Xi’s Speeches in Guangdong and Hainan Emphasize “Party Central Committee”

On January 16, 2024, the Chinese Communist Party's Provincial and Ministerial Cadre Finance Seminar opened at the Central Party School in Beijing. All Politburo Standing Committee members, except Li Qiang, were seated on the rostrum. (Video Screenshot)

[People News] After Xi Jinping’s attendance at the commissioning ceremony of the *Fujian* aircraft carrier was seen as a demotion, hinting that his loss of military and party power is not mere rumor, Xi’s words and actions in Hainan and Guangdong further confirm that there is a “Party Central Committee” above him controlling him.  

According to mainland official media reports, on November 6, CCP leader Xi Jinping listened to a work report on the construction of the Hainan Free Trade Port in Sanya City, Hainan Province. Reporting to him were Zheng Shanjie, Director of the National Development and Reform Commission, and Feng Fei, Secretary of the Hainan Provincial Party Committee. The first paragraph of the report is particularly noteworthy because Xi mentioned the “Party Central Committee” twice.  

The news report stated that Xi Jinping emphasized that “building the Hainan Free Trade Port is a major decision made by the Party Central Committee…” and that it is necessary to “earnestly study and implement” the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, “under the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee… to fully achieve the goals of Hainan Free Trade Port construction.”  

After leaving Hainan, from November 7 to 8, Xi Jinping visited Meizhou and Guangzhou in Guangdong Province for inspection and research. In Meizhou, he made a special trip to the Ye Jianying Memorial Park and stated that the current CCP’s rivers and mountains and foundations were laid and accumulated by Mao Zedong and other so-called “older generation revolutionaries,” so their stories must be told well, and people must “always listen to the Party and follow the Party.”  

When listening to reports from Guangdong provincial high officials in Guangzhou, Xi said that studying and implementing the spirit of the plenary session is “a major political task for the entire party and the whole country at present and for some time to come,” and that it is necessary to “effectively unify thoughts and actions with the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee.”  

The “Party Central Committee” and “centralized and unified leadership” that Xi Jinping repeatedly emphasizes are one of the core contents of the communiqué of the just-concluded Fourth Plenary Session, namely that during the “15th Five-Year Plan” period, it is necessary to “uphold and strengthen the authority of the Party Central Committee and its centralized and unified leadership.” This is in line with the *People’s Daily* article published after last year’s Third Plenary Session, which stated that implementing the various reform tasks determined by the *Decision* “lies in strengthening the Party’s leadership, especially the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee.”  

The fact that Xi has to emphasize this in his speeches is certainly not what he personally desires, because in the nine years before he was rumored to have suffered a stroke at last July’s Third Plenary Session, such expressions by Xi were rare. The reason is that in the eyes of Xi and CCP high officials, Xi, as the sole “venerated one,” represented the “Center,” and there was no need for any centralized and unified leadership.  

However, since Xi’s incident last July, CCP military newspapers and official media have repeatedly signaled “collective leadership.” For example, on August 29, the Beijing Daily client published an article titled “Upholding the Centralized and Unified Leadership of the Party Central Committee Is the Highest Political Principle.” CCP high officials have also repeatedly mentioned it, some only saying during studies of the plenary session spirit to “unify thoughts and actions with the spirit of the plenary session” and “with the major decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee,” no longer expressing loyalty to Xi.  

Xi Jinping has also had to emphasize it in certain public occasions. For example, at the 16th collective study session of the CCP Central Politburo on July 31 last year, at the sixth meeting of the Central Committee for Deepening Overall Reform on August 29, at the symposium on comprehensively promoting ecological protection and high-quality development in the Yellow River Basin held in Lanzhou on September 12, and at the symposium commemorating the 100th anniversary of Qiao Shi’s birth on December 16, he mentioned “strengthening the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee.”  

January 15 this year marked the 90th anniversary of the Zunyi Conference. On January 14 and 15, CCP Xinhua News Agency, military newspapers, and CCTV all published articles on this occasion. The military newspaper article stated: “Whenever the entire party firmly safeguards the authority and centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee, the party’s cause will continuously achieve victories; when it departs from the authority and centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee, the party’s leadership will inevitably weaken, and the party’s cause will inevitably suffer setbacks.”  

Is this not publicly declaring to the outside world that the current CCP Central Committee has replaced Xi’s “venerated one” status with “centralized and unified leadership”? Does this not indicate that Xi’s “venerated one” status has been weakened?  

Now, Xi Jinping’s expressions in Hainan and Guangdong are slightly different from last year’s tone. Last year, Xi only mentioned “strengthening the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee” in his speeches, with a tone that still gave a feeling of being high above, but now it feels like Xi has to comply with instructions from the Central Committee above him, stating that it is a “decision made by the Party Central Committee” and “under the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee,” placing himself below the Center.  

Does this not confirm external revelations that Xi is currently just a puppet on stage, that he does not truly hold power, and that this is not just a “rumor”? The CCP high-level has been acting this drama for over a year and is still acting. Does this not indicate that internally they are not yet ready to officially announce Xi’s stepping down?  

As for Xi’s visit to pay homage to Ye Jianying and saying those words, is it not to respond to the “Red Second Generation’s” letter to gain their support?  

Recently, independent commentator Cai Shenkun revealed in his self-media program that he received information that more than 200 Red Second Generation members jointly wrote a letter to Xi Jinping, proposing to further improve the cultivation of successors for the party and the state, and stating that this political system cannot be lost.  

Cai Shenkun believes that this group of “Red Second Generation” wrote the letter out of a purpose to protect the party, protect the regime, or protect their wealth. They believe they are on the same boat as Xi, that their fathers’ generation, like Xi’s father, ultimately won the country, and the country must continue to the present and cannot be lost in Xi Jinping’s hands.  

However, no matter how the CCP high-level tries to restore the previous “Party Central Committee” collective leadership status to prolong the CCP regime, and no matter how the “Red Second Generation” wants to persuade Xi to step down to let the CCP regime linger on, the CCP, which has harmed the country and the people for decades, has already aroused heavenly resentment and human anger. Heaven has also indicated that its death is imminent. Those who disregard heavenly will and public sentiment and intend to continue persisting on the CCP’s evil path will ultimately only end up with a tragic outcome.  

(People News first release) △