Loyalty Language Removed from Military Newspaper and State Media Reports: Evidence of Xi Jinping's Changing Status

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[People News] Since the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) Third Plenary Session in July last year, there have been unusual changes in reports about the party leader from the CCP's military newspaper and official state media. These anomalies reflect irregularities within the military and higher levels of the CCP. This has led to speculation regarding whether Xi Jinping still holds military power and retains his status as the "core" leader. Increasing signs suggest that Xi's position within the military and the party has indeed shifted, even though he continues to dominate media coverage daily.

The latest indication is that Xinhua News Agency has omitted standard loyalty language in its reports about Zhang Jun, President of the Supreme People's Court, and Ying Yong, Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, during their meetings summarizing work in 2024 and outlining key tasks for 2025.

According to a Xinhua report on January 13, Zhang Jun emphasized during the National Court Presidents' Meeting that the judiciary must be guided by "Xi Jinping Thought," implement the directives of the Central Political and Legal Work Conference, adhere to the CCP's absolute leadership, and deliver impartial justice.

On the same day, Ying Yong stressed at the National Procurator-Generals' Meeting the need to focus on core responsibilities of legal oversight, better serve the overall situation, and continue advancing prosecutorial practices under Xi Jinping's rule-of-law thought. He also pledged to uphold the CCP's "absolute leadership" and "resolutely safeguard the authority and centralized leadership of the Party Central Committee."

However, reports on the official websites of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate were far more elaborate. The Supreme People's Court report, reviewing achievements over the past year, attributed successes to Xi's "leadership and guidance at the helm" and the influence of "Xi Jinping Thought." For the coming year, it emphasized placing learning and practicing "Xi Jinping Thought" as the top priority and unwaveringly implementing the party's absolute leadership while aligning closely with the "Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core." Phrases like "leadership and guidance at the helm" have been standard expressions of loyalty and flattery in recent years.

Similarly, the Supreme People's Procuratorate report prominently featured Ying Yong's emphasis on "Xi Jinping Thought" in its opening paragraph and included standard loyalty expressions such as "2442" (a reference to key loyalty pledges), "Xi Jinping as the core," and "resolutely safeguarding the authority and centralized leadership of the Party Central Committee." This aligns with Ying Yong's background, as he served under Xi Jinping during Xi's tenure as Party Secretary of Zhejiang Province from 2002 to 2007, gaining Xi's trust and becoming a key member of the "Xi faction."

It is notable that Xinhua's report omitted such loyalty expressions, including "leadership at the helm," "Xi Jinping as the core," and "2442." This is not a minor matter. Just a few days earlier, the same pattern appeared in the military newspaper.

According to a report by the CCP's military newspaper, the National Meeting of Directors of Veterans Affairs Departments (Bureaus) was held in Beijing on January 9. In the first paragraph of the report, it mentioned being guided by "Xi Jinping Thought," and in the final section, it referenced Xi’s significant directives regarding areas of work. However, the report contained no other mentions of Xi Jinping and entirely omitted customary loyalty phrases like "2442."

In contrast, the report on the National Veterans Affairs Ministry's website was markedly different. It not only included phrases like "under the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core" and "2442," but also lavishly praised Xi. It attributed the achievements in various areas of work to Xi’s role as "the core of the Party Central Committee, the core of the entire Party," his "guidance at the helm," the influence of "Xi Jinping Thought," and his efforts to "unite hearts and souls with Xi Jinping Thought."

The use of such language by Pei Jinjia, who hails from Fujian and is considered a member of Xi's "Fujian faction," is unsurprising. What is puzzling, however, is why the military newspaper dared to omit these laudatory mentions of Xi. Likewise, who gave the state media the audacity to do so?

Would such a situation arise if Xi Jinping still firmly controlled the military and remained the undisputed "General Secretary"? The answer is clearly negative. The inconsistencies and abnormalities in the military newspaper and state media suggest that CCP elders may be maneuvering behind the scenes.

Apart from the military newspaper and state media omitting loyalty phrases for Xi-aligned officials, there are cases of self-censorship among Xi’s loyalists. For example, Wang Xiaohong, a close ally of Xi who leads the Ministry of Public Security, made only a single mention of Xi Jinping in a January 10 report celebrating the 5th Police Day. The report entirely omitted the "2442" loyalty language, a stark departure from similar Police Day reports in 2023 and 2024. In fact, Wang Xiaohong’s reduced mentions of Xi began after the Third Plenary Session last year. While there was a brief return to references to "Xi Jinping Thought," it seemed largely perfunctory. Therefore, Wang Xiaohong's positioning amid high-level political shifts is worth observing.

The omission of loyalty language by Xi-aligned officials, the removal of such language by the military newspaper and state media, and the self-restraint shown by Xi-aligned figures all signal a real shift in Xi’s status. These changes reflect ongoing internal struggles within the CCP leadership, with the broader trend moving against Xi and his faction.

(Originally published by People News)