[People News] According to the Party media Xinhua News Agency, the Central Economic Work Conference was held in Beijing from December 10 to 11. Xi Jinping attended the meeting and delivered an important speech. The other six Standing Committee members, including CCDI Secretary Li Xi, who had been “missing” for 20 days, were all present. Politburo member Ma Xingrui was absent again. Unlike previous years, the official communiqué for the first time included the title “Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission” among the attendees.

The Party media communiqué, titled “Central Economic Work Conference Held in Beijing, Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech,” reported on this year’s Central Economic Work Conference content and attendance. Party media photos show the highly watched CCDI Secretary Li Xi sitting at the far right of the podium, looking down at documents. CCTV news broadcast shows Li Xi entering with no major anomalies, immediately following the six other Standing Committee members. The close-up shots given by CCTV also show Li Xi as the last Standing Committee member shown, with a duration of three to four seconds similar to the other five members (excluding Xi Jinping).

Previously, Li Xi, as a Standing Committee member, had consecutively missed three major meetings: the two Politburo meetings on November 28 and December 8, and a collective Politburo study session on November 28. Most unusually, the December 8 Politburo meeting did not schedule any agenda items regarding the CCDI’s annual work or the date of the next plenary session. The CCDI was forcibly skipped—something that has never occurred in over ten years of high-level CCP meeting arrangements.

Li Xi’s last public appearance was on November 21, attending the 110th anniversary symposium for Hu Yaobang. From then until the Central Economic Work Conference on December 10, he had been missing for a full 20 days. The anomaly in Li Xi’s activities has been linked to the Ma Xingrui case. One explanation is that Li Xi was involved in Ma Xingrui’s case. During Li Xi’s tenure as Guangdong Party Secretary, Ma Xingrui was the provincial governor, and the two worked together for four years. Other analyses suggest that Li Xi may not truly be in trouble but was secretly carrying out highly sensitive political tasks.

Normally, a CCP Politburo Standing Committee member is at the rank of Zhengguo (ministerial-level), and aside from Zhao Ziyang due to the June 4 political incident, no sitting official has ever truly gotten into trouble while in office. Even Zhou Yongkang of the second central core was only removed after retirement. Even if Li Xi were truly in danger, it would not be under the pretext of corruption. For the CCP, this would be self-destructive: if the CCDI Secretary appointed by Xi becomes a corrupt official, the CCDI’s image of purity is shattered, and Xi Jinping’s biggest political highlight—anti-corruption—would be completely exposed. Wang Qishan was trimmed but ultimately landed safely, and Zhao Leji also remained safe as CCDI Secretary.

Li Xi and Ma Xingrui are both part of Xi’s faction. Could Li Xi be targeted and removed by Party elders or anti-Xi factions due to deep involvement in the Ma Xingrui case? The likelihood is low. If the anti-Xi faction could control the situation to that degree, Li Xi would likely defect immediately. The combined strength of the CCDI and military commission would make it nearly impossible for Xi faction officials to escape being ruthlessly purged, both in the military and in politics.

At this work conference, another point worth noting in terms of personnel: Xinhua and other Party media reported in the communiqué that “members of the CCP Politburo, secretaries of the CCP Secretariat, vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, leaders of the National People’s Congress, state councilors, the president of the Supreme People’s Court, the procurator-general of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, CPPCC leaders, and members of the Central Military Commission attended.”

Unlike previous years, the “Vice Chairman of the CMC” was listed, placed after “members of the CCP Politburo and secretaries of the CCP Secretariat” and before “leaders of the National People’s Congress.”

In previous years, the CMC vice chairmen always attended the Central Economic Work Conference—for example, Zhang Youxia attended last year, and the CCTV camera scanned from right to left over Wang Yi, Shi Taifeng, Li Ganjie, Li Hongzhong, then Zhang Youxia, Chen Wenqing. Yet in the Party media communiqué, the title “Vice Chairman of the CMC” was not listed. This year, the first vice chairman of the CMC, Zhang Youxia, also attended the Central Economic Work Conference. In this year’s CCTV footage, the other vice chairman Zhang Shengmin was not seen.

This subtle change in Party media reporting highlights the sensitivity of high-level CCP power struggles. On the eve of the Fourth Plenum of the CCP, the Ministry of Defense spokesperson suddenly announced the downfall of nine generals including He Weidong. During the Fourth Plenum, Zhang Shengmin, previously appointed as CMC Discipline Inspection Secretary, was elected vice chairman of the CMC. Analysts suggest this is further evidence that Xi Jinping has effectively lost military control.

During this turbulent period of high-level military power struggle, the separate listing of the “Vice Chairman of the CMC” in the economic work conference may carry multiple meanings:

  1. It emphasizes the continuity and stability of military leadership, ensuring the military’s representation at major state meetings and giving the outside world the appearance of internal harmony in the CCP military.

  2. It signals an intent to strengthen the military’s role in economic decision-making. China’s economic direction is increasingly moving toward high-tech, AI, manufacturing, and military-industrial integration, so the subtle wording change aligns with major adjustments in the economic structure.

  3. The public inclusion of the additional vice chairman reflects the continuation of power struggles within the military, the outcome of a power balance, and the symbol of military influence extending into politics—Party commands the gun, and the gun also commands the Party.

In terms of macro-policy wording, this year’s conference is largely similar to 2024, filled with empty rhetoric. The few new directions this year include: “better coordination of domestic economic work and international trade struggles,” “maintaining the bottom line to prevent systematic return to poverty,” and “promoting active marriage and childbirth views, striving to stabilize the new birth population scale.” These mainly respond to CCP economic challenges: U.S. tariffs, rising unemployment, and a dramatic population drop—all heavy blows to the CCP’s economy.

(People News exclusive)