The CCP's Discipline Inspection Commissions Turn to Flexible Employment as "Doomsday Positions" Rise

Photo: A job fair in China (Getty Images)

[People News] Recently, numerous local CCP Discipline Inspection Commissions (DIC) and Supervisory Committees have issued recruitment notices seeking temporary workers for flexible employment, specifically to guard detained individuals under investigation—euphemistically referred to as "caretakers." Amidst China's economic downturn, social unrest, and rising unemployment, positions in areas like security guards for bridges and buildings, prison officers, and the funeral industry—dubbed "stability maintenance" or "doomsday positions"—are quietly emerging.

According to Radio Free Asia, a caretaker recruitment notice in the Wudang district of Guiyang garnered attention on November 27. The requirements include short-term contracts, a basic medical check, and benefits such as meals and accommodations. Caretakers are expected to work only four hours daily, primarily tasked with guarding detainees within DIC compounds, with an emphasis on discipline and confidentiality. The report also noted that as early as November 21, the DIC in Yichuan County, Henan Province, recruited 20 members for a detention guard team. This process was more formalized, involving written tests, medical examinations, and political background checks. The positions were divided into general caretakers and roles for retired military personnel.

Corruption among officials remains rampant and shows no signs of abating. The sharp increase in internal disciplinary and legal cases has fueled the creation of so-called "flexible employment positions" as caretakers for CCP Discipline Inspection Commissions (DIC) and Supervisory Committees. A simple web search reveals numerous recruitment notices for temporary DIC personnel. For instance, on February 20, 2024, the DIC in Dan County, Zhoukou City, Henan Province, announced the recruitment of 130 caretakers in a single round. However, the requirements were quite stringent—this was no job for just any burly farmworker. Applicants had to be recent college graduates, retired military personnel with college degrees, or individuals with experience in law enforcement. They also had to be between 18 and 35 years old, meet height requirements (men over 1.7 meters, women over 1.6 meters), and pass political background checks and credit evaluations. This doesn’t seem like hiring caretakers for detainees but rather personal guards and bodyguards for these officials—young, highly skilled individuals adept at both physical and intellectual tasks.

Not only is the DIC recruiting temporary personnel, but it is also expanding its permanent workforce. Public data shows that in 2025, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission plan to recruit 25 staff members from society. Applicants must be recent graduates, CCP members, firmly committed to the "Four Consciousnesses," "Four Confidences," and "Two Upholds," and ideologically aligned with Xi Jinping’s leadership. They must also aspire to dedicate themselves to disciplinary and supervisory work. Clearly, this is not about hiring public servants for the nation but about recruiting enforcers for Xi Jinping and foot soldiers for Li Xi. Similar permanent positions were also available in 2023 and 2024.

Amid economic decline, business closures, and massive layoffs, the expansion of personnel in the DIC highlights two trends in the CCP’s political ecology:

First, Corruption Continues to Thrive. Public data reveals that disciplinary departments opened 405,000 cases in the first half of this year, involving 41 provincial-level cadres and resulting in 332,000 disciplinary actions, including those against 25 provincial- and ministerial-level officials. From January to September 2024, national disciplinary and supervisory agencies received 2.703 million petitions, opened 642,000 cases, and punished 589,000 individuals, including 53 provincial- and ministerial-level officials. According to the China Discipline Inspection and Supervision News, on November 28, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission reported 22,603 violations of the "Eight-point Regulation" in October 2024 alone.

Within the CCP system, officials are seen as "servants of the people" when left unchecked but turn into "enemies of the people" once investigated. Why such stark contrasts? One reason is systemic corruption—fixating on minor infractions without addressing the root issues. Another is the extremely low cost of corruption, which has become a highly profitable venture. Officials can embezzle hundreds of millions or even billions, and when exposed, face only 5-10 years in prison.

Many embezzled assets even manage to flow safely overseas. Mainland economist Lu Qiyuan once noted that approximately $30 billion (around 210 billion yuan) leaves China annually, equivalent to the country’s annual fiscal revenue. In 2023, the topic of "Over the past three years, China’s goods trade surplus totaled nearly $2 trillion, but foreign exchange reserves remained virtually unchanged. Where did the over $2 trillion in reserves go?" sparked widespread online debate. How much of this is linked to corrupt officials fleeing abroad? While this remains unclear, in September this year, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the "Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act of 2023," which stipulates that if the CCP invades Taiwan, the U.S. Treasury Department will disclose the assets of CCP Politburo Standing Committee members, Politburo members, and Central Committee members in the U.S.

Secondly, The growing number of cases investigated by the Discipline Inspection Commission (DIC) does not indicate stronger anti-corruption efforts but rather heightened factional struggles within the CCP. Anti-corruption efforts that do not address systemic issues or Party problems are merely selective purges. When the Party says it must strictly govern itself, it really means targeting others within the Party. The current wave of internal purges, particularly among the military’s top brass, is exceptionally intense. The investigation into Central Military Commission (CMC) member Miao Hua caused a major stir. Of the original seven CMC members, Li Shangfu and Miao Hua have been removed, leaving only five members. On November 4, after a month-long disappearance, the remaining CMC members reappeared during an inspection of the Information Support Forces. Xi Jinping appeared visibly dejected, while Zhang Youxia seemed furious and imposing. There are rumors of discord between Zhang Youxia and Xi, with speculation that Xi’s military authority has been weakened and that the CMC has become a dysfunctional and fragmented entity. The rise in corruption cases reflects the growth curve of CCP power struggles, which are increasingly expanding and shifting downward. Local CCP branches are mimicking the central leadership, using anti-corruption as a fundamental tool for internal power struggles. The recent case of Mao Qi, a county secretary in Jiangxi, is a typical example.

Political corruption, economic decline, and social unrest have led to chaos and instability. "Xianzhong" (fanatic violence against authority) phenomena are erupting across various regions. Mass unemployment, widespread defaults on mortgage payments, and an increase in suicides—such as people jumping from bridges or buildings—have become haunting symbols of the CCP’s oppressive regime. These tragic scenes, coupled with a variety of emerging "doomsday professions," paint a grim picture of CCP's end times. For example, local governments are spending taxpayer money to hire temporary workers like bridge and building guards.

The CCP continues to expand its stability maintenance forces. In April 2012, then-Minister of Justice Wu Aiying reported to the 11th National People’s Congress that China had 681 prisons detaining 1.64 million inmates, with an average of 2,408 inmates per prison, and 300,000 prison police. These numbers are over a decade old. On November 14, videos circulated on the Chinese social media platform Douyin (TikTok), revealing that the prison system had urgently hired 80,000 new employees in November alone. Starting salaries for college graduates are reportedly 12,000 yuan per month, with no restrictions on majors or the need for connections.

To maintain the regime and the Party's grip on power, the CCP has been expanding prisons and detention centers nationwide. In October this year, multiple lawyers reported on social media that new detention facilities are being built to accommodate the rising number of detainees. According to an August 6 announcement by the Supreme People's Procuratorate, 367,000 arrests and 761,000 prosecutions were approved in the first half of the year, increases of 18.5% and 6.8%, respectively, over the same period last year. Experts suggest that the CCP has expanded the definition of national security and escalated stability maintenance measures, entering an era of "light offenses being criminalized and minor crimes being heavily penalized."

With intensifying factional struggles at the top, elite officials fleeing abroad, widespread mutual harm among the populace, and a growing reliance on stability maintenance systems such as the DIC, public security, judiciary, and prisons, the CCP regime appears to be approaching a critical point of collapse and disintegration. Meanwhile, young people face limited prospects, turning to religious practices such as burning incense and praying for solace. This trend has led to a rise in demand for temple staff. Additionally, the pandemic has caused a significant increase in deaths, making the funeral industry unexpectedly lucrative. This dystopian landscape, characterized by the proliferation of "doomsday professions," reflects the CCP's nearing downfall. The collapse of the regime seems increasingly imminent.

(Originally published by People News)