CCP Politburo Convenes; PLA Daily Sends Unusual Signals

CCP Politburo Convenes

[People News] On January 30, the CCP Politburo held its first meeting since the Zhang Youxia incident, and the wording showed notable changes compared with a year ago. Footage of the subsequent group study session revealed that no military representatives appeared at this enlarged Politburo meeting. On the same day, an anti-corruption article in the PLA Daily made no mention of Zhang Youxia or Liu Zhenli, yet published another piece stating that “the support or opposition of the people” is the key factor that “determines victory or defeat.” Internal CCP divisions appear to be deepening.

Changes in the Politburo Meeting’s Wording

The first Politburo meeting of 2026 publicly disclosed only one agenda item: reviewing work reports from the Party leadership groups of the National People’s Congress, State Council, CPPCC, Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Secretariat. A year earlier, on January 20, 2025, a similar meeting covered the same items, plus ecological issues of the Yellow River Basin. This year’s meeting appeared thinner, highlighting that the publicly released content was likely not the main topic.

After the official announcement of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli’s cases, Beijing’s political atmosphere has been tense. Military authority appears uncertain, and who truly holds power and controls the situation has become increasingly unclear. The Politburo could not avoid the key issue of supreme power, yet dared not discuss it openly. Certain wording changes were nevertheless apparent.

In evaluating the 2025 work of the five Party leadership groups, the first half of the statement matched last year, but the latter half differed significantly.

Last year’s meeting said they had “strengthened their sense of mission, earnestly fulfilled responsibilities, enhanced Party group self-construction, and conscientiously fulfilled the main responsibility for comprehensively and strictly governing the Party, making new contributions to advancing Chinese-style modernization and national rejuvenation.”

This year’s meeting said they had “focused closely on the overall work of the Party and the state, effectively strengthened Party group self-construction, and made positive contributions to completing major annual targets and successfully concluding the 14th Five-Year Plan.”

Compared with last year, three phrases disappeared: “strict Party governance,” “Chinese-style modernization,” and “national rejuvenation.” The new phrase introduced was “overall work.”

Last year’s meeting outlook for 2026 said, “Uphold the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee as the highest political principle, ensuring unity of thought, consistent direction, and strict implementation of orders.”

This year’s meeting simply said, “Uphold the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee and ensure that decisions and deployments are implemented.”

Gone were “highest political principle” and “unity of thought, consistent direction, and strict implementation.” In today’s Zhongnanhai, who truly holds supreme power is in question. Unity of thought and direction appears unattainable, and strict enforcement of orders even more so.

Last year’s meeting also mentioned “high-quality development” and “a new journey of Chinese-style modernization.” This year only referred to the start of the 15th Five-Year Plan.

These wording shifts suggest that the struggle over military and supreme authority may still be ongoing, and that Xi Jinping has not regained his former authority. His signature slogans—“strict Party governance,” “Chinese-style modernization,” and “national rejuvenation”—have once again disappeared.

After the meeting, the Politburo held a group study session. CCTV footage showed 21 Politburo members and at least 28 other officials present, with no military representatives; Ma Xingrui was again absent. Xinhua’s report was significantly shorter than usual, and Xi’s speech was noticeably compressed. Xi’s camp’s aggressive counter-moves appear not to have regained the initiative.

PLA Daily Article Signals Open Challenge?

On January 30, the PLA Daily front page published an article titled “Song of Integrity: The Army Wins Battles Because the People Are Its Backing.” It stated, “The support or opposition of the people is the true natural barrier and the key to determining victory or defeat.” The article quoted no words from Xi and made no mention of Zhang or Liu.

Published on the front page, it likely represents the military’s voice. Its tone seemed like an open challenge to Zhongnanhai.

The conclusion emphasized relying on and serving the people, calling it a timeless truth and the army’s enduring essence. It talked about people’s support but did not mention the Party’s “absolute leadership,” instead saying that “the people, through firsthand experience, are convinced of the correctness of the Party’s leadership,” an unusual formulation.

On January 24, when Zhang and Liu’s investigations were announced, a PLA Daily editorial quickly accused them of “seriously betraying the trust of the Party Central Committee and CMC,” “seriously trampling the CMC chairman responsibility system,” and harming the Party’s rule, while stressing the “CMC chairman responsibility system.”

Yet six days later, the front-page article omitted that phrase entirely and did not openly support Xi, instead emphasizing reliance on the people—appearing to send a signal challenging Xi.

The Deliberately Avoided Zhang Youxia Case

On January 30, the PLA Daily also ran an article titled “Advance the Anti-Corruption Struggle with Greater Clarity and Determination,” from the National Defense University’s Xi Jinping Thought research center.

It quoted Xi on anti-corruption but never mentioned Zhang or Liu. It referred to the Party’s absolute leadership over the military but not the CMC chairman responsibility system. Despite coming from a Xi Thought research center, it showed no overt loyalty to Xi.

The article concluded by saying anti-corruption requires removing “toxins” and “disease roots,” adding, “Those who eliminate harm must examine its source; those who treat illness must eradicate its root.” Given that five of seven CMC members have fallen, leaving only Xi and Zhang Shengmin, references to “disease roots” naturally raise questions.

This piece, on page seven, seemed to serve as a footnote to the front-page article.

At a January 29 Defense Ministry press conference, spokesperson Jiang Bin said investigating Zhang and Liu was significant for anti-corruption. Yet the published transcript omitted those questions and answers. Given that their cases were already public, this avoidance appears suspicious.

The PLA Daily’s tone has also fluctuated. On January 30 it hinted at challenging Xi; on January 31 it published another article emphasizing faith in anti-corruption victory and reiterated that the military must obey Xi, mentioning Zhang and Liu only in terms of corruption, not prior political accusations.

Who truly leads the CCP Politburo remains unclear. The PLA Daily’s unusual signals and reversals suggest growing turbulence. As the Year of the Horse begins, the Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli case is triggering an even fiercer political upheaval within the CCP.

— The Dajiyuan
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