CCP Leader Lives "Through Telegrams": Why Li Qiang's High-Profile Presence?

The Second-Generation Red Nobility Stages a Coup, Xi is Panicked. (People News Report Illustration)

[People News] Since Xi Jinping’s head injury during the Third Plenary Session earlier this year, rumors about his waning power have not ceased. Recently, the propaganda department under his confidant Cai Qi has shown peculiar behavior. The main state media outlets have been reporting very few stories about Xi attending significant events or giving key speeches, while the second-in-command, Li Qiang, has been making frequent, prominent appearances at major events. This has fueled speculation that the rumored "Xi down, Li up" shift may have some truth to it.

On the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s "Important News" section, since November 1, there have been six pieces of news about Xi Jinping compared to 11 about Li Qiang. News concerning Xi has largely focused on sending congratulatory or condolence telegrams—minor ceremonial acts—while Li Qiang’s activities have included meeting with foreign heads of state and participating in international conferences where he delivered speeches.

On the CCP’s main web pages dedicated to reporting the activities of "Xi Jinping" and "Li Qiang," Xi’s latest news about attending a meeting dates back to October 30, centered on studying his own reform ideology under the title "Deeply Study and Implement the Spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee," with Li Qiang notably mentioned as the host. The "Attended Events" section has not been updated since October 1, with the latest report being an old piece about a "Wreath-Laying Ceremony" in Beijing, where Li Qiang's name was also mentioned. The "Meetings" and "Speeches" sections include news from over five days ago, with only two pieces from November 1 onward. Recent news primarily consists of congratulatory messages. The most recent "Overseas Visits" entry is embarrassingly dated July 5.

Li Qiang's situation, on the other hand, is quite different. From November 2 to the present, there have been nine major news reports about him, most of which involve meetings with foreign leaders or participation in international conferences. It appears that the visibility and importance of Xi and Li in the media have been inverted.

For instance, the Foreign Ministry website’s recent reports on Xi Jinping predominantly feature trivial telegrams of congratulations or condolences, as if the CCP leader has nothing better to do than send ceremonial messages. On November 1, there was news titled "Xi Jinping and UAE President Mohammed Exchange Congratulatory Messages on the 40th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations." On November 2, he sent a message to Spain’s King Felipe VI regarding a severe storm and flood in Spain. On November 3 and 4, there was no news about him. On November 5, he sent congratulatory messages to newly elected Fijian President Ratu Wiliame Katonivere and Botswana President Mokgweetsi Masisi. There was no news on November 6, and on November 7, he sent a congratulatory telegram to U.S. President-elect Trump.

The congratulatory message to Trump was interpreted by outsiders as an act of reluctant obligation. The tone of the message was more fear-driven than celebratory, featuring phrases like "China-U.S. cooperation benefits both, confrontation hurts both," "The international community expects," "Enhancing dialogue and communication," "Properly managing differences," and "The right way to coexist"—words that sounded more like a warning or a threat than congratulatory sentiments. In contrast, the November 5 message to Botswana President Mokgweetsi Masisi included warm phrases like, "I highly value the development of China-Botswana relations and am willing to work together to elevate our strategic partnership." Similarly, Xi’s message to Fiji’s newly elected president included, "I highly value the development of China-Fiji relations and am willing to work together to promote the steady and healthy development of comprehensive strategic relations."

These telegrams likely do not reflect Xi’s personal will but rather represent decisions made collectively by the Zhongnanhai leadership or the CCP’s consensus. In other words, while Xi is sending telegrams, he may not have control over their content or the decision to send them.

The fact that Xi is predominantly visible through "telegrams" began to stand out as early as October 26. From October 26, 27, and 29, the only "important news" on the Foreign Ministry’s page was related to congratulatory telegrams sent to foreign presidents, kings, or celebrating anniversaries, all featuring the phrase "I highly value…," with no other significant news. This is unusual. Logically, the Foreign Ministry’s website and main leadership activity pages should convey critical political information as mouthpieces of the Party. Why then is the Party leader only visible through telegrams?

There is one speculation: Xi may have been sidelined due to health issues or the weakening of the Party and state. His role might have shifted to largely symbolic, ceremonial, or procedural duties.