The Fifth Anniversary of Wuhan Lockdown: The Governance Model of an Extreme Government

Photo Caption: A man wearing a mask receives a package through a temporary barricade wall in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China, on March 8, 2020. The barricade was built to control access to residential areas. After the coronavirus outbreak, flights, trains, and public transportation (including buses, subways, and ferry services) remained shut down. (Photo by Getty Images)

[People News] On January 23, 2020, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced the lockdown of Wuhan. This marked the beginning of the global COVID-19 pandemic and became a blueprint for the CCP’s pandemic response model. Five years later, how should we view the actions taken back then? Beyond the traumatic memories left with the public, what did the CCP gain from this lockdown campaign?

According to a report by Radio Free Asia, Wuhan announced the lockdown on January 23, five years ago. This set a significant precedent in China’s history.

“During a major infectious disease outbreak, when the source and outcomes are unknown, choosing to control population movement cannot be said to be entirely wrong,” former Peking University professor and U.S.-based independent scholar Xia Yeliang told Radio Free Asia. “But what truly needs reflection is what was done after the lockdown.”

In the view of independent political economist Qin Peng, the Wuhan lockdown provided the CCP with a comprehensive large-scale test on how to manage the government under extreme circumstances. From this perspective, Qin Peng believes, “The CCP used this opportunity to gradually explore a set of methods to control the people. In a certain sense, it was indeed a significant victory for the CCP.”

Strict Control and Micro-Management Masking Governance Incompetence

According to Xia Yeliang, the Wuhan lockdown primarily highlighted the Chinese government’s incompetence and failure in social governance.

He noted that in 2018, the CCP approved the establishment of the Ministry of Emergency Management, whose primary responsibilities include disaster management and emergency response. "The Wuhan outbreak falls squarely under disaster management and emergency response—this is exactly what the ministry is supposed to handle. But how did it perform in reality? The provision of basic daily necessities, transportation, medical care, and the coordination of assistance from across the country—if these were overlooked initially due to the sudden outbreak, what about months later? If, even after months, these issues remain unresolved, it is a clear dereliction of duty by the government."

For instance, on January 29, 2020, the WeChat public account Rice and Millet reported the tragic case of a 17-year-old boy with cerebral palsy in Hubei who died after being left alone at home for six days. His family members were quarantined due to the outbreak.

Guo Siyu, a Wuhan native, recalled in an interview with Radio Free Asia, "Five years have passed, but the pandemic has never truly ended. The impact and trauma of the lockdown on us Wuhan natives have never faded."

She described the year of the lockdown as a time of "self-rescue" for Wuhan residents. In her view, "When Xi Jinping issued the lockdown order, it felt as if he had already abandoned Wuhan." At the time, Guo’s baby was just nine months old. She recalled facing daily challenges in securing food and battling inner fear: "I lived in constant anxiety, essentially ‘spending money to buy survival.’"

In addition, Guo’s job as a tutor helping students prepare portfolios for overseas studies was severely affected. "Starting from the lockdown and throughout the pandemic years, China’s relationship with foreign countries was severed, and I lost my source of income," she said.

This experience mirrors that of many ordinary Chinese citizens during the pandemic. However, Xia Yeliang pointed out that during the Wuhan lockdown, CCP leader Xi Jinping never visited Wuhan. "He claims to personally direct and deploy operations, but he never appears on-site. Every time there is a disaster or an emergency, he is never present at the scene."

Finally, Xia observed that even five years after the COVID-19 outbreak, the CCP has not conducted a thorough review or drawn serious lessons to prevent a recurrence. "I believe this is a government incapable of introspection, leading to a society that cannot reflect. A government that cannot reflect is incapable of effective governance."

Extreme Governance Model Proven and Replicated

Many aspects of the Wuhan lockdown were later replicated across other parts of China.

The most notable example is the infringement on freedom of speech. According to the documentary 76 Days of Wuhan Lockdown, during the 76 days of lockdown in Wuhan, 229 articles by independent media were deleted, and 638 "literary inquisition" cases were documented. Several citizen journalists who reported from Wuhan went missing, including Li Zehua, Chen Qiushi, Fang Bin, and Zhang Zhan. Beyond Wuhan, individuals who discussed or published commentary online also faced restrictions, such as Professor Xu Zhangrun.

Guo Siyu listed additional rights violations she experienced: "The right to freedom of movement—our home was sealed off, and we couldn’t leave freely; the right to information—we were not allowed access to the truth; children’s right to education; our right to life and health—even critically ill patients were not admitted to hospitals; the right to fair trade—cabbages were sold to me for 100 yuan each, and the government profited from national hardship."

However, this governance model was widely replicated after Wuhan.

Qin Peng analyzed this extreme governance model in an interview with Radio Free Asia, outlining three key aspects: Control of Speech: Arresting citizen journalists, censoring the internet, and using international experts and media to shape narratives. Official Narratives: Utilizing propaganda to condition people to accept the government’s version of events. Diverting Blame: Shifting responsibility for apparent government failures onto neighbors, creating interpersonal conflicts, or blaming external entities like the U.S. or nature.

"Such strict control measures were possible during Mao Zedong’s era, but after decades of reform and opening up, people believed the public would no longer accept Mao-era practices," Xia Yeliang said. "Yet, unexpectedly, after the Wuhan lockdown, authorities found that such measures were still viable."

Damage to Central Authority and Xi Jinping’s Personal Standing

For Guo Siyu, the Wuhan lockdown fundamentally changed her perspective on many issues.

She said, “After the Wuhan lockdown, many things I used to value became insignificant. Material possessions and reputation are fleeting—health comes first. Parents and children are the top priority. Even spiritual needs dropped several levels; all I wanted was to survive and stay safe.”

Qin Peng, however, believes that while the CCP gained significant experience in pandemic governance after the Wuhan lockdown, the overall outcomes of China’s pandemic response and its long-term economic impact have inevitably harmed the CCP.

He stated, “Many people used to have an almost blind faith in the Chinese Communist Party’s governance capabilities. But the shift from extreme control measures to a sudden, unprepared reopening exposed the rigidity—or lack of flexibility—of CCP policies. Furthermore, after reopening, China didn’t experience the economic recovery many had predicted. First, they didn’t defeat the virus; second, they failed to revive the economy. This has had far-reaching consequences for China’s political and economic future, as well as significant damage to the central government and Xi Jinping’s personal authority. That’s also why the CCP now dares not even mention a ‘victory in the fight against the pandemic.’”