The September 3rd Military Parade Again Proves Xi Has Lost Control of the Military — Zhang Youxia Appears on Tiananmen Rostrum

Zhang Youxia (Video screenshot)

[People News] The CCP’s “September 3rd” military parade took place, costing over 30 billion yuan, and once again became a tool of brainwashing. The CCP not only brings disaster to the country and its people, but also seeks to control the minds of the population. If this continues, the terrifying scenes depicted in the novel 1984 may reappear.

Undoubtedly, one of the central figures of this parade was CCP leader Xi Jinping. Because of his outward display of power, many who doubted rumors since last year that Xi had lost his authority again took this as proof that Xi still firmly holds power. However, the reality is precisely the opposite. No matter how much the CCP tries to conceal it, the September 3rd parade revealed in three ways that Xi has lost control of the military.

1. Zhang Youxia, rumored to control military power, appeared on the Tiananmen rostrum

During the live broadcast, when the camera panned across retired senior officials, after showing former Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli, it also showed Zhang Youxia standing right beside him. Unlike other senior officials who kept a bit of distance from one another, Zhang stood shoulder to shoulder with Zhang Gaoli. Was this deliberate positioning to be caught on camera?

Regardless of the reason, Zhang Youxia’s ability to stand in the very front row with Politburo Standing Committee–level officials, and to be shown on state media cameras, is highly unusual. At least during the 2019 “October 1st” military parade, no vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC)—neither Xu Qiliang nor Zhang Youxia—appeared on camera.

Clearly, Zhang is not a dispensable figure. His presence reveals his elevated status.

2. The parade’s chief commander was only a lieutenant general; the general who should have held the post may be in trouble

This year, the parade’s chief commander was Lieutenant General Han Shengyan, commander of the Central Theater Command Air Force, which oversees Beijing. Since 1949, the tradition has been that the commander of the military region (the capital’s jurisdiction) leads the parade, with 1953 being the sole exception. For example, in 1999 it was Li Xinliang, in 2009 Fang Fenghui, and in 2019 Yi Xiaoguang—all generals. Even non–National Day parades followed this: the 2015 parade was led by General Song Puxuan, the 2017 Zhurihe parade by General Han Weiguo. All were full generals.

Yet Han Shengyan, promoted only to lieutenant general in 2017, has had no promotion since, and replaced General Wang Qiang, commander of the Central Theater Command, as chief commander of the parade. This strongly suggests that Wang Qiang may have run into trouble—he had already been absent from the Ministry of Defense reception.

Wang Qiang had been promoted to general by Xi himself before the 20th Party Congress and was regarded as part of Xi’s camp. His disappearance, like that of other Xi loyalists in the military, is not a good sign for Xi.

Moreover, downgrading the parade commander from a general to a lieutenant general seems disrespectful to Xi as CMC chairman. Does this signify that the parade’s standard was lowered—and does this lowering indicate that Xi no longer holds real military authority?

3. The live broadcast commentary did not mention “obeying Chairman Xi’s orders” or “implementing the CMC responsibility system”

During the live broadcast, there were repeated slogans about “the Party’s absolute leadership over the military” and “the military under the Party’s command.” Xi was mentioned in phrases like “historic achievements in strengthening the armed forces under Chairman Xi’s leadership,” “Xi Jinping steering the ship,” “Xi’s thought on strengthening the military as a scientific guide,” and at the end with slogans like “the Party Central Committee with Xi at its core.”

But missing were references to “implementing the CMC chairman responsibility system” or “troops resolutely obeying Chairman Xi’s orders.”

By contrast, in the 2019 parade, when Xi’s power was at its peak, the commentary included lines such as “Since the 18th Party Congress, the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi have led the military,” and “all theaters resolutely obey the orders of the Party Central Committee, the CMC, and Chairman Xi.” In 2017, the praise for Xi was even more effusive. But since rumors of Xi’s loss of power last year, such wording has quietly disappeared.

The change in wording speaks for itself.

Another change: during this parade, the official commentary did not name the leaders of each marching unit. In 2019, every formation was introduced by saying its leader was such-and-such a major general. The omission this time was likely because too many generals—including major generals—have been purged over the past year. To cover up the scandals, the authorities skipped that part altogether.

In short, while on the surface Xi still appears as powerful as before, behind the scenes much has changed. Will the Fourth Plenary Session in October provide the answer?