Who Does the Military Listen to? Xi Jinping Inspects Paratroopers and Seems Powerless

The image shows representatives from the Chinese military attending the Two Sessions in Beijing. (Video screenshot)

[People News] On November 4, the day before the U.S. election, Xi Jinping inspected the Chinese Airborne Forces in Xiaogan, Hubei. On October 17, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader had just inspected a certain Rocket Force brigade; less than a month later, he inspected the military again, with clear signs of deliberate arrangement. The rarely seen He Weidong also made an appearance. However, this time the CCP leader avoided mentioning "absolute leadership of the Party over the military" or "loyalty," an unusual avoidance of discussing military power, as if he could no longer control the content of his speeches.

Who does the military listen to?

On October 17, Xi Jinping inspected a Rocket Force brigade in Anhui, when there were already rumors he had lost control over the military. Xi first visited Fujian but did not inspect the Eastern Theater Command; afterward, he went to Anhui and inspected the Rocket Force, which is directly under the Central Military Commission (CMC), but the commander and political commissar of the Eastern Theater Command did not accompany him, and He Weidong was also absent. It seemed that the Fujian faction, which Xi personally fostered in the military, found it hard to make an appearance.

At that time, Xi Jinping stated in his speech, "We must uphold the absolute leadership of the Party over the military... ensuring that the troops resolutely follow the commands of the Central Committee and the CMC at all times and under all circumstances."

On November 4, during his visit to Hubei, Xi Jinping inspected the Chinese Airborne Forces in Xiaogan. In the Xinhua report, Xi did not mention "the absolute leadership of the Party over the military" or "following the command of the Central Committee and the CMC," nor did he talk about "loyalty." This is a rather subtle and sensitive change.

Every time the CCP leader inspects the military, he emphasizes the most crucial military authority. On October 17, his speech continued to mention Party command over the army but no longer emphasized "absolute loyalty" and the "CMC Chairman Responsibility System." Instead, he spoke of "following the commands of the Central Committee and the CMC," which seemed somewhat vague. The speech on November 4 outright avoided military authority. So, who does the military currently listen to?

The so-called "Central Committee" theoretically refers to the CCP Central Committee and usually means the CCP Politburo or the Politburo Standing Committee. However, apart from the Chairman and Vice Chairmen of the CMC, other Politburo members are not qualified to discuss the military, and they are likely very cautious to avoid military topics to prevent being seen as disloyal.

In recent years, the CCP media have been promoting "the Central Committee" as referring to Xi Jinping alone. When Xi says the military listens to "the Central Committee," he presumably means that it listens to him alone. But on October 17, he spoke of "following the commands of the Central Committee and the CMC."

Xi Jinping, being the CCP General Secretary and the CMC Chairman, should not need to say "following the CMC's command." The current CMC has six members, including CMC Chairman Xi Jinping, Vice Chairmen Zhang Youxia and He Weidong, and members Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, and Zhang Shengmin. Li Shangfu lost his CMC membership after being expelled from the Party and military. The newly appointed Minister of Defense, Dong Jun, did not fill the CMC seat at the Third Plenary Session.

If the CCP military needs to follow the CMC's command, it would mean following a six-member CMC, and the previously emphasized CMC Chairman Responsibility System would be set aside. Under this logic, any military orders solely from Xi Jinping might be ineffective, and the new Defense Minister might not even be qualified to issue military commands.

"Political Building of the Army" No Longer the Top Priority

After Xi's October 17 military inspection, the Xinhua report was titled "Xi Jinping Emphasizes Strengthening Political Guidance, Fulfilling Mission Responsibilities, Diligence and Practical Efforts, and Enhancing the Deterrence and Combat Capability of Strategic Missile Forces during Rocket Force Brigade Inspection." In his speech, Xi first emphasized "implementing the spirit of the CMC Political Work Conference in the troops... continuing to deepen political rectification, and solidly advancing the work of political building of the army," with "combat readiness and training" mentioned in the second paragraph.

After Xi's November 4 military inspection, the Xinhua report was titled "Xi Jinping Emphasizes Comprehensive Strengthening of Combat Training and Readiness, Enhancing Airborne Combat Capabilities, and Building a Strong, Modernized Airborne Force during Airborne Force Inspection." The previously emphasized political work disappeared from the title.

This time, Xi's speech began with "combat readiness and training," followed by "strengthening airborne combat force building" in the second paragraph, and "political rectification" in the third paragraph. However, he did not mention "political building of the army" or enhancing "Party leadership, organizational strength, and execution capability."

This time, He Weidong, who oversees political work as the CMC Vice Chairman, accompanied Xi on the inspection. Logically, Xi should have emphasized "political building of the army" to support He. However, in Xi's speech, political work was instead placed at the back. The military now seems to follow CMC orders, and "political building of the army" may no longer be the military's top priority, making political officers more apprehensive than military generals.

If Xi has suddenly shifted his focus to "combat readiness and training," he should inspect the CCP’s Marine Corps, Navy, or Air Force, or perhaps even the Rocket Force again. However, he chose to inspect the airborne forces, which doesn’t really convey serious war preparations.

The Chinese Airborne Forces, part of the Air Force, haven’t participated in actual combat since the Korean War, but they were involved in suppressing Beijing’s protesting students and citizens in 1989. While the Airborne Forces could theoretically be quickly deployed to a combat zone, the CCP lacks enough large transport aircraft, limiting the number of deployable troops in a single operation, likely primarily meant for rapid suppression of civilians.

Russia’s airborne troops, considered elite, suffered heavy losses in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, failing in their preemptive occupation and decapitation missions. It would be difficult for Chinese Airborne Forces to safely cross the Taiwan Strait by plane. Even if a few manage to parachute over Taiwan, their survival chances are slim. Surrendering might be their only hope for survival, and further combat preparations wouldn’t make much difference. Therefore, if the CCP leader’s visit to the Airborne Forces was about combat readiness, it seems he might have chosen the wrong unit or perhaps did not choose at all.

The CMC Now Controls the Tone of Xinhua’s Reports and Possibly Xi’s Speeches. It seems the CMC determines where Xi inspects the military and who accompanies him.

Mysterious Absence of the Central Theater Command Leaders

On October 17, during Xi’s inspection of a Rocket Force brigade in Anhui, CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, Rocket Force Commander Wang Houbin, Political Commissar Xu Xisheng, and new CMC Office Director Fang Yongxiang were present. However, Eastern Theater Command Commander Lin Xiangyang and Political Commissar Liu Qingsong were absent. Since the Rocket Force is directly under the CMC and not the Eastern Theater Command, Xi’s close allies in the Eastern Theater Command couldn’t be present.

On November 4, when Xi inspected the Chinese Airborne Forces in Xiaogan, Hubei, the Air Force Commander Chang Dingqiu, Political Commissar Guo Puxiao, and CMC Office Director Fang Yongxiang accompanied him, but there was no sign of the Central Theater Command’s Commander or Political Commissar. Although Hubei is in the CCP’s Central Theater Command, the Airborne Forces are not under its command.

In a short period, Xi inspected the military twice, but both times it involved CMC-controlled units, not the various theater commands. This suggests the military indeed follows the CMC’s orders. After Xi’s military reforms, the five theater commands were re-divided, with an increase in the ranks of theater commanders. However, it seems that these have been curtailed by the CMC’s control, with the heads of the military branches appearing more prominently.

During this inspection, the Central Theater Command’s leadership did not appear, and the identity of its Commander and Political Commissar remains a mystery. In August, the Central and Northern Theater Command leaders were reportedly swapped, with former Northern Theater Commander Wang Qiang becoming Central Theater Commander and former Central Theater Commander Huang Ming taking over the Northern Theater. However, checking the CCP’s Central Theater Command information on China’s Baidu Encyclopedia, the “Commander” column remains blank.

Additionally, former Central Theater Political Commissar Xu Deqing was reportedly transferred in September to become the CCP’s Army Political Commissar, replacing Qin Shutong, who was rumored to have fallen from grace. Therefore, the current Central Theater Command’s Commander and Political Commissar are still unknown. Xi inspected the military in the Central Theater Command’s area, but its Commander and Political Commissar didn’t appear, adding to the mysteries within the CCP military.

The CCP leader’s back-to-back inspections of the military in just over twenty days might indicate a desire to assert military authority. However, his recent speech unusually avoided mentioning military power. If this inspection was arranged by others, it could be the CCP’s attempt to conceal internal chaos, but the inspection locations and speech content suggest Xi is powerless.

Such odd phenomena only add to external speculation. The U.S. presidency is about to change hands, and the Zhongnanhai leadership seems preoccupied. The severe turmoil within the CCP is becoming impossible to hide.

(From The Epoch Times)