What Hidden Secrets Lie Behind Wang Huning's Frequent Visits Amid Abnormal Zhongnanhai Political Dynamics?

File Photo: On October 23, 2022, Wang Huning, a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Standing Committee, attended a press conference at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing alongside other newly appointed members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and both domestic and international journalists. (Photo by Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)

[Peopel News] Recently, the political dynamics within the CCP's top leadership have been unusually turbulent, with abnormal behavior observed among the "Seven Elders" (top leaders). There are shocking rumors that Xi Jinping may soon step down from his positions as General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Some political observers and well-known independent commentators, such as Chen Pokong, have analyzed recent activities of the CCP's top leadership over the past two months. They believe that Xi is highly likely to resign from these positions citing health reasons, either at the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session or the 21st Party Congress, while retaining his role as State President.

Recent public activities of the seven top leaders in Zhongnanhai reveal unusual patterns. After returning to Beijing on November 23 from the 19th G20 Leaders' Summit in Brazil, Xi Jinping’s appearances have not been reported by state media, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Xi’s dedicated activity pages, or Baidu's hot searches. Instead, recent state media coverage has focused predominantly on Wang Huning.

The "Wang Huning Special Report Collection" on state media highlights his activities: November 22: "Wang Huning Conducts Research in Hainan" and "Wang Huning Attends the Opening Ceremony of the 12th National Traditional Games of Ethnic Minorities." November 23 (the day of Xi’s return): "Wang Huning Meets with Kazakh State Advisor Karin." Several unusual phenomena stand out: Since October, Wang Huning has been conducting frequent research visits to various provinces, with high-profile coverage by state media. His trips include visits to Zhejiang, Xinjiang, and Hainan.

Typically, such provincial research visits by members of the Politburo Standing Committee are rare, except in the lead-up to significant meetings, such as the National Economic Work Conference or the Fourth or Fifth Plenary Sessions. It is even rarer for the Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a largely ceremonial position, to conduct frequent field visits.

Moreover, Wang Huning is known for his "reclusive" nature, rarely leaving Beijing. Except for one notable instance when he went to a train station to welcome North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Wang has hardly been seen outside Zhongnanhai. Rumors suggest his father, during the Cultural Revolution, confined him and his siblings indoors for fear of accidents, fostering what some call a "stay-at-home syndrome."

Yet, over the past month, Wang has been frequently traveling to various provinces, often accompanied by Shi Taifeng. This raises the question: Who is Shi Taifeng?

Shi Taifeng is currently a member of the CCP Politburo, Secretary of the CCP Secretariat, Minister of the CCP United Front Work Department, and Vice Chairman and Deputy Secretary of the Party Group of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). When Wang Huning conducted research visits to Xinjiang’s Hotan and Kashgar, he was not only accompanied by Shi Taifeng but also by Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui and others. This level of accompaniment is clearly high-profile, matching the protocol typically reserved for General Secretary Xi Jinping’s visits. This unusual arrangement stands out.

Moreover, during his visits, Wang Huning frequently referenced "Xi Jinping Thought." Party media often prefaced Wang's remarks with terms like "emphasized" and "demanded," a rhetorical style commonly seen in reports on Xi’s speeches. Independent commentator Chen Pokong analyzed that since the Third Plenary Session earlier this year—after a reported head injury to Xi—the use of phrases like "Xi Jinping Spirit," "Socialism in the New Era," and "Two Establishes and Two Safeguards" has significantly declined in public discourse. This shift suggests a political compromise among factions, including the Party elders, the "Princeling" faction, and Xi’s allies, in light of domestic and international challenges and previous policy missteps. This compromise appears to involve reducing Xi’s power and implementing a system of "collective leadership" where responsibilities are divided among factions.

The high-profile nature of Wang Huning's visits, as well as the presence of Shi Taifeng, likely reflects agreement among the Party elders and collective leadership. Wang and Shi’s frequent use of slogans in public seems intentional, possibly aimed at balancing factions and ensuring a smooth transition in anticipation of significant political changes.

Chen Pokong speculated that the frequent research visits by Politburo Standing Committee members could signal that the CCP is preparing for the Fourth Plenary Session. If Xi steps down as General Secretary due to health reasons, Wang Huning might temporarily assume the role until the 21st Party Congress, where Hu Chunhua (a member of the Communist Youth League faction) could potentially take over.

Chen further noted that figures like Cai Qi, Li Qiang, and Hu Chunhua are all part of the post-1960s generation. Xi might find it difficult to accept their ascension at this stage, as there are still eligible leaders from the post-1950s generation. Moreover: Cai Qi has a poor reputation. Li Qiang lacks sufficient experience. The Party elders would likely oppose both. Wang Huning, on the other hand, is a "three-generation veteran" who has served under Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. He is perceived as relatively neutral, having no major involvement in contentious issues such as anti-corruption campaigns, Hu Jintao’s removal from a Party Congress, or Li Keqiang’s death. This makes him an acceptable choice for all factions. The military also views Wang, a scholar with no military background, as an easy figure to control. His role in crafting ideological doctrines like the "Three Represents," "Scientific Development," and "Thought for the New Era" further bolsters this perception.

Political observers believe Xi is unlikely to relinquish all his positions. If he steps down as General Secretary, he would likely also resign as Chairman of the Central Military Commission. However, he may retain the title of State President, which allows him to meet foreign dignitaries, issue decrees, and maintain the prestigious title of "President Xi." Retaining this role could also provide him with a degree of protection against his political enemies.

In conclusion, while the CCP’s political landscape is highly volatile and historically has seen sudden falls from power, it remains uncertain whether Xi will step down from his Party positions. The decision to choose a transitional figure through factional compromise before the 21st Party Congress is still up in the air.