Analysis: Major Shift in Myanmar s Conflict—Beijing May Struggle to Maintain Control

On February 2, members of the Burmese community in the San Francisco Bay Area gathered at San Francisco's United Nations Plaza to condemn the military coup in Myanmar and demand the release of detained national leader Aung San Suu Kyi. (Photo by Li Wenjing / Dajiyuan)

October 24, 2024 — Myanmar’s civil war continues with airstrikes, explosions, and curfews. Since the Lashio offensive in July, the situation has significantly changed, and experts suggest that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is attempting to balance both warring sides, but it may ultimately lose control over the situation.

On October 18, the Chinese consulate in Mandalay was hit by a grenade attack, causing minor damage to the building with no reported injuries. China demanded a thorough investigation from Myanmar. It is still unclear who was responsible, and both the Myanmar military junta and democratic forces quickly condemned the attack.

This incident occurred just as Myanmar's military leader, Min Aung Hlaing, was about to visit Beijing, amid widespread revolutionary armed resistance in Myanmar. Reports from Kokang Information Network suggest that major trade routes and key northern towns such as Lashio have fallen under the control of ethnic armed groups. The military junta continues airstrikes in Lashio, causing over 100 civilian casualties.

On October 20, large numbers of Myanmar refugees attempted to enter China through border checkpoints, fleeing the ongoing conflict. Videos circulating online show intense fighting on the Myanmar side, with the sound of gunfire. Chinese border forces closed the Tengchong Dianchi crossing, and the refugees later dispersed.

Bloomberg reported that the consulate attack highlighted Myanmar’s growing chaos. For decades, China has tried to maintain influence over the lawless ethnic armed groups in Myanmar’s border areas while supporting the country’s military leaders. The attack on the consulate indicates that this balancing act is no longer sustainable. Both sides are reportedly angered by Beijing’s recent actions under Xi Jinping’s leadership, leaving Xi in a difficult position.

Beijing has recently strengthened its public interactions with the Myanmar military junta. As rebel forces gain strength, the CCP brokered a ceasefire in January, but it collapsed after a few months. Lway Yay Oo, a spokesperson for the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, stated, "The Chinese (CCP) government pressured us to stop fighting and not take any offensive actions." Once the ethnic armies began capturing southern military positions, Beijing employed economic coercion and vague threats of retaliation to halt their advance.

Chinese dissident Fu Yifeng, who has visited Myanmar, told Epoch Times that the CCP’s deep infiltration into northern Myanmar has exacerbated tensions, leading to recent escalations and extremist nationalist protests, including attacks. Anti-Chinese incidents in Myanmar are also a result of the CCP's involvement.

"There is no clear evidence showing which group attacked the consulate. It could be ethnic nationalism or a 'false flag' operation orchestrated by the CCP. Regardless, there is a strong likelihood that political motives are behind it. The CCP’s relationship with the Myanmar military junta is opportunistic, favoring whichever side serves its interests," Fu said.

The Fall of Lashio—Myanmar Junta Protests CCP Support for Rebels

In late July, the allied forces captured Lashio, Myanmar's fourth-largest city and the capital of northern Shan State, dealing a heavy blow to the Myanmar northeastern army. The rebels then advanced south toward Mandalay, Myanmar's second-largest city, which connects by road to the capital Naypyidaw and the largest city Yangon. Analysts suggest that if Mandalay falls, the junta could face its greatest political crisis since the coup.

Southern Weekly reported that the morale of the Myanmar military is low, and their firepower advantage is shrinking. In the current situation of interwoven enemy and friendly forces, Myanmar's artillery units struggle to support their infantry. While the military has the advantage of air power and long-range artillery, the strategy of vengeful bombing has limited tactical significance.

On the evening of August 5, Min Aung Hlaing admitted defeat in the battle for Lashio in a televised address. He also pointed out that foreign technical experts were assisting the Kokang Allied Forces’ drone units. According to Bloomberg, Min Aung Hlaing accused unnamed foreign countries of providing food, money, and other supplies to his enemies—clearly referring to China (the CCP). Nationalist supporters of the military also took to the streets to protest China’s alleged support for the enemy.

Fu Yifeng observed that Myanmar's civil war has generally been a low-intensity conflict involving small-scale clashes between ethnic armed groups. Without foreign governments providing intelligence, weapons, funds, food, and tactical guidance, large-scale armed conflicts are unlikely to occur.

"The areas currently under the control of the Myanmar military are mainly central regions, including major cities like Mandalay and Yangon. However, land frequently changes hands between the junta and ethnic armed groups, with the military controlling roughly 40% of the country. Given Myanmar’s complex terrain and the multitude of local forces, without coordination from other large armed groups or foreign support, the allied forces are unlikely to defeat the junta," Fu said.

Analysis: CCP Supports a Pro-China Government

Political commentator Li Linyi told Epoch Times that Myanmar is a critical stronghold for the CCP in Southeast Asia and an important strategic resource in the Belt and Road Initiative. Myanmar offers a direct link between Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, making it highly valuable to Beijing. Therefore, the CCP has always placed great importance on Myanmar and its government.

"I don’t think the CCP will ultimately be able to maintain control. The CCP doesn’t want the Myanmar military junta to collapse completely because it’s uncertain how pro-China any new rebel government would be. Beijing wants to maintain a balance, preventing the rebel forces from being too aggressive in attacking the military junta. This has led to Myanmar’s current state of instability," Li said.

Li believes the CCP is still watching the situation. If its interests in Myanmar aren’t secured, it might consider supporting regime change. However, if most of its interests remain intact, the CCP would prefer not to see the rebel forces take power. Historically, Aung San Suu Kyi’s relationship with the CCP wasn’t as close as that of the junta.

Ignatius Lee, a young scholar of international relations in the UK, told Epoch Times that while the CCP is the largest stakeholder in Myanmar’s conflict, it lacks real influence, as none of the three factions trust one another. Although the military appears to be losing ground, it still controls key cities and infrastructure. A successful assault on Mandalay could change the entire conflict, but the outcome remains to be seen.

"If Beijing truly had influence, it would have been able to mediate. Earlier this year, both sides in Myanmar paused fighting not to please Beijing but because they needed time to regroup militarily. The CCP’s ambiguous stance depends on neither side gaining a decisive advantage. In a stalemate, it’s best not to choose sides, as backing the wrong one could backfire, leaving Beijing hesitant."

An anonymous commenter on the Kokang Information Network suggested that the CCP doesn’t want Myanmar to achieve lasting peace and unity, having learned from the lesson of Vietnam’s unification. The fear is that a united Myanmar could align with the West. As long as Myanmar remains in chaos, the CCP can continue to exploit its cheap labor, energy, and mineral resources. Despite claiming non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, the CCP is conducting a proxy war in Myanmar. The allied forces, if they consider themselves part of Myanmar, should resist CCP coercion, support the National League for Democracy, accelerate the overthrow of Min Aung Hlaing, and dismantle the junta’s power to achieve a truly democratic federal state.

Edited by: Lin Congwen