Is the Core Status of Xi No Longer Being Upheld? Strange Wording from Senior CPPCC Officials

Photo Caption: The first session of the 14th National People's Congress will open on March 5, 2023, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China. (Photo by Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

[People News] While news about Xi Jinping continues to dominate headlines, and while unusual signs have appeared in loyalty pledges from senior CCP officials and the military, alongside frequent personnel changes within official circles, the author has noticed another issue: an oddity in how senior officials of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) are being described in reports about studying Xi’s thought.

According to mainland Chinese media, on May 28 the CPPCC held its third collective study session of 2026, focusing on Xi’s ideas on Party building, speeches, and directives. The meeting was chaired and addressed by CPPCC Vice Chairman and Secretary-General, as well as Wang Dongfeng. The report stated that participants should “always firmly uphold the ‘Two Establishes,’ resolutely safeguard the authority of the Party Central Committee and its centralised, unified leadership, raise political standing, … and implement the Party Central Committee’s decisions and deployments.”

What is “strange” is that, unlike in the past, officials including Wang Dongfeng did not follow “Two Establishes” with the usual phrase “achieve the ‘Two Safeguards.’” In the highly politicised environment of the CCP, even such subtle wording changes are clearly unusual.

According to official CCP definitions, the “Two Establishes” refer to establishing Xi’s core position in the Party Central Committee and the whole Party, and establishing the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought. The “Two Safeguards” refer to safeguarding Xi’s core status and safeguarding the authority of the Party Central Committee. Yet in this case, CPPCC officials only mentioned “safeguarding the authority of the Party Central Committee,” adding “centralised and unified leadership,” while omitting “safeguarding Xi’s core status.” What signal does this send?

By contrast, at the second collective study session on March 18, 2026—focused on Xi’s discourse on “correct views of political achievement”—the wording first emphasised understanding the significance of the “Two Establishes,” followed by “resolutely achieving the ‘Two Safeguards,’” and then “more firmly implementing the Party Central Committee’s major decisions and deployments.”

Interestingly, at the first collective study session on February 4, 2026, attended by the same group, neither “Establishes” nor “Safeguards” appeared. Instead, the wording emphasised “aligning thinking and action with the Party Central Committee’s decisions and deployments” and “upholding the Party’s overall leadership and the centralised, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee.” This came just two weeks after Xi had removed Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and Joint Staff Chief Liu Zhenli, during a period of strong internal backlash and limited military expressions of support for Xi.

Looking back at five study sessions throughout 2025, the wording varied. At the April 25 session, all “loyalty phrases” (often referred to as “two establishes, four consciousnesses, four confidences, two safeguards”) were present, but there was no mention of “Party Central decisions” or “collective leadership.”

At the May 29 session on Xi’s diplomatic thought, only “deeply understanding the decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes’ and resolutely achieving the ‘Two Safeguards’” was mentioned, again without references to “decisions” or “collective leadership.”

However, just days earlier on May 26, at a study session chaired by CPPCC Chairman Wang Huning, both “Establishes and Safeguards” were mentioned, along with “aligning thinking and action with the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee with Xi at its core.”

At the August 29 fourth study session, in addition to praising Xi’s economic thought, there were references to both “Establishes” and “Safeguards,” along with “upholding the centralised, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee over economic work” and “deeply grasping the Party Central Committee’s analysis and judgments on the economic situation.” A similar combination of phrases appeared at an August 19 CPPCC党组 session.

At the fifth study session on November 19, alongside the standard loyalty phrases, there was also “aligning thinking and action with the spirit of the plenary session and the Party Central Committee’s decisions.” Yet two days earlier, when Wang Huning and other vice chairmen studied, they only mentioned “more consciously safeguarding the authority and centralised, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee,” without other loyalty language.

Clearly, whether CPPCC officials use the full set of loyalty phrases, only “Establishes and Safeguards,” or emphasise “centralised, unified leadership,” appears linked to shifts in high-level power struggles within the CCP. The current wording resembles Wang Huning’s phrasing in November last year, suggesting underlying reasons.

Since reports emerged during the July 2024 Third Plenum that Xi had suffered a stroke, signs and leaks about his loss of military and Party control have not ceased. Meanwhile, trends toward collective leadership within the CCP leadership have become increasingly evident. From the “Decision” passed at that plenum through early 2026, official media references to “safeguarding the authority and centralised, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee” have increased significantly compared to the years of Xi’s power consolidation. Even top leaders, including Xi himself, have repeatedly emphasised this.

For example, on August 29, 2024, the Beijing Daily app published an article stressing that adherence to centralised, unified leadership is the CCP’s highest political principle, arguing that this has enabled the Party to overcome crises and that in increasingly complex conditions, such leadership is even more essential.

Xi himself mentioned “strengthening centralised, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee” on multiple occasions in 2024—something less common in previous years.

In 2025, reports from Xinhua, PLA Daily, and CCTV became even more explicit, using “centralised, unified leadership” in place of the earlier emphasis on Xi’s personal authority. For instance, a January 15 PLA Daily article stated that whenever the Party firmly upholds centralised, unified leadership, its事业 succeeds, and without it, setbacks are inevitable.

At the January 20 Politburo meeting, Xi praised Party groups for “firmly safeguarding the authority and centralised, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee” and called for continuing to uphold this as the “highest political principle.”

In other words, starting in 2025, the CCP’s highest political principle shifted at the top level from “resolutely achieving the ‘Two Safeguards’”—including safeguarding Xi’s core status—to simply “upholding the authority and centralised, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee.” Wang Huning’s gradual change in wording in 2025 is linked to this shift.

However, after Xi removed Zhang and Liu in January this year, he appeared to regain some power, contradicting earlier expectations. “Centralised, unified leadership” was again sidelined, as Xi seemed intent on restoring his dominant personal authority.

Yet five months later, dissatisfaction within the Party and military has continued to grow. Unusual statements have emerged from officials in the National People’s Congress and CPPCC. Xi’s expectations have not been realised, and concerns over his health and declining reputation have led other senior leaders to consider distancing themselves from him. This suggests that internal power struggles are far more intense than outsiders imagine.

Under these circumstances, CPPCC officials mentioning only “safeguarding the authority and centralised, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee,” while omitting “safeguarding Xi’s core status,” may signal a new development in this power struggle. Has Xi made some compromise and accepted collective leadership? Will there be further changes? Regardless, the author concludes that as long as those in power seek to preserve the Party while ignoring repeated warnings from “heaven,” the outcome is destined to be tragic.

(First published by People News)