Xi-Zhang Power Struggle Heats Up: Three Major Blows to Xi’s Authority

Illustration: Is Zhang Youxia the "bowman" predicted in the Tui Bei Tu prophecy to launch a coup? (Illustration by People’s Report)

[People News] Yesterday, the British Financial Times reported, citing informed current and former U.S. officials, that China’s Minister of Defense, Dong Jun, is under investigation for corruption. As a reputable media outlet, the report from Financial Times was quickly picked up by major platforms such as Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and Deutsche Welle, seemingly lending credibility to the rumors. However, at a routine press conference held that afternoon, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning dismissed the claims as "groundless rumors" when asked about them by foreign reporters. Interestingly, upon further inquiry into the Chinese government's stance today at noon, this statement from Mao Ning appeared to have been removed. Additionally, reports on Dong Jun's activities remain on the Chinese Ministry of Defense’s official website, and there has been no indication of their withdrawal.

Analyzing the Credibility of the Rumors

Are the rumors true? In early November, former Chinese Navy lieutenant commander Yao Cheng and independent commentator Cai Shenkun both revealed on social media that Miao Hua, Director of the CMC Political Work Department and a naval admiral, had been taken in for investigation. Cai Shenkun further predicted that a large group of senior military officials promoted by Miao Hua—including Dong Jun, the newly appointed Minister of Defense as of last year—would also be implicated, suggesting another round of purges in the military.

Miao Hua held authority over the promotion of all military officers, and any official aspiring to the top ranks of the Chinese military needed his approval before their file reached Xi Jinping's desk. Dong Jun, it seems, was one of Miao Hua’s recommendations to Xi. While both Miao and Dong were considered Xi’s confidants, Dong Jun apparently never earned Xi’s full trust. This might explain why, since becoming Defense Minister, Dong has not been appointed as a State Councilor or a member of the CMC—an unusual deviation from the historical norm of Defense Ministers holding vice-national-level status in the Chinese military hierarchy.

Analysts have noted that, given Miao Hua’s pivotal position, he had unparalleled access to resources for bribery, as officers from all branches seeking promotion would likely offer him bribes. This raises the possibility that Dong Jun may have been among those who bribed him. Similarly, it’s also plausible that Dong engaged in corrupt practices himself, as officials who resort to bribery often feel compelled to recoup their expenditures through similar means.

However, Xi Jinping likely understands that corruption is pervasive among Chinese officials, from top to bottom. Given that both Miao Hua and Dong Jun are Xi’s close allies, it is unlikely Xi would willingly “cut off his own hands.” Therefore, if Miao and Dong are in trouble, corruption and bribery might merely be pretexts—the real issue is political, likely stemming from actions taken by anti-Xi factions. This situation might well represent a targeted purge of Xi’s loyalists by Zhang Youxia’s faction. 

"The Bowman" Leading a Counter-Purge?

A logical deduction is as follows: Before the Third Plenum this year, Xi Jinping purged many of Zhang Youxia's loyalists, including former Defense Minister Li Shangfu and several senior Rocket Force commanders. Naturally, this would have left Zhang's faction dissatisfied. During the Third Plenum, Xi, weakened by health issues, saw his power reduced. Moreover, various domestic and international crises stemming from his missteps required Xi to "personally take responsibility." Consequently, Xi's authority was divided among senior officials, and a collective leadership system emerged in Zhongnanhai. With Zhang, the "bowman," gaining influence in the Central Military Commission (CMC), his faction may have pressured Miao Hua to reveal details of corruption. Under coercion, Miao reportedly implicated Dong Jun. Taking advantage of Xi's trip to South America, Zhang’s faction allegedly detained Dong on the day he returned from Laos.

Reports in the past two days have also suggested that Miao Hua’s associates—General Lin Xiangyang (Eastern Theater Commander), General Liu Zhenli (Chief of the Joint Staff Department), and General Wang Chunning (Commander of the People’s Armed Police)—have also been taken in for investigation. All of them are regarded as Xi’s confidants. If true, this could indicate a larger corruption network involving Miao Hua’s faction.

When asked about the rumors of Dong Jun’s investigation, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning neither confirmed nor denied the reports. Instead, she acknowledged that there were "shadows" and "winds" that had been "caught." Unlike the usual fiery denunciations of "fabrication," "reserving the right to pursue accountability," or "interference in internal affairs," her ambiguous response has fueled speculation, reminding many of typical diplomatic phrases like "Believe it or not, I do," or "I have no information to provide."

Jokes have also surfaced. For instance, before Li Shangfu’s removal, he refused to meet with the U.S. Defense Secretary. Similarly, rumors suggest that Qin Gang's dismissal was tied to a visit by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko, who reportedly delivered confidential information to Xi Jinping. On November 21, at the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Expanded Meeting in Laos, Dong Jun also declined a meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Notably, on October 30, Rudenko made another unexpected trip to Beijing, shortly after Xi’s return from the BRICS summit in Kazan. Some jokingly remarked at the time, "Dong Jun’s days are numbered."

Prior to this, several of Xi’s key allies in the military had already been purged. These included General Qin Shutong (former Army Political Commissar), Qin Shengxiang (head of the Military Reform Office), Yuan Huazhi (Navy Political Commissar), Lieutenant General Li Huohui (Deputy Army Commander), and General Zhang Mingcai. Additionally, Xi's close aide Zhong Shaojun, Director of the CMC General Office, was demoted to Political Commissar of the National Defense University. Similarly, Chen Guoqiang, Vice Chairman of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, was reassigned as Political Commissar of the National University of Defense Technology.

These developments suggest that after the 20th Party Congress’s Third Plenum, Zhang Youxia has launched a counter-purge targeting Xi Jinping’s influence in the military. The power struggle between Zhang and Xi has reached a boiling point.

CMC Turning into a "Precarious Tower"

Despite the rumors, Miao Hua's name still appears on the official list of Central Military Commission (CMC) members provided by the Chinese Ministry of Defense.

The structure of the CMC resembles a pyramid: one Chairman, Xi Jinping; two Vice Chairmen, Zhang Youxia and He Weidong; and three members, Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, and Zhang Shengmin. If Liu Zhenli and Miao Hua are indeed detained, the pyramid's base will collapse, leaving a diamond-shaped structure. In such a scenario, the CMC would become unstable, turning the pyramid into a precarious tower.

If Dong Jun, Liu Zhenli, and Miao Hua are indeed under investigation, it would deliver three major blows to Xi Jinping:  Severe Damage to Xi's Authority: Xi’s credibility would suffer another major setback, with critics likely accusing him of "poor judgment in selecting personnel," "failure in oversight," and even "dereliction of duty." Threats to Xi's Position and Security: The removal of key allies could weaken Xi’s power base and jeopardize his personal safety. Over the past decade, Xi has created numerous enemies among various factions, including the Jiang Zemin-Zeng Qinghong bloc, the princelings, and the Communist Youth League. Damage to the Military's Reputation and Capability: The perception of the PLA among both domestic and international audiences would further deteriorate. This could severely impact the morale and combat readiness of military personnel, reducing their effectiveness and cohesion.

However, it is highly likely that the CCP will attempt to suppress or obscure these developments. For example, it might choose not to announce the detentions publicly or resolve the cases with “soft landings” or extrajudicial settlements. Such measures would aim to mitigate external criticism and preserve the illusion of the CCP’s "greatness, glory, and correctness," while avoiding further revelations that might undermine the regime’s legitimacy.

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