Cai Qi (right) and Wang Xiaohong (left) serve as Xi Jinping;s gatekeepers. (Composite image)
[People News] Following the purging of Xi Jinping’s No. 1 trusted figure in the military—former CCP Politburo member and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission He Weidong—and his No. 2 military loyalist—former CMC member and Director of the CMC Political Work Department Miao Hua, who were both expelled from the Party and the military and handed over to the Military Procuratorate for prosecution—three other major confidants personally promoted and heavily used by Xi—Ma Xingrui, Li Xi, and Wang Xiaohong—also appear to have run into trouble.
I. Is Ma Xingrui Under Investigation?
On December 8, the CCP Politburo held a meeting. Overseas sources revealed that, according to reliable information, Politburo member Ma Xingrui was absent from that meeting.
Ten days earlier, on November 28, the Politburo held a meeting to review the “Comprehensive Report on the Inspection of Provinces Under the 20th Central Committee.” Regarding whether Ma Xingrui attended that meeting, two claims circulated overseas: one said he was absent; another said he attended but was taken away at the venue.
On the afternoon of November 28, the Politburo held a group study session. CCTV footage showed that Ma Xingrui was absent.
Ma Xingrui was personally promoted and heavily used by Xi at the 20th Party Congress and is regarded as one of Xi’s important confidants.
Financial Times once quoted insiders saying that Ma Xingrui has family ties with Xi’s wife Peng Liyuan, and that he frequently visited the Xi family even before Xi came to power—making him the high-ranking official closest to Xi.
Ma Xingrui, a technocrat from the aerospace system, has received continuous promotions from Xi since he took power:
— March 2013: Vice Minister of Industry and Information Technology, Director of the National Space Administration, Director of the China Atomic Energy Authority, Director of the National Defense Science and Technology Industry Administration
— From November 2013: Deputy Party Secretary of Guangdong, Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee, Party Secretary of Shenzhen, Governor of Guangdong
— December 2021: Party Secretary of Xinjiang
— October 2022: “Elected” as a member of the 20th Politburo.
If nothing unexpected happened, Ma Xingrui was expected to become a candidate for the Politburo Standing Committee at the 21st Party Congress.
However, on July 1 this year, Ma was suddenly removed from his post as Xinjiang Party Secretary, with the explanation of being “reassigned.”
Since no major incidents occurred in Xinjiang, Ma’s sudden removal was indeed suspicious. Five months have now passed, and the CCP still has not announced a new position for him. This suggests his removal likely means he encountered a serious problem.
After Ma Xingrui left Xinjiang, his subordinates there were successively investigated:
— Nov. 1: Xinjiang CPPCC Vice Chairman Jin Zhizhen investigated
— Nov. 10: Urumqi Deputy Party Secretary and Political-Legal Committee Secretary Ma Zhijun investigated
— Nov. 30: Xinjiang Executive Vice Chairman Chen Weijun investigated.
For a period of time, rumors circulated overseas that Ma Xingrui’s wife Rong Li, his younger brother Ma Xingquan, and his secretary Li Guangdong were being investigated by the discipline commission. Ma’s financial interests with Xi’s brother-in-law Xu Xingjian have also resurfaced.
In addition, the 2023 Rocket Force corruption case implicated several military-industrial enterprises in the aerospace system. Some high-ranking officials who fell—or “disappeared”—had connections with Ma Xingrui, who worked in the aerospace sector for 17 years. Whether he is involved in these corruption cases has become a key focus of attention.
Taken together, the likelihood that Ma Xingrui is under CCDI investigation is high.
II. Is Li Xi Being Dragged Down?
The December 8 Politburo meeting had two major abnormalities compared with December meetings of the previous two years:
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In previous years, before the December Politburo meeting, Xi would preside over a Politburo Standing Committee meeting to listen to the annual report from the CCDI and National Supervisory Commission. This year, Xi did not hold such a meeting.
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The December Politburo meetings in prior years always included:
— listening to reports from the CCDI
— planning next year’s anti-corruption work
— setting the date for the next January CCDI Plenary Session.
This year’s meeting did none of these: no anti-corruption agenda, no CCDI report, no date for the 2026 CCDI session.
In other words, by normal practice, Politburo Standing Committee member and CCDI Secretary Li Xi should have been one of the central figures of the meeting. But all agenda items relating to him were removed.
The November 28 Politburo meeting focused on reviewing the inspection report on provinces. Li Xi is head of the Central Inspection Leading Group. By convention, he should have attended. However, the CCP’s media report only contained text—no photos or video—so his presence cannot be confirmed.
Overseas reports claimed Li Xi was absent. At the Politburo group study session that afternoon, CCTV footage showed that among the seven Standing Committee members, Li Xi alone was absent.
Since Li Xi last appeared publicly on November 20 at the symposium marking the 110th anniversary of Hu Yaobang’s birth, 19 days have passed without a public appearance.
Li Xi, personally promoted by Xi to the 20th Politburo Standing Committee and appointed CCDI Secretary, is considered one of Xi’s most important confidants.
Among the seven Standing Committee members, Li Xi follows Xi the closest. The CCDI is Xi’s tool for power struggle—whoever Xi wants purged, Li Xi purges. The number of high-ranking officials investigated under Li Xi each year exceeds that under his predecessor Zhao Leji.
Because Li Xi and Ma Xingrui both missed the November 28 Politburo group study, some speculate that Li Xi may be implicated in Ma’s problems. This suspicion is plausible.
When Li Xi was Guangdong Party Secretary, Ma Xingrui was the Governor. They worked together for four years (2017–2021).
Overseas sources claim Li Xi’s wife had long been doing business in Hong Kong with Ma Xingrui’s wife Rong Li. Rong Li, Li Xi’s wife, and Peng Liyuan all belong to the “wives’ faction.” The Li family, Ma family, and Peng Liyuan’s family may have intertwined interests.
If Ma Xingrui is investigated, it is entirely possible he could implicate Li Xi.
III. Has Wang Xiaohong Been Stripped of Power?
On December 3, Xinhua News reported that State Councilor and Director of the National Narcotics Control Commission Wang Xiaohong delivered a speech at the National Narcotics Control Commission’s plenary session and national video conference on anti-drug work.
The report did not mention Wang Xiaohong’s most important position: Minister of Public Security.
On November 21, Xinhua reported that Central Secretariat Secretary and State Councilor Wang Xiaohong recently conducted inspections in Xi’an and Yan’an (Shaanxi) and Yinchuan and Zhongwei (Ningxia).
Again, the report did not mention his role as Minister of Public Security.
On November 7–8, FBI Director Christopher Wray visited Beijing to discuss fentanyl trafficking and law-enforcement cooperation. The CCP representative who met him was not Minister of Public Security and Narcotics Commission Director Wang Xiaohong, but the third-ranking vice minister of Public Security, Xu Datong.
Fentanyl is the biggest drug crisis faced by the U.S. and one of the most important issues in U.S.–China relations. Under normal circumstances, Wang Xiaohong should have met Wray. But he was absent from this key diplomatic engagement.
On April 16 this year, Vice Minister of Public Security and Director of the Immigration Administration Xu Ganlu was dismissed. Xu, from Tong’an, Fujian, worked in Fujian’s public-security system for many years and was one of Wang Xiaohong’s old subordinates and hometown associates.
On July 9, two key vice ministers—Chen Siyuan and Sun Maoli—were dismissed simultaneously. One oversaw daily operations; the other oversaw finance and equipment. Together, they formed the core of Wang Xiaohong’s support structure in the ministry.
Thus, three of Wang Xiaohong’s major power pillars in the Ministry of Public Security—his trusted men who controlled the “national border, administrative affairs, and purse strings”—have all been removed and replaced by a new team with no ties to him.
Currently, the nine top officials in the Public Security Ministry include Minister Wang Xiaohong; Executive Vice Minister Qi Yanjun; CCDI Secretary Ren Airong; Vice Ministers Xu Datong, Wang Zhizhong, Ling Zhifeng, and Yang Weilin; Party Committee member and Political Department Director Jia Lijun (vice-ministerial rank); and Counterterrorism Commissioner Yue Xiuhu (vice-ministerial rank). Except for Qi Yanjun, the other seven cannot be considered Wang Xiaohong’s confidants.
The events of November–December, combined with the internal reshuffling of senior personnel, show that Wang Xiaohong—Xi’s most important loyalist in charge of the “knife handle”—has seen his power significantly reduced.
In addition, Wang Xiaohong and Cai Qi—both Xi loyalists—are representatives of the “Fujian faction.” With the downfall of the military’s Fujian-faction leaders such as He Weidong, Miao Hua, Lin Xiangyang, Qin Shutang, and Wang Xiubin, whether Wang Xiaohong and Cai Qi will also be implicated or toppled has become a subject of domestic and overseas attention.
Conclusion
After the 20th Party Congress, the CCP’s political situation has entered an era of near-complete black-box operation. Recently, the CCP has suddenly stirred up another wave of anti-Japan sentiment. In my view, this is a smokescreen intended to divert attention from internal power-struggle crises. The harder the CCP pushes “anti-Japan,” the sharper and more intense the internal infighting.
No matter what pretty coverings are placed over an abscess, it will eventually burst.
After the He Weidong and Miao Hua scandals exploded, will a major case surrounding figures like Ma Xingrui also erupt? Will Wang Xiaohong remain in his post as Minister of Public Security? Let us wait and see.
— The Dajiyuan
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