Trump Advances Step by Step, Xi Jinping Loses Ground

Trump's soft and hard tactics leave the CCP disoriented. (Image by Qing Yu / People News)

People News - On February 10, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order imposing a 25% tariff on all imported steel and aluminum. White House officials stated that these tariffs will take effect on March 4. Trump also announced plans to establish a reciprocal tariff system that will impose tariffs on products imported from countries that charge high tariffs on U.S. goods.

These two sudden tariff measures seem to represent a global tariff policy. Compared to Trump’s February 1 announcement of increased tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China, there have been significant changes with these new measures.

First Change: The scope of the tariffs has significantly expanded. Countries exporting steel and aluminum to the U.S. include Canada, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Vietnam, the UAE, Russia, and China. Most countries with trade relations with the U.S. have imbalanced tariffs, although the degree of imbalance varies. It appears that Trump is directly declaring a global tariff war and engaging in a tariff showdown.

Second Change: The tariff enforcement is now more reasonable, fair, and feasible. The so-called reciprocal tariff system is not about making excessive demands but rather about ensuring equality and mutual benefit in trade. Free trade is based on mutual benefits rather than one party exploiting the other.

Third Change: Trump’s announcement of these two tariff measures did not mention trade deficits. It remains unclear whether the reciprocal tariff system will address issues such as weighted tariff parity and reducing trade deficits. Moreover, will the reciprocal tariff system apply to China, the largest source of the U.S. trade deficit? How will the U.S. handle systemic issues like large-scale government subsidies by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), intellectual property theft, and forced technology transfers? The reciprocal tariff system may simply lay the groundwork for more open and fair measures to address these challenges.

From an outside perspective, Trump’s 25% tariffs on imported steel and aluminum and the establishment of a reciprocal tariff system seem like a global tariff crackdown rather than a direct attack on the CCP. However, this is not the case. Trump has his own strategy and calculations. In response to the global threats and challenges posed by the CCP, Trump is advancing on all fronts, step by step, steadily and flexibly.

Firstly, the 25% tariffs imposed on steel and aluminum imports to the U.S. have had an indirect yet significant impact on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Taking steel as an example: In 2024, the main sources of U.S. steel imports were Canada (6.5 million tons), Brazil (4.5 million tons), Mexico (3.517 million tons), South Korea (2.8 million tons), and Vietnam (1.36 million tons). China exported very little steel directly to the U.S., but it exported significant quantities to Canada (675,400 tons), Mexico (1.171 million tons), South Korea (8.193 million tons), and Vietnam (12.767 million tons). This means China used these countries to transship steel to the U.S., effectively making profits from American consumers. In August 2024, Canada imposed a 25% tariff on Chinese steel dumping, prompting China to reroute its steel exports through Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia before re-exporting to Canada, which then sent the steel to the U.S. These deceptive transshipment and dumping tactics have unfairly impacted the U.S. steel industry and its workers. Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs are aimed at targeting the CCP’s exploitative trade practices and repairing the damage caused by China’s manipulation of global free trade rules.

Secondly, the reciprocal tariff system has a smaller impact on major free trade countries like Canada but a greater effect on developing countries such as China, Vietnam, Brazil, and India. According to The Wall Street Journal, the average tariff rates of most developed countries are similar to the current U.S. rates. For example, the European Union imposes a 10% tariff on U.S.-made cars, while the U.S. imposes a 2.5% tariff on EU-made cars of the same category. (The U.S. imposes a higher 25% tariff on light trucks.) Although the U.S. levies higher tariffs on certain automobiles, Germany and France’s overall tariff levels, based on trade-weighted calculations, are lower than those of the U.S. Data from the World Bank shows that the average tariff rate for Germany and France—the two largest economies in Europe—is 1.95%, compared to 2.72% for the U.S.

Therefore, the U.S.'s implementation of a reciprocal tariff system primarily aims to block countries that facilitate China’s transshipment trade. Currently, China’s industrial supply chain has shifted to countries like Vietnam, India, and others in Southeast and South Asia. The reciprocal tariff system is intended to close off these transshipment routes used by the CCP. As for China itself, whether the reciprocal tariff system will fully apply is uncertain. However, Trump’s ultimate goal is not just achieving tariff reciprocity with China. Tariffs are likely just a lever for Trump to use in reshaping geopolitical dynamics and redrawing the global trade map. His broader objective is to reset the global political and economic order, fully encircle the CCP, and counter its influence. Trump’s strategy toward China will not be limited to tariff reciprocity; rather, he will use tariffs as a tool to gain an absolute comparative advantage and decisively curtail the CCP’s power.

After Trump’s election, many seemingly sudden and unconventional issues—both domestic and international—have, upon deeper examination, been part of a broader strategy centered around confronting the CCP. These include topics such as fentanyl, illegal immigration, Greenland, control of the Panama Canal, the imposition of a 10% tariff, and taking over Gaza (which ties into Middle East peace, control of the Suez Canal, and the U.S.'s global maritime strategy). Other actions include tracing the origins of COVID-19, the “Stargate Strategy,” the new golden era of U.S.-Japan relations, and the upcoming U.S.-India summit. In the three weeks since Trump took office, he has launched comprehensive encirclement, infiltration countermeasures, and strong counterattacks against the CCP on multiple fronts—ranging from tariffs, critical minerals, AI technology wars, geopolitics, and Indo-Pacific security.

In contrast, Xi Jinping and the CCP appear to have been thrown into disarray by Trump’s relentless attacks, nearly to the point of losing their footing. Before Trump took office, Xi and the CCP made numerous moves to preemptively deal with the uncertainty surrounding Trump’s policies and tariff threats. They sought to curry favor with the U.S., had state media promote narratives about China-U.S. friendship, and actively worked to mend relations with Japan. At the same time, Xi rushed to speak with Putin in an attempt to pressure Trump. However, in hindsight, all of these diplomatic maneuvers ended up being futile. Trump’s tactics are entirely self-invented, outside of any conventional playbook, making them difficult to counter.

With Trump’s multi-pronged strikes, Xi has become increasingly indecisive. Trump’s casual remark of “I’m in no rush” has shifted the burden to Xi. Xi now finds himself in a difficult position, facing a dilemma: initiating talks would be a significant loss of face and could destabilize his authority, making him a target for ridicule as the one who personally tore apart the “East rising, West declining” narrative. He also fears falling into a rhetorical trap set by Trump, unsure of what the outcome may be. If Xi continues to avoid engagement, there’s concern about angering Trump, which could trigger even more erratic moves that might backfire. This highlights Xi’s inability to govern effectively and his political fragility. He is also deeply worried that if Trump raises tariffs further and causes an economic collapse, anti-Xi factions within the CCP could seize the opportunity to hold him accountable and attempt to oust him.

Cai Qi's propaganda department has gone completely silent, unable to figure out Trump’s playbook. Promoting narratives about China-U.S. friendship at this time is highly inappropriate. On the other hand, reverting to a “wolf warrior” stance could backfire and further escalate tensions, leading to an even more intense situation.

They had hoped to use Elon Musk as an inside player, but Musk, driven by his loyalty to DOGE and MAGA, even drafted a will. He didn’t care about his own life and ended up exposing how Shi Zhengli had been using U.S. taxpayer money as her salary. This wasn’t a strategic move—it was a landmine. They also hoped DEEPSEEK could pull off a surprise move to intimidate Americans, but instead, its facade was completely stripped away, attracting international condemnation and leaving it battered and bruised. With no better options, they resorted to playing the “AI Great Leap Forward” card, which only works to fool the easily swayed nationalist youth in China.

What big moves does Xi Jinping still have up his sleeve? He has already promised not to devalue the renminbi and cannot go back on his word now. At most, he could try taking small jabs at Google, Microsoft, or Tesla, but the balance is tricky—push too hard, and they might flee China altogether, effectively “bleeding out” the economy. Left with no better options, Xi may have to ask Li Qiang to convene a State Council meeting to talk up the concept of “domestic circulation” as a distraction.

(Originally published by People News)