Why Did Mao Zedong Repeatedly Thank the Japanese Army?

Left: Mao Zedong, Right: Lin Biao (Dajiyuan composite)

[People  News] On September 3, both Taiwan and Beijing commemorated the War of Resistance Against Japan, drawing international attention. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) promotes the idea that it was the main force in the war against Japan, but the Republic of China (ROC) President Lai Ching-te does not accept this claim. Regarding the CCP’s large-scale military parade, Lai remarked: “Taiwanese people love peace and do not believe in commemorating peace with guns.” So, was the CCP truly resisting Japan, or was it pretending? Who was really the backbone of the resistance?

September 3 is Armed Forces Day in the Republic of China, a holiday originating from the commemoration of victory in the war against Japan. In terms of propaganda, Beijing and Taiwan approach the occasion very differently. Taiwan displayed over 300 historical images and archival documents. The CCP, meanwhile, used standardised commemorative symbols and tightly controlled propaganda materials. This practice has led many observers to doubt whether the CCP actually played a substantial role in the war of resistance.

Memoirs of key figures shed further light on the CCP’s real stance: “fake resistance, real betrayal, true civil war.”

First, was Mao Zedong himself truly resisting Japan? Let’s look at Mao’s own words.

In the 1995 edition of Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong (p. 535), Mao wrote: “In fact, Japanese imperialism became our good teacher: First, it weakened Chiang Kai-shek; second, it allowed us to develop Communist Party–led base areas and armies. Before the war, due to our own mistakes, our forces had been reduced to just over 20,000. During the eight years of war, our army grew to 1.2 million. You see, didn’t Japan do us a great favour?”

Li Rui, Mao’s former secretary, recalled in his 1999 memoir that Mao had said at the CCP’s Eighth Central Committee Tenth Plenum: “At that time, I told you (addressing Liu Shaoqi and others) not to fight Japan. You didn’t believe me at first, but now you see my idea was correct. After the war began, there were three forces in China: the KMT, the CCP, and Japan. What should the Communist Party do? Let the KMT and Japan fight each other! After they’re both exhausted, the country will naturally be ours!”

In The Truth About Mao Zedong’s Collusion with the Japanese Army, Yuan Tengfei wrote that after the CCP seized power, Mao repeatedly attempted to invite Okamura Yasuji, the commander of Japan’s invasion forces in China, to visit, but failed. Instead, he invited former Japanese Lieutenant General Endō Saburō.

In 1956, when Mao hosted Endō and others in Zhongnanhai, he said: “No! Without your imperial army invading half of China, the Chinese people could not have united… the CCP could not have seized power. So, the Japanese imperial army was a very good teacher for us… We should thank you.”

Later, Mao told visiting Japanese delegations and politicians on various occasions:

“Aggression is, of course, bad, but one cannot look only at the negative side… Japan did us a big favour… We must thank the Japanese imperial army.”

“After occupying half of China, the Chinese people awakened and united… creating the conditions for the Liberation War… If thanks must be given, I would rather thank the Japanese militarists.”

During the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations, when meeting Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, Mao replied: “We should thank Japan. Without Japan’s invasion… we could not have achieved the United Front with the KMT… nor could we have seized power.”

When Tanaka expressed regret that Japan’s invasion had “caused great trouble,” Mao responded: “That was good… That is historical dialectics.”

Zhang Guotao, one of the CCP’s founders and early leaders, published his Memoirs in 1998, where he revealed the CCP’s real attitude toward the war.

At the August 20, 1937, Luochuan Conference, Mao warned members not to be misled by patriotism or rush to the frontlines as heroes. He argued that the Eighth Route Army should stick to guerrilla warfare, avoid frontal clashes, strike where the enemy was weak, and focus on expanding Communist forces and establishing guerrilla bases behind enemy lines.

Zhang recalled Mao’s reaction to the war:
While the KMT fought bitterly for three months around Shanghai and Yan Xishan vowed to defend Shanxi after losing Taiyuan, Mao never praised or encouraged such valour. When Nanjing fell and the KMT retreated in disarray, Mao gleefully described his outlook: if Chiang Kai-shek did not surrender, China’s territory might be lost to Japan, but since Japan could only occupy major cities and lines of communication, the CCP’s guerrilla war in the countryside could expand. Through prolonged struggle, China would rise again—but only under Communist leadership. Thus, Mao concluded, Chiang would lose China to Japan, and the CCP would one day reclaim it.

Two other sources are worth mentioning. Iwai Eiichi, then head of intelligence for the Japanese Foreign Ministry in Shanghai, published Memories of Shanghai in 1983. Building on such works, Endō Homare compiled The Truth About Mao Zedong’s Collusion with the Japanese Army, widely considered authoritative.

According to Endō, during the war, Mao used CCP spy Pan Hannian to infiltrate the Japanese Foreign Ministry, selling the KMT’s military intelligence—obtained through United Front cooperation—to Japan. This was part of Mao’s strategy to weaken the KMT and prepare for its eventual defeat.

He also wrote that Mao exploited Zhang Xueliang’s 1936 Xi’an Incident to end KMT campaigns against the Red Army, obtained weapons from the KMT under the pretext of “cooperation,” and then secretly sold KMT military intelligence to Japanese intelligence agencies.

Public records further reveal the truth.

The KMT fought 22 major battles (such as Shanghai, Wuhan, Changsha), 1,171 medium-scale engagements (over 50,000 troops on each side), and about 38,931 skirmishes.

The CCP, by contrast, engaged in no major battles except for the “Hundred Regiments Offensive,” one of its very few large-scale campaigns.

Even this campaign was criticised internally.

At the 1943 Taihang Bureau meeting, Deng Xiaoping complained: “The Hundred Regiments Offensive exposed our forces too much, caused heavy casualties, and created grave difficulties for our base areas and the Eighth Route Army.” Liu Bocheng later called it a “strategic error,” while Nie Rongzhen condemned the second stage as contrary to guerrilla principles and too costly.

The commander, Peng Dehuai, was later denounced during the Cultural Revolution as a “plotter” and “adventurist,” accused of launching the offensive behind Mao’s back. This demonstrates that the CCP had no real interest in fighting Japan, despite later propaganda that it was the “main force” of the resistance.

Casualty figures of officers further show who bore the brunt of the war.

During the resistance, about 206 KMT generals at division level or above died in battle. In the CCP, strictly speaking, no generals at that level died. At the regimental level, only Deputy Chief of Staff Zuo Quan and 4th Division Commander Peng Xuefeng were killed (many say by illness or bombing, not in combat). Another, Fan Zixia, was killed in a Japanese raid. Altogether, only three can be counted.

By contrast, ample evidence shows the CCP spent the war inciting student strikes and worker unrest behind the lines, undermining the KMT’s war effort.

Japan’s surrender ceremonies also reveal the truth. They were conducted in three stages, at three locations, and all were received by ROC officials:

The Nanjing surrender took place on September 9, 1945, when the Japanese expeditionary forces in China surrendered to the Republic of China (the Nationalist government). The ceremony was held in the auditorium of the Central Army Officer Academy of the Nationalist Government. The surrendering party was General Okamura Yasuji, commander of the Japanese expeditionary forces; the receiving party was Nationalist General He Yingqin.

The Beijing surrender took place on October 10, 1945, at the Hall of Supreme Harmony in Beijing. The Chinese representative was Nationalist General Sun Lianzhong, commander of the 11th War Zone.

The Taiwan surrender ceremony was held at 10 a.m. on October 25, 1945, in the Taipei Public Hall (now Zhongshan Hall). The surrendering party was General Andō Rikichi, Governor-General of Taiwan and commander of the Japanese 10th Area Army. The receiving party was ROC General Chen Yi, Chief Executive of Taiwan Province, who was delegated by China Theatre Commander-in-Chief General He Yingqin as the “principal officer to receive the surrender.”

This last ceremony marked the end of Japan’s 50-year rule over Taiwan and the Pescadores, officially restoring them to the Republic of China—a day commemorated as Taiwan’s retrocession.

Thus, at all three surrender ceremonies, Japan capitulated to the Republic of China government, not the CCP.

The reality is that the KMT exhausted nearly all its forces in the war. When Japan surrendered, the CCP—having built up strength in the rear—launched a civil war to topple the Republic of China. In the end, the ROC government retreated to Taiwan.

Many observers, therefore, conclude that the CCP merely stole the fruits of the ROC’s resistance and lacks any true legitimacy to rule China.

(First published by People News)