Rumors of Xi Losing Power Flood the Internet: If He Steps Down, Will There Be Retaliation?

Photo Caption: Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang (second from left) at the closing ceremony of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Former President Hu Jintao was forcibly escorted out early. The congress concluded at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, where Xi was expected to secure his third term. (Photo by Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)

[People News] In recent months, the internet has been abuzz with analyses suggesting that Xi Jinping may be losing power. Observers and commentators, citing Xi's health issues and various unusual incidents and activities within the CCP's top leadership, speculate that Xi's lifelong "emperor dream" may be crumbling. Recently, Wang Huning's increasingly prominent appearances, including receiving a Vietnamese Communist Party delegation with a demeanor resembling that of a general secretary, have led some observers to believe that Wang may be eyeing the role of interim General Secretary.

Another theory suggests that during Singapore Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s late-November visit to Beijing, he reportedly expressed a desire to "establish new ties with China's (CCP's) next generation of leaders." Media coverage showed Lee shaking hands with Chen Jining, leading some commentators to speculate that Chen might officially succeed Xi as General Secretary at the 21st National Congress.

This raises the question: could Xi step down after the 21st National Congress? If he does, would he face a vengeful backlash from anti-Xi factions, risking retaliation or acts of revenge?

Based on public information from the CCP, I have compiled an incomplete tally: since Xi Jinping came to power at the 18th National Congress, and continuing to the present, the anti-corruption campaigns targeting “tigers” and “flies” as well as crackdowns on crime and corruption have resulted in approximately 350 Party officials at the deputy ministerial level or above being investigated and prosecuted, along with around 100 military officers ranked major general or higher. This includes 9 individuals at the vice-national level and 35 at the ministerial level. Those implicated span across Jiang faction members, the second-generation red elite, princelings, the Communist Youth League faction, and even Xi’s own inner circle, with the Jiang faction having the largest number of individuals involved, holding the highest positions, including one at the national level and five at the vice-national level. Below the ministerial level, the numbers are even greater. Of course, given limited information, the actual numbers are likely higher.

There is no doubt that many of these individuals, along with their families, close associates, and subordinates, harbor significant resentment or even outright hatred toward Xi. This is especially true for the Jiang faction.

The Jiang faction has cultivated its influence for over 20 years, deeply embedding itself within the CCP system. It retains significant influence among those still in high-ranking positions or those controlling key sectors such as trade, culture, and technology, as well as among retired officials with notable standing, such as Zeng Qinghong, Luo Gan, Jia Qinglin, and Zhang Gaoli. If Xi were to lose power and the conditions were favorable, it is highly likely that they would express their discontent or take action. They still have many former subordinates, associates, and allies operating in political, economic, and other fields.

Beyond those directly ousted or ruined, and those stripped of wealth, reputation, or even their lives, there are numerous individuals who have been indirectly harmed, leading to suppressed dissatisfaction or grievances. For instance, after Li Keqiang’s death, his friends, family, and former subordinates likely have doubts about the circumstances surrounding it and may demand accountability. Similarly, Hu Jintao being forcibly removed from the congress and the suppression of the Youth League faction would naturally fuel resentment among those connected to them. Wang Qishan’s allies and associates, who faced purges, are also unlikely to be satisfied. Military officers promoted by Miao Hua, who was recently investigated, would also harbor grievances.

These individuals form a latent group waiting for the opportunity to settle scores. And this group is not small.

Over the past decade, Xi Jinping has personally directed and overseen various initiatives, but repeated failures have emerged across political, economic, urban planning, foreign policy, and personnel management fields. National poverty alleviation claims have been proven false, the so-called victory over COVID is a sham, Xiongan New Area is a failed project, the strategy of aligning with Russia against the U.S. is floundering, extravagant spending in Southern countries has yielded little result, and his crackdown on private education was reversed. Many of the trusted individuals he promoted have faced scandals. The more corruption is fought, the more dissent grows within the military. Xi’s centralization of power, authoritarianism, suppression of free speech, and the personality cult surrounding him have drawn widespread criticism both within the Party and among the public.

Now, Xi has offended reformists, princelings, and many other factions. In the bureaucratic system, officials protest by "lying flat" and doing the bare minimum; in society, discontent is expressed through passive resistance. Incidents of mass protests and sporadic acts of defiance have become increasingly frequent. In short, Xi has lost the trust of the people, the bureaucracy, and even the military. If he were to lose power, and the opportunity arises, one can only imagine the precarious situation he would face.

Xi must undoubtedly understand why he cannot afford to lose power. Preserving his authority has likely become the sole focus of his remaining years, even if it means resorting to extreme measures, such as annihilating all "enemies" with nuclear force. To Xi, stepping down or relinquishing power is simply not an option. However, Xi's critical misjudgment lies in his approach to maintaining power: his strategy centers on preserving the Party. This is where his fatal danger lies. His crises and threats to his power all stem from the Party itself and the officials and personnel operating within its system. It is the inherently corrupt nature of the Party that ensures all of Xi's decisions and actions are doomed to fail. The Party’s structure guarantees that no one around him will remain genuinely loyal. Of course, many individuals may not want to see Xi lose power, but this is due to vested interests: their wealth, privilege, corrupt gains, and futures are tied to the positions and status derived from Xi's authority. However, it is certain that once conditions are ripe, these individuals—united by mutual self-interest—will betray him for the same reason. Thus, as long as Xi’s strategy revolves around preserving the Party, he faces inherent and inescapable risks, regardless of his actions.

How history will unfold remains a grand drama for us to witness. Let us wait and see.