Even Xi s home province Shaanxi Military District no longer pledges allegiance to him

Chinese paramilitary police stand guard at Tiananmen Square. (China Photos/Getty Images)

[People News] As we enter 2025, in less than a month, the Chinese military and state media have consecutively released signals indicating that the Party leader no longer holds military power and that his authority has been weakened. These signals are even more pronounced than those released after the Third Plenary Session in July 2024. Specifically:

  1. At the New Year’s cultural performance hosted by the Central Military Commission (CMC) on January 17 to honor retired cadres stationed in Beijing, Xi Jinping’s close-up shots were fewer than last year, and he was not given a single close-up during the performance. In contrast to Xi's forced smiles and expressionless demeanor after the performance, Zhang Youxia, the First Vice Chairman of the CMC, appeared relaxed and cheerful. Moreover, the content of the performance was entirely different from last year, focusing on loyalty to the Communist Party rather than to "Chairman Xi."

  2. On January 17, the PLA Daily published a report titled "The Jiangsu Military District Deepens Study and Implementation of the Central Military Commission Political Work Conference Spirit – Inheriting Fine Traditions, Typical Models Leading the Way." The report made no mention of "Chairman Xi" throughout.

  3. On January 14 and 15, Xinhua News Agency, the PLA Daily, and CCTV published three heavyweight articles commemorating the 90th anniversary of the Zunyi Conference. These articles collectively signaled that the current Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is replacing "Xi as the sole authority" with "centralized and unified leadership."

  4. On January 13, the PLA Daily and the PLA's official website published an article in their "Study the Political Work Conference of the CMC" column. This article featured reflections from the PLA General Hospital's Ninth Medical Center. Like many similar articles recently, this one also did not mention "Chairman Xi" at all.

  5. On January 10, in a report by the Ministry of Public Security celebrating the fifth Police Day, Xi Jinping was mentioned only once, and there was no mention of the pledge of loyalty phrases such as "2442" (an abbreviation for loyalty pledges often used in pro-Xi propaganda).

  6. On January 9, at the National Conference of Directors of Veteran Affairs held in Beijing, Xinhua News Agency and the PLA Daily deliberately removed words of praise for Minister Pei Jinjia, considered a member of Xi's "Fujian clique," including loyalty slogans like "2442," which are typically standard in such reports.

On January 24, the PLA Daily published a report titled "The Shaanxi Military District Deepens Study and Implementation of the Central Military Commission Political Work Conference Spirit," which once again revealed unusual information.

Similar to previous reports, this article mentioned "Chairman Xi" only once, specifically in the phrase "earnestly study the important spirit of Chairman Xi’s speech at the Central Military Commission Political Work Conference," and did not mention Xi again throughout the article. Furthermore, there were no words of praise or pledges of loyalty to Xi. What is most surprising about this stance is that it comes from Xi Jinping's close associates.

It is well-known that Fuping County in Shaanxi is Xi Jinping’s hometown, where his father, Xi Zhongxun, has a large tomb. Additionally, the current Party Secretary of Shaanxi Province, Zhao Yide, is a member of the "Xi family army."

According to available information, Zhao Yide was born in 1965 in Wenling, Zhejiang, and holds a graduate degree from the Zhejiang Provincial Party School. He has held positions such as a member of the Zhejiang Provincial Standing Committee and Party Secretary of Hangzhou. During Xi Jinping's tenure in Zhejiang, Zhao served as Secretary of the Provincial Youth League Committee. Zhao also has connections with Xi's trusted allies, Cai Qi and Li Qiang. In 2013, when Cai Qi was a member of the Zhejiang Provincial Standing Committee and Executive Vice Governor, and Li Qiang was the governor, Zhao Yide served as the Provincial Secretary-General.

Thanks to the promotion by Xi and Cai, Zhao Yide became Party Secretary of Hangzhou in 2015, Deputy Party Secretary of Hebei Province from 2018 to 2020, and was transferred to Shaanxi in July 2020, where he successively served as Deputy Party Secretary, Governor, and Party Secretary of the province. In 2023, he became Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Shaanxi Provincial People's Congress and First Party Secretary of the Shaanxi Military District.

The Shaanxi Military District is subordinate to the Central Theater Command of the PLA and operates under the dual leadership of the military system and the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee and government. It is primarily responsible for militia, reserve forces, conscription, mobilization, and garrison duties in Xi'an. As the First Party Secretary of the Shaanxi Military District, Zhao Yide wields significant power. Did this stance from the Shaanxi Military District receive Zhao Yide's approval?

Now, let’s look at the current Commander of the Shaanxi Military District, Ming Zunqiang. Limited information about him has been officially released, but it is known that he was born in 1969 in Yuncheng, Shandong, and was promoted to Commander in May 2024. According to Shaanxi Daily, on May 26, 2024, the Suide Revolutionary Memorial Hall was inaugurated in Mizhou Town, Suide County. Shaanxi Provincial Party Secretary Zhao Yide, Governor Zhao Gang, Xi Jinping’s relative Xi Yuanping, and Commander Ming Zunqiang attended the event. Previously, Major General Zhao Tianxiang served as both a member of the Shaanxi Provincial Standing Committee and Commander of the Military District.

There is also an earlier piece of news: in May 2021, during a visit by Qian Feng, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs, to Xi'an for research purposes, Ming Zunqiang attended as a "responsible officer of a certain unit." This suggests that Ming had been serving in military positions in Shaanxi for some time.

Speculation about Ming Zunqiang’s promotion background arises due to his birthplace. Xi Jinping’s wife, Peng Liyuan, is also from Yuncheng County. Given Peng’s military background, particularly her role as Chairwoman of the CMC Evaluation Committee, it is not implausible that Ming leveraged his hometown connection with Peng for advancement.

Meanwhile, Tang Shuhai, who became Political Commissar of the Shaanxi Military District in 2023, previously worked at a research institute under the Strategic Support Force. On March 22, 2016, PLA Daily published his article "Forming Unique Advantages in Key Scientific Research Fields." His transfer from a research institute to serve as Political Commissar of the Shaanxi Military District is also noteworthy.

Interestingly, Zhao Yide and Ming Zunqiang, both with ties to Xi Jinping, adopted a very different tone last year. On July 18, 2023, PLA Daily published an article by Tang Shuhai titled "Creating a Peaceful and Stable Political Environment" regarding the study of the CMC Political Work Conference. This article repeatedly mentioned "Chairman Xi," including phrases such as:

"Chairman Xi, at the Central Military Commission Political Work Conference, profoundly explained the contemporary requirements for building a politically strong military..." "Fully implementing the CMC Chairman Responsibility System to ensure absolute loyalty, purity, and reliability, and resolutely following the command of the Party Central Committee, the CMC, and Chairman Xi under any circumstances..."

In previous years, statements from the Shaanxi Military District were filled with praise and pledges of loyalty to Xi. In 2023, the Shaanxi Military District even hosted an online live course on "Studying and Implementing Xi Thought."

That both the Commander and Party Secretary of Xi’s hometown military district are now downplaying "Chairman Xi" indicates that this directive did not come from Xi Jinping himself. The behind-the-scenes decision-makers among the CCP elders may have chosen to use military districts linked to Xi—such as those in Jiangsu and Shaanxi—to send signals of Xi's loss of power. Could the Fujian Military District be next? 

(First published by People News)