4th Plenary Session Set for October 20 – Xi Jinping’s Final Outcome Draws Attention

Dark clouds loom over Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. (Feng Li/Getty Images)

[People News] After being delayed for a year, the CCP’s 20th Central Committee 4th Plenary Session has finally been scheduled. On September 29, the CCP Politburo held a meeting and decided that the 4th Plenary Session would be held in Beijing from October 20 to 23. The personnel arrangements to be decided at this plenary, as well as the question of Xi Jinping’s future, have once again triggered heated discussion.

According to state media Xinhua, at the September 29 Politburo meeting, the Politburo heard a report on the “solicitation of opinions” regarding the draft of the Proposal on Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, and decided that, after revisions based on the discussion, the draft will be submitted to the 20th 4th Plenary Session for review. The meeting also decided the plenary will be held October 20–23 in Beijing, and “studied other matters.”

As is widely known, the “other matters” reviewed at Politburo meetings are often not directly related to the stated theme, but are very important, most likely involving personnel issues.

Earlier the same day, Hong Kong’s Sing Tao Daily analysed that, in addition to reviewing the 15th Five-Year Plan Proposal, the 4th Plenary Session may also involve high-level personnel decisions.

For example, former Director of the Central Military Commission Political Work Department, General Miao Hua—who fell in November last year and was removed from the CMC—may be officially expelled from the Party. Analysts believe the Politburo will pass the Report on the Review and Handling of Miao Hua’s Issues and decide to expel him from the CCP and terminate his delegate status to the 20th Party Congress, with the 4th Plenum confirming this decision.

In addition, former commander of the People’s Armed Police General Wang Chunning and former CMC Logistics Support Department head Lieutenant General Zhang Lin—both 20th Central Committee members who have already been removed as NPC deputies—are also expected to be formally expelled at the 4th Plenary Session.

Meanwhile, CMC Vice Chairman and Politburo member He Weidong has been “missing” from public view for half a year, with no official word on his situation. Analysts suggest his case may not be addressed at this plenary either.

Some have previously assessed that He Weidong’s problems are too complicated, and may not be formally announced even at the 4th Plenary Session.

AP: Xi Jinping Retreating to “Second Line”

Recently, Chinese Premier Li Qiang attended and delivered a speech at the 80th United Nations General Assembly in New York, while Xi Jinping was absent. An AP report on September 2 directly analysed this as showing that Xi is “retreating to the second line.”

The report argued that this change is the latest example of Xi reducing overseas travel and delegating tasks to loyal subordinates. His leadership style seems to be evolving, pushing Li Qiang into a more prominent role.

Neil Thomas, a China politics researcher at the Asia Society Policy Institute, said Li Qiang may become an important interlocutor for governments and companies seeking engagement with China. Thomas noted that age could be a factor: at 72, Xi shows no sign of stepping down, but by cutting back on travel, he is trying to maintain his health and ultimately tighten his grip on power.

Another expert said Xi is delegating, but “this is not decentralisation or structural change. He simply wants others to act on his behalf.”

Neil Thomas further analysed that Li Qiang may become the key point of contact for foreign governments and businesses engaging with Beijing.

Five Major Watch Points at the 4th Plenary

Political commentator Chen Pokong recently told Epoch Times that there are five major watch points for the upcoming 4th Plenary Session. The first watch point is whether Xi Jinping will give up one, two, or all three of his top posts, and whether he will withdraw from the Politburo Standing Committee. A possible scenario, Chen said, is that Xi “yields power without giving up position”—holding on to his titles to preserve face and vanity.

The second watch point is the Politburo itself: it currently has only 24 members (one short of the usual 25, and lacking a female member). After He Weidong’s downfall, another seat is now vacant, so the Politburo needs replenishment. Moreover, Xi’s close ally Ma Xingrui may also be in trouble.

The third watch point is the Central Military Commission: out of its seven members, three seats are now vacant.

The fourth watch point concerns the State Council: of its five State Councillors, two positions are empty—the Foreign Minister and Defence Minister—and these also need to be addressed.

Chen argued that although the 4th Plenary Session appears to be focused on economic and social issues, the real core issue is high-level personnel arrangements. An incomplete Politburo and CMC cannot be left unresolved until the 21st Party Congress. Regardless of whether Xi “yields power and position” or “yields power but not position,” such a large-scale reshuffle would be a heavy blow to him.

The fifth major watch point, Chen added, is whether the image of a successor to Xi Jinping will emerge—for example, Ding Xuexiang, Hu Chunhua, or Chen Jining. If such a figure appears, it would suggest Xi plans to step down at the 21st Party Congress. If no successor emerges, it would indicate Xi still harbours ambitions to rule long-term or “govern from behind the curtain.” But given Xi’s declining health and weakening grip on power, the possibility of him clinging indefinitely to his position is rapidly shrinking.

Chen Pokong previously noted there are four possible scenarios for Xi at the 4th Plenary:

Most conservative version: The plenary discusses only economic and policy matters, no personnel changes. Xi retains all three posts—General Secretary, State President, and CMC Chairman.

Most radical version: Xi is stripped of all posts and steps down—something widely hoped for domestically and internationally.

Third version: Xi yields some power, e.g. stepping down as General Secretary, citing health reasons, while keeping other posts.

Fourth version: Xi does not step down formally but “retires to the second line,” taking only honorary titles. Similar to Mao Zedong in the late 1950s–early 1960s, Xi could push Li Qiang or Ding Xuexiang to front-line leadership while he recedes. This would allow him to preserve life and health while retaining ultimate control.

Chen said all four scenarios remain possible. Based on the Politburo meeting’s hints, however, it is very likely that Xi’s positions will remain unchanged, and he will hold power until the 21st Congress. If Xi refuses to step down, maintains the status quo, and resists pressure from party elders at the Beidaihe meeting, China’s economy will continue to collapse.

Commentator Wen Zhao also observed that adjustments at the plenary are inevitable, but entirely unpredictable until they are announced. If no major personnel changes occur, it means Xi and his loyalists still firmly hold power.

Independent commentator Du Zheng earlier wrote in Taiwan media that since entering his third term, Xi’s misrule has plunged China into a deep economic crisis and heightened political tensions in Beijing. Both the CCP and Xi himself have become targets of opposition inside and outside the system. “Anti-Xi and anti-CCP” sentiment has already become mainstream public opinion in China.

Since the 3rd Plenary last July, persistent rumours about Xi’s health crisis and weakening grip on power have fueled speculation that he may retire at the 4th Plenary Session or at the 21st Party Congress. △