He Weidong’s Commands Ignored, Military Branches Show Who’s Really in Charge

On March 5, 2024, military delegates attending the CCP National People&9;s Congress arrived outside the Great Hall of the People.(online screenshot)

[People News Report] Since news circulated over three months ago that CCP leader encountered an "incident" during the 20th Central Committee's Third Plenary Session, unusual signals have been appearing among the top echelons of the CCP's party, government, and military. Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia has made multiple high-profile appearances, notably meeting with U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and visiting Vietnam to meet the country's top leaders with a tone markedly different from the past. The recent Politburo meeting and the news about the Central Military Commission (CMC) General Office issuing documents to the military without mentioning "Xi Jinping Thought" have all fueled speculation that Xi Jinping’s control over military power has weakened and his status within the party is diminishing.

So, what is the current standing of He Weidong, the other CMC vice chairman personally promoted by Xi Jinping? Is the military following his directives? Recently, a series of reports in military publications about various units’ efforts to "thoroughly study and implement the spirit of the CMC Political Work Conference" has provided an answer.

The CMC Political Work Conference was held on June 17 in Yan’an, with Xi Jinping attending alongside CMC members, including Zhang Youxia and He Weidong. According to official sources, it was "personally convened and decided by Xi Jinping."

The core of Xi's speech was on the importance of "political building of the military," as he said, "Currently, international, domestic, and military situations are undergoing complex and profound changes, and the military faces intricate political tests. We must firmly grasp the requirements of building a politically strong military and tirelessly promote this political work.” He also emphasized, “Political work is forever the lifeline of our military,” and added that “senior cadres should have the courage to confront their own shortcomings, reflect deeply, and take corrective actions to address root ideological issues, driving the political construction of the military forward.”

Xi’s speech revealed that, even after more than a decade as CMC chairman, he still lacks full control over the military and has not gained complete loyalty. The disloyalty includes numerous high-ranking officers, such as the arrested or investigated Rocket Force commanders, two former defense ministers, and heads of military-industrial enterprises. To Xi, even those senior officers who have not been arrested might still be disloyal, which is why he spoke of the need for them to "address root ideological issues."

In other words, Xi intends to use anti-corruption measures and other means to further purge the military, particularly targeting those senior officers whose loyalty to him is in doubt. Hence, the various military branches’ studies of the CMC Political Work Conference should be centered around loyalty and anti-corruption.

On September 2, a special seminar was held at the National Defense University for senior military cadres to study and implement the CMC Political Work Conference spirit. He Weidong, responsible for military political work, emphasized that studying the conference spirit is a "major political task." He urged the attendees to "resolutely implement Xi’s decision-making and instructions, adhere to the strategy of political military construction in the new era,” and “deeply understand Xi’s rationale for holding the CMC Political Work Conference in Yan’an, grasp the decisive significance of the 'Two Establishes,' and adhere to the 'Two Upholds' and the CMC Chairman responsibility system." The focus was still on loyalty.

In addition to CMC member and Political Work Department Director Miao Hua, senior leaders from CMC departments, CMC-affiliated organizations, the Joint Command Center, theater commands, military branches, CMC-affiliated units, and the Armed Police Force also attended.

But is the military truly executing He Weidong’s directives and grasping the essence of the CMC Political Work Conference? Let’s take a look at relevant reports in military media surrounding He Weidong’s speech at the seminar.

November 1
The report from the CCP military newspaper and website on the Military Academy’s Political Work Research Institute’s study was titled “Promote Research through Learning, Strive for Practical Results in Work and Entrepreneurship.” The report stated, “Recently, leaders and staff of the Military Academy’s Political Work Research Institute went deep into grassroots units to conduct investigations, hold discussions with researchers from various specialized fields and positions, and identify the blocking points and challenges in theoretical research, brainstorming and formulating solutions.” The entire text only mentioned “the important spirit of Chairman Xi’s speech” once.

October 31
The report covered the 980th Hospital of the Joint Logistics Support Force’s study experience, titled “Strengthen Ideological Foundation, Improve Support Effectiveness.” The content discussed how to “deeply understand Xi’s important discourse on ‘enhancing the leadership, organizational, and executive power of Party organizations,’” with only one mention of “the important spirit of Chairman Xi’s speech” in the full text.

October 25
The report covered the Chongqing unit of the People's Armed Police, which integrated political capability training into all aspects of construction and management. Not a single mention of "Chairman Xi."

October 16
The report shared insights from the National Defense University Military Management Academy's study experience, titled "Promote Learning, Emphasize Teaching and Research for Practical Effectiveness." The text only mentioned studying the spirit of the CMC Political Work Conference, with no reference to "Chairman Xi."

October 13
The report covered a study experience from an army brigade, titled "Strengthen Combat Fortresses, Focus on Preparing for Battle," emphasizing "enhancing the leadership, organizational, and executive power of the Party organization," with two mentions of "Chairman Xi" in the full text.

October 11
The report covered a CMC National Defense Mobilization Department seminar on studying and implementing the CMC Political Work Conference spirit, noting that it was held in late September in Yan'an, Shaanxi. The four-paragraph text included one mention each of "Chairman Xi" and "Xi Jinping's Strong Military Thought" in the final paragraph.

October 7
The report shared a reflection from a unit in the Western Theater, titled "Continue the Fine Tradition, Inspire the Will for Skilled Combat," with no mention of "Chairman Xi."

October 6
The report shared a reflection from an army brigade in the Eastern Theater, titled "'Three-Level Linkage' Builds a Party Organization that Can Fight and Win Battles," mentioning in-depth study of Xi's thought, "Learning Xi Jinping’s Strong Military Thought," but without the "Two Establishes" or "Two Upholds."

October 5
The report covered the Anhui unit of the People's Armed Police, which emphasized the main role of officers and soldiers in improving the quality and effectiveness of supervision and discipline, with no mention of "Chairman Xi."

October 4
The report covered a base in the Western Theater Air Force carrying out "Three-Front" activities to promote high-quality development of the unit, mentioning "Xi’s thought" and "Xi Jinping’s Strong Military Thought" but without the "Two Establishes" or "Two Upholds."

September 24
The report shared a reflection from an information support unit, titled "Boost Spirit, Gather Motivation," with one mention of "Chairman Xi."

September 20
The report covered a reflection from the Jiangsu unit of the People’s Armed Police, titled "Carry Out Heartwarming Actions to Inspire Motivation," with one mention of "Chairman Xi."

Other reports that mentioned "Chairman Xi" once include:

September 19: Reflection from an information support unit

September 18: Reflection from an Air Force brigade

September 16: Reflection from the Fifth Medical Center of the PLA General Hospital

September 12: Reflection from a brigade of the 73rd Group Army

September 9: Reflection from an army brigade

September 2: Reflection from a brigade of the 78th Group Army

August 29: Reflection from a brigade in the Northern Theater Air Force

Examining the military branches’ study of the CMC Political Work Conference spirit over the past two months reveals abnormalities. They not only downplayed or avoided issues like "loyalty" and "anti-corruption," ignored He Weidong's instructions, and only made superficial mentions of Xi Jinping. Most mentions served merely to preface speeches or directives, suggesting a consensus within the CCP's top ranks to "save face" for Xi without formally announcing his diminishing influence. Similar weakening can be seen in Xinhua News Agency reports.

As for the usual expressions of loyalty to the CMC Chairman, such as the "CMC Chairman responsibility system" or the "Two Establishes, Two Upholds," these have been ignored by all military branches. Only a few units mentioned "Xi Thought" and "Xi Jinping's Strong Military Thought," likely due to the commanders of units such as the Eastern and Northwest Theater Air Force, who were promoted by Xi and are intended to show loyalty.

The stance of the military branches once again confirms that Xi's control over military power is slipping. The neglect of directives issued by Xi's confidant, He Weidong, indicates that Zhang Youxia is the real "boss" in the military. This also suggests that the recent appearances of CCP elders are significant, showing internal divisions within the CCP's top ranks and a serious challenge to Xi’s status within the Party. No amount of screen time for Xi can mask this declining influence. △

(People News Report Exclusive)