During the closing ceremony of the Two Sessions, video footage showed that as Xi Jinping was leaving, several Politburo members, including Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) He Weidong, turned around and stood by their seats to watch Xi depart. However, Zhang Youxia remained facing forward, not even glancing back as Xi walked past behind him. (Screenshot from video)
[People News] Just over ten days ago, former Chinese media professional Zhao Lanjian, now residing in the U.S., revealed that Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) He Weidong had been taken away for investigation. This news has now been confirmed. Independent commentator Cai Shenkun, citing the latest information, stated that He Weidong is definitely in trouble, and an internal notification has already been issued to military commanders at the theater command level. With the CMC Political Work Department Director Miao Hua already officially announced as having fallen from grace last year, both of Xi Jinping’s highest-ranking confidants in the military have now been placed under investigation. Some analysts suggest that Xi’s actions stem from a fundamental distrust of the military leadership. However, the question remains—what does purging his own trusted allies actually achieve for Xi?
It is almost certain that the downfall of He Weidong and Miao Hua will drag more military leaders into the fray. On the evening of March 25, Zhao Lanjian made another exclusive revelation on X (formerly Twitter), claiming that on March 22, Commander of the PLA Rocket Force Wang Houbin was arrested on the spot in his office. This arrest came less than two years after Wang was promoted to the rank of General and appointed Commander of the Rocket Force.
In July 2023, after reports emerged overseas that Rocket Force Commander Li Yuchao, Deputy Commanders Wu Guohua, Liu Guangbin, and Zhang Zhenzhong were under investigation, Xi Jinping responded by promoting two new generals just before the PLA’s August 1st Army Day celebrations. Their appointments were publicly announced: Wang Houbin as Commander of the Rocket Force; Xu Xisheng as Political Commissar of the Rocket Force. Both men were outsiders to the Rocket Force—Wang was from the Navy, and Xu from the Air Force—suggesting that Xi had completely lost trust in the internal leadership of the Rocket Force. Instead, he sought to control it through generals and political officers he personally trusted.
According to records, Wang Houbin joined the military in 1979 and held key positions in the Navy, including: Director of the General Staff Department’s Comprehensive Research Office; Deputy Chief of Staff of the East Sea Fleet and Deputy Commander of the Zhoushan Naval Base; Promoted to Rear Admiral in December 2014; Chief of Staff of the South Sea Fleet in January 2016; Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy in April 2018; Promoted to Vice Commander of the Navy in December 2018; Promoted to Vice Admiral in December 2019; Member of the Navy Party Committee.
Xu Xisheng’s Background. Born in 1964 in Shandong, Xu Xisheng’s exact enlistment date is unclear. He previously held positions such as: Political Commissar of the Fuzhou Air Command; Director of the Political Department of the Beijing Military Region Air Force; Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Theater Command Air Force; Promoted to Political Commissar of the Southern Theater Command Air Force in June 2017; Promoted to Air Force Lieutenant General in 2018; In early 2023, appeared on CCTV as a Central Committee member, Deputy Political Commissar of the Southern Theater Command, and Political Commissar of the Southern Theater Command Air Force.
With senior military officers falling one after another, Xi Jinping faces a growing challenge in finding commanders he can trust. Typically, for an officer to rise, they must not only be personally familiar with Xi but also receive approval from figures like Miao Hua and other CMC members. Miao Hua’s endorsement, in particular, carried significant weight. So, why were Wang Houbin and Xu Xisheng selected?
One possibility is that Miao Hua played a role in recommending Wang Houbin. Miao previously served in the Navy, where he became Political Commissar in late 2014, overlapping with Wang’s tenure. Another possibility is that Xi himself had a favorable impression of Wang from his time governing Zhejiang and Shanghai, or from visits to Zhoushan, where Wang may have been serving as Deputy Chief of Staff of the East Sea Fleet and Deputy Commander of the Zhoushan Base.
According to reports from the Chinese Communist Party's official media, Xi Jinping made five visits to Zhoushan for research during his time in Zhejiang, with each visit focused on the theme of the marine economy. This is significant because Zhoushan hosts a Chinese Communist Navy base, which plays a crucial role in any potential military action against Taiwan. During Xi's visit to Zhoushan and his inspection of the naval base, Wang Houbin's display of 'loyalty' may have caught Xi's attention.
Xu Xisheng, who is from the Air Force, also comes from Fujian. Xi Jinping worked in Fujian for 17 years from 1985 to 2002, during which he held several key positions, including First Secretary of the Fuzhou Military District Party Committee, Director of the Fujian Provincial Defense Mobilization Committee, and Deputy Director of the Nanjing Military Region Defense Mobilization Committee. The military unit he interacted with most frequently was the 31st Group Army stationed in Xiamen, which is part of the Nanjing Military Region; He Weidong, the current Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, is from this group army.
The Fuzhou Command of the Air Force was established in 1960 and later reorganized into the Air Force's 8th Army. In 2003, the 8th Army was restructured into the Fuzhou Command of the Air Force. Prior to the military reform in 2016, the Fuzhou Command was under the Air Force of the Nanjing Military Region of the Chinese Communist Party. It is clear that Xu Xisheng had interactions with Xi Jinping during his time in Fujian. He was transferred to the Political Department of the Beijing Military Region Air Force by February 2015 at the latest, and subsequently advanced in rank, with his move to Beijing and promotions occurring during Xi's consolidation of power. Xi is likely to believe that Xu is 'loyal' to him.
According to reports from mainland media, in February 2023, during the graduation ceremony of a study class for newly appointed members and alternate members of the Central Committee, as well as major provincial and ministerial leaders focusing on Xi Jinping's thoughts, Xu Xisheng expressed his loyalty and quoted the saying often attributed to Xi Jinping and his father: 'The country is the people, and the people are the country.'
With Wang Houbin now implicated in a corruption case, likely linked to the Miao Hua corruption scandal, one might wonder if Xu Xisheng, who has ties to He Weidong, will remain unaffected. The repeated troubles faced by these generals aligned with Xi—do they not serve as a basis for external observers to evaluate whether Xi maintains control over the military?
Additionally, another recent indicator of Xi's control over the military is the latest statement from the Shandong Provincial Military District. On March 23, the People's Liberation Army Daily published a report titled 'Shandong Provincial Military District Deeply Studies and Implements the Spirit of the Central Military Commission's Political Work Conference.' Like previous statements from various military districts in recent months, it also downplayed references to 'Chairman Xi,' avoided mentioning the political loyalty issues that concern Xi, and ceased expressions of loyalty.
Such statements are unusual, echoing a report from January this year regarding the 'Shaanxi Provincial Military District Deeply Studies and Implements the Spirit of the Central Military Commission's Political Work Conference.' At that time, the report mentioned 'Chairman Xi' only once, and there was no further reference to Xi throughout the article, nor any expressions of flattery or loyalty.
It is important to note that Fuping County in Shaanxi is Xi Jinping's hometown, where his father, Xi Zhongxun, has a relatively large grave. Zhao Yide, who comes from Zhejiang and currently serves as the Secretary of the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee and the First Secretary of the Provincial Military District Party Committee, is a member of the 'Xi family army.'
Additionally, the current commander of the Shaanxi Military District, Ming Zunqiang, comes from Shandong. Tang Shuhai, who was appointed as the political commissar of the Shaanxi Military District in 2023, previously served at a research institute within the Strategic Support Force. Both individuals are suspected of having connections to the Xi faction. This explains why, in recent years, the statements from the Shaanxi Military District have been filled with praise and expressions of loyalty towards Xi. With the military district commander and secretary from Xi's hometown making such declarations, the effort to downplay 'Chairman Xi' suggests that the orders are certainly not originating from Xi himself.
Turning to Shandong, it is the hometown of Xi's wife, Peng Liyuan. The current Secretary of the Shandong Provincial Party Committee, Director of the Standing Committee of the Provincial People's Congress, and First Secretary of the Party Committee of the Military District, Lin Wu, is originally from Fujian and is viewed as a member of the 'Xi family army.' The current commander of the Shandong Military District is Shi Huajie, who assumed office in May 2024, while the political commissar is Wang Aiguo, who has held the position since 2021. The recent statements from the Shandong Military District that downplay Xi also indicate that the orders are not coming from Xi, but are similarly related to shifts in the power dynamics of the Military Commission.
Perhaps changes in Lin Wu's rhetoric can provide insights into the evolving situation in Zhongnanhai. On the afternoon of January 18 this year, a meeting was convened in Jinan for the first secretary of the Party Committee of the Shandong Military Sub-district and the Garrison District to report on their work. In his address, Lin Wu refrained from the usual flattery towards Xi and did not mention political loyalty issues. Instead, he emphasized the need to 'effectively align thoughts and actions with Xi Jinping's important directives and the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee.'
In 2024, Lin Wu stated at the same conference that the focus should be on political leadership, emphasizing the need to deeply understand and grasp concepts, forge loyalty, and strive to promote action through knowledge. In 2023, Lin Wu's remarks included that the party committees at all levels of the provincial military district are resolutely implementing the decisions and deployments of Chairman Xi Jinping and the Party Central Committee, as well as the Central Military Commission. He emphasized the importance of maintaining the correct direction, clearly prioritizing political matters, and ensuring absolute loyalty, while also referencing the "two establishments" and "two safeguards."
Furthermore, Mr. Jiang Wangzheng, who lives in Australia, disclosed over a month ago that Lin Wu is currently undergoing an exit audit. After just two years as the Secretary of the Shandong Provincial Party Committee, changes are taking place. What does this signify?
With a series of incidents involving generals from the Xi faction in the Chinese military, and Xi's recent visits to Yunnan and Guizhou without any vice chairmen of the Military Commission accompanying him, do these developments indicate that Xi is losing military power?
(First published by People News)
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