zhongnanhai column, we discussed that domestic media also featured articles revealing Sun Zhigang’s wrongdoings from a political perspective. For example, on the day Sun stood trial in Tianjin, Sina Finance ran an article titled After Ten Years as a Ministerial-Level Official, He Was Expelled from the Party at 70, and His Misconduct Led to Investigations of Multiple Subordinates. It noted that during his five-year leadership in Guizhou, Sun engaged in non-organizational activities during cadre inspections. Two vice-ministerial-level officials promoted by him during his tenure fell from power, the first being Li Zaiyong, who was sentenced to a suspended death sentence just days before Sun’s trial in Tianjin.

Sun Zhigang was promoted from Guizhou Governor to Provincial Party Secretary in July 2017. Earlier that year, Li Zaiyong had been elevated by Chen Miner to the positions of Provincial Party Committee member and Secretary-General. However, in the same month that Sun succeeded Chen Miner, Li was reassigned to serve as the Party Secretary of Guiyang City.

Over the next few months, Sun capitalized on Li Zaiyong’s prior experience of forcefully implementing "agricultural structural adjustments" during his tenure in Liupanshui City. Sun appointed Li as Executive Vice Governor and Deputy Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee while enacting policies to eradicate corn cultivation across the province. Sun later praised Li's most notable effort: using binoculars to check roadside and mountainous areas for hidden cornfields. Local officials, under pressure from Li, and worried about farmers' livelihoods, especially in mountainous areas, secretly advised farmers to grow some corn deep in the mountains, where Li’s binoculars couldn’t reach, to "barely stave off starvation."

While Sun Zhigang was charged solely with bribery, Li Zaiyong faced both bribery and abuse of power charges. The court identified the abuse of power as having "particularly severe social impacts, causing significant losses to the state and the people." However, this only referred to his failings related to forest and land destruction for "tourism projects" in Liupanshui, not his role in supporting Sun’s province-wide "Corn Revolution" during his tenure at the provincial government.

Similarly, although Sun Zhigang's "Corn Revolution" inflicted incalculable economic damage on Guizhou's rural areas, he was not prosecuted for it. This was because it tied into Xi Jinping's full endorsement of Sun’s leadership in achieving "comprehensive poverty alleviation" in Guizhou, contributing to the nationwide goal of "complete poverty eradication." Even though Baidu Baike created a special entry titled "Sun Zhigang Eliminated Nearly 8 Million Acres of Corn in One Year," the courts did not dare to add an "abuse of power" charge against him.

The CCP’s internal notification on Sun Zhigang focused only on his damage to Guizhou’s "political environment" and the "large amounts of property" he received. However, what he truly deserved severe condemnation for was the destruction of the local economic ecosystem during his administration and the tremendous economic loss inflicted on farmers throughout the province.

The month Sun Zhigang was brought down, domestic media cited a Guizhou corn expert, who disclosed that after Sun stepped down as Provincial Party Secretary due to age, the province's corn planting area had gradually recovered to over 10 million acres by last year. However, it still had not reached the scale before Sun’s forced "Corn Revolution." It is hoped that in the future, the area can be restored and increased to between 18 million and 20 million acres to ensure food security for the entire province. This illustrates just how grievous Sun Zhigang's actions were.

(Adapted from Radio Free Asia)