CCP Cultivates 'Local Collaborators' to Penetrate Taiwan's Countryside; Experts Recommend Establishing a Whistleblower Mechanism

Among Taiwan's various outlying islands, Kinmen, Matsu, and Dongsha hold important positions in defense. (Google Maps/Dajiyuan illustration)

[People News] In recent years, Taiwan has witnessed several cases involving individuals allegedly accepting CCP funding and violating the Anti-Infiltration Act, highlighting how the CCP uses "local collaborators" to gradually infiltrate Taiwanese society and the political system, posing significant challenges to Taiwan's democratic institutions. Experts suggest that Taiwan could learn from the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act to ensure transparency in foreign funding and establish a whistleblower mechanism to guard against external interference.

According to Voice of America, on November 4, Zhang Mengchong and his wife, members of Taiwan's "Chinese Unity Promotion Party" (CUPP), were indicted by the Chiayi District Prosecutor's Office under the Anti-Infiltration Act for allegedly accepting CCP funding from 2011 to 2023. The couple allegedly used radio stations and online platforms to promote specific referendum topics and candidates, attempting to influence public opinion in Taiwan.

This case highlights the phenomenon of the CCP funding individuals or organizations in Taiwan to sway political outcomes and is one of several similar incidents in recent years.

"Receiving Money to Work for the CCP"

In July 2024, the Chairman of the Cross-Strait Indigenous Peoples Exchange Association in Taiwan, Li Shangdian, and his wife were sentenced to five and four months in prison, respectively, for accepting 120,000 RMB from the Guangxi Taiwan Affairs Office last year to assist KMT legislator Cheng Tiancai in his campaign. According to the indictment, the couple received full funding from the Guangxi Taiwan Affairs Office to organize a travel group to Guangxi. During the trip, they accepted illegal funds, reported campaign progress to CCP officials, solicited votes from group members, and engaged in online promotion.

In March 2024, former Taoyuan City legislative candidate Ma Zhiwei was accused of accepting approximately 1.05 million NTD from the CCP for her campaign and transmitting sensitive information, including contact lists from national security agencies and "National Congress liaison directories," to her CCP funders. She was prosecuted by the Taoyuan District Prosecutor's Office under the Anti-Infiltration Act and the National Security Act and sentenced to eight months in prison by the Taoyuan District Court in August.

In December 2023, ahead of Taiwan’s presidential election, Xu Shaodong, honorary chairman of Taiwan’s "Chinese People’s Party," arranged for 60 members of the Taiwan New Residents Care Association to visit Loudi, Hunan Province, China, for free hospitality. Xu and three members allegedly conspired to follow CCP instructions to interfere in Taiwan’s elections.

Also that month, Taichung-based journalist Lin Xianyuan was accused of receiving approximately 130,000 RMB from CCP spokesperson Chen Binhua to publish eight misleading online polls related to the presidential election and was detained by prosecutors.

In November 2021, the hotel operated by Zhang Wei, son of CUPP Chairman Zhang Anle, was alleged to have assisted over a thousand CCP-affiliated individuals, including United Front officials, in illegally entering Taiwan. The Taipei District Prosecutor’s Office indicted Zhang Wei and 10 others under the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.

CCP Spends Heavily to Cultivate "Local Collaborators"

Wang Zhisheng, an assistant professor in the Department of Border Police at Taiwan’s Central Police University, explained to Voice of America that the CCP's methods for infiltrating Taiwan vary. One approach is funding local collaborators in Taiwan, such as specific political parties, politicians, or influential public figures, to exert influence during elections or referenda, thereby interfering in Taiwan’s political operations. For instance, Li Shangdian of the Cross-Strait Indigenous Peoples Exchange Association was sentenced for accepting CCP funds to assist a candidate’s campaign.

The second approach involves CCP funding outside of election periods. Some Taiwanese organizations "proactively" become local collaborators, promoting pro-CCP stances or organizing relevant activities. These collaborators, supported by funding, form pro-CCP groups, participate in marches or protests on specific issues, or engage in social media promotion to advance United Front work or infiltration. This includes pro-unification groups, some mainland spouses, former mainland students, and certain reporters in Taiwan. Wang noted that a well-known example is the "Wang Bingzhong case" involving Taiwan's pro-China New Party.

Wang Bingzhong, a member of the New Party's youth wing, along with city councilor Hou Hanting and others, were accused in 2018 under Taiwan's National Security Act of accepting funds from a "spy" in Taiwan to recruit current and retired military personnel, youth, and students. In 2021, the High Court ruled them not guilty.

Wang Zhisheng stated, "Some pro-communist figures in Taiwan even openly say they would rather see the Communist Party unify Taiwan than have the Democratic Progressive Party govern. This kind of mindset does exist in Taiwan. It could be driven by ideology, temptation, or even leverage related to personal interests. This creates a complex situation where these 'local collaborators' become increasingly entangled."

Wang highlighted that in Taiwan’s open society, these types of collaborators are pervasive. Even influencers paid to praise the CCP on media platforms fall under this category.

"Passive Collaborators" Unwittingly Penetrated

The third category is "passive" local collaborators—individuals who do not actively participate but are organized or guided in specific activities, such as travel groups, pilgrimage tours, or youth camps in China. These activities are often arranged by CCP-related organizations or local collaborators in Taiwan. Participants may unwittingly absorb CCP propaganda, becoming conduits for its influence.

Wang pointed out that religious and sports exchanges are particularly vulnerable to CCP penetration in Taiwan.

Due to the Taiwanese public’s deep religious devotion and historical ties to mainland China, some temples may receive incense money from the CCP through specific Taiwanese businesspeople, indirectly supporting particular candidates during elections and influencing followers. In addition, indigenous and marginalized communities in rural Taiwan are targeted, with the CCP offering subsidies and support to foster pro-China sentiments from a young age, achieving subtle influence.

Wang said, "There’s room for the government to clarify whether such activities should be considered legitimate exchanges or meticulous United Front efforts by China (CCP) to influence participants. This is why Taiwan finds it hard to prevent Beijing’s infiltration."

Experts: Learn from the U.S.'s Foreign Agents Registration Act and Establish Whistleblower Mechanisms

Under Taiwan’s current Anti-Infiltration Act, it is prohibited for any person to follow instructions, commission, or funding from foreign sources to engage in illegal or improper activities related to elections or government policy decisions. This aims to prevent foreign interference and ensure that Taiwan’s internal policies and operations remain unaffected by undue influence.

Wang Zhisheng suggested that the Anti-Infiltration Act could be further refined by introducing regulations similar to the U.S.'s Foreign Agents Registration Act, which requires political parties, businesses, or social organizations to disclose foreign funding sources, especially from foreign governments. This would enhance transparency and ensure that foreign funds influencing Taiwan can be monitored and controlled to prevent external interference.

Huang Zhaonian, associate professor and director of the National Development Institute at National Chengchi University in Taipei, told Voice of America that Beijing funds local collaborators in Taiwan with the goal of influencing public opinion and attempting to sway election outcomes.

Huang noted that Beijing not only targets Taiwan but also engages in similar actions in other democracies such as the U.S. and Australia, using donations, political contributions, and other means to influence elections. This often involves businessmen or companies friendly to the CCP sponsoring pro-China candidates to help them gain legislative or governmental positions to push policies favorable to the CCP.

Additionally, Beijing encourages certain companies to acquire stakes in local media or offers them business opportunities in the Chinese market to sway public opinion. These tactics aim to interfere in democratic elections and media environments.

Huang said that when the CCP uses economic interests to lure Taiwanese collaborators into illegal activities, many monetary transactions and bribery are conducted secretly, making it difficult for outsiders to obtain key evidence.

He recommended that the Taiwanese government strengthen interagency information-sharing and collaborate with like-minded allies for cross-border intelligence sharing to better track financial flows and interference activities. He also encouraged insiders to come forward and reveal related illegal activities.

Huang said, "Whistleblowers and those aware of illegal activities should be encouraged to come forward, and appropriate protective and incentive mechanisms should be established. The key is to overcome the problem of information asymmetry, making existing laws effective and enforceable."

Promoting the Advantages of Democracy and Rule of Law

Yu Ping, an independent scholar based in New York, told Voice of America that while Taiwan cannot completely sever ties with mainland China, democracy and freedom are the best tools to counter United Front activities. He believes Taiwan should not be overly closed off from the CCP but should engage in various forms of exchange to showcase the superiority of Taiwan’s system.

Yu said, "I think Taiwan doesn’t emphasize enough the promotion of its democratic and legal system, especially to the mainland. On one hand, measures should be taken to prevent improper CCP infiltration, but on the other hand, system competition should be open and transparent. Competing openly and fairly can have a greater impact on the mainland."